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ABSTRACT
Depression and anxiety are encountered on a frequent basis and their effect on 
cognitive processes can have significant implications for psychotherapy and 
neuropsychological evaluations.
Empirical studies o f their specific effects on neuropsychological test performance 
are a relatively recent trend and results have been mixed due to various methodological 
problems (Sweet, Newman, & Bell, 1992) and their significance with respect to cognition 
has been questioned (Reitan & Wolfson, 1997).
The present study explored the effect o f  differing levels o f  anxiety and depression 
(on MMPI Scales 2 and 7) on attention performance (neuropsychological tests o f 
attention) in 1209 cases gathered retrospectively. Referral sources included neurology, 
tumor clinic, epilepsy clinic, attorneys, and other allied professions.
Results supported several theoretical models of cognition that predict adverse 
effects o f depression on attention ability, however the amount of variance contributed to 
attention performance by depression was small (5%). Results also supported predictions 
o f Processing Efficiency Theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) and the Yerkes-Dodson Law 
that anxiety can improve performance on attention tests.
The present study represented a unique contribution to this area due to its large 
sample size, use o f  standardized measures, and diverse patient populations.
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The Contribution o f Depression and Anxiety to Poor Attention
Performance on Neuropsychological Assessment Measures
Depression and anxiety are ubiquitous in the patient populations with which 
neuropsychologists and clinical and counseling psychologists work (Sweet, Newman, & 
Bell, 1992). Recognition o f the impact o f  emotional distress on cognitive processes, such 
as attention, is important for the work in which psychologists engage, particularly for 
assessment and psychotherapy. Decreased attentional skills due to emotional distress can 
have implications for psychotherapy by limiting the patient’s ability to attend to, and 
follow, therapist questions and comments. Patient inefficiency in encoding important 
information relevant to therapeutic change may also hinder compliance and recall of 
assigned homework and treatment strategies. Within the field o f neuropsychology, it is 
especially important to understand the impact o f emotional distress on attentional 
processes. The ability to distinguish between disordered attention secondary to emotional 
distress and disordered attention due to organic etiology is of crucial importance. 
Understanding the extent to which emotional distress contributes to disordered attention 
can be critical to proper interpretation o f  neuropsychological assessment results, 
specifically deficits in attention and recall.
Interest in the effects o f emotional distress and psychiatric disturbance on 
neuropsychological test performance is a relatively recent trend. Sweet et al. (1992) 
reported that, o f  94 studies published on the effects o f emotional distress on 
neuropsychological performance between 1960 and 1975, only 5 examined affective
Depression and AnxieQ^ 2 
disorders, and o f  the 14 published between 1975 and 1978, only 2 were concerned with
depressive disorders. However, between 1978 and 1992 over 40 were published, with the
majority o f those having been published from 1986 to 1992. One reason for the lack o f
earlier empirical study in this area was a variety o f methodological problems observed by
Miller (1975). He noted a paucity o f standardized measures across the studies at that time
that limited efrbrts to compare findings. He also pointed out the inadequate diagnostic
specificity and the use of differing diagnostic criteria prevalent during that time period.
Since then, there has been an increased use o f standardized neuropsychological tests and
batteries and more rigorous diagnostic criteria through the development o f the DSM-HI-R
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987) and subsequent DSM-IV (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994; Sweet et al., 1992).
While increased focus on the effects of psychiatric disturbance on 
neuropsychological test performance is noteworthy, the empirical investigations o f those 
effects have not been without potential confounds. According to Sweet et al. (1992), 
potential confounding, or moderating, variables in the investigations of neuropsychological 
performance primarily involve motivation, malingering, and medical factors (Sweet et al., 
1992).
Richards and Ruff (1989) tested the hypothesis that reduced motivation accounts 
for cognitive deficits in depressed patients by randomly assigning two groups o f subjects, 
depressed and nondepressed, to either a motivation or non-motivation condition. 
Motivation manipulation involved encouragement, a monetary incentive, and performance 
feedback. Results showed that motivation was indeed lower for depressed subjects, 
however it did not significantly affect neuropsychological performance. The authors
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concluded that, although depressed patients may be less motivated, reduced motivation
may not fully account for observed cognitive deficits in depressed patients.
Another potential confounding variable in empirically evaluating the impact o f 
emotional disturbance on neuropsychological performance is malingering, or the 
“deliberate and conscious feigning o f  symptoms or the gross exaggeration o f  symptoms 
for the purpose o f attaining monetary or other external rewards” (Sweet et al., 1992). 
Thought to be relatively rare, malingering can pose significant diagnostic and assessment 
difficulties by artificially generating increased mood symptom endorsement and inaccurate 
and false cognitive profiles. As such, they may artificially skew investigative findings.
Confounding medical factors mentioned by Sweet et al. (1992) include the 
pharmacological treatment o f depression, anxiety, and other psychological conditions. 
Medications used in the treatment o f these conditions have been shown in some studies to 
impair neuropsychological functioning, however results have generally been mixed. For 
example, some studies found improved cognitive performance following (primarily) 
pharmacological treatment o f depression (Brumback & Staton, 1980; Fromm & 
Schopflocher, 1984). Others either observed no changes (Curran, Shine, & Lader, 1986; 
Telford & Worrall, 1978) or observed only perceptual motor slowing (Squire, Judd, 
Janowsky, & Huey, 1980). Commonly prescribed medications that were found to exert an 
adverse neuropsychological effect, at least in certain individuals, included anxiolytics, 
antidepressants, antipsychotics, anticonvulsants, and even antihypertensives (Dodrill,
1988; Hartman, 1988; Solomon et al., 1983; Trimble, 1987). Particularly troublesome 
was lithium’s adverse affect on memory which, according to Jamison and Asiskal (1983), 
accounted for the most frequently reported side-effect leading to lithium noncompliance.
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Shaw, Stokes, Mann, & Manevitz (1987) reported that over 80% o f  their subjects
receiving lithium complained o f  neuropsychological side-effects. While some medications
may cloud neuropsychological interpretation, many psychiatric and brain-injured patients
usually perform better on neuropsychological measures due to a decrease in depression’s
negative influence on cognitive functioning (Glenn & Joseph, 1987).
Does Emotional Distress Have a Detrimental Effect on Cognition?
While the prevailing opinion in neuropsychology appears to be that emotional 
disturbances such as depression and anxiety do have an adverse affect on 
neuropsychological performance (Sweet et al., 1992), there are those who contend 
otherwise. In a lengthy review o f the interaction o f emotional disturbance with 
neuropsychological deficits, Reitan and Wolfson (1997) question this widely held 
assumption. They acknowledge, as most do, that intellectual and cognitive impairment 
represents a stressful situation that can cause emotional difficulties and problems o f 
adjustment. They also agree that brain-injured individuals, if not experiencing impaired 
self-awareness (Prigatano & Schacter, 1991), experience a significant reduction in ability 
from his or her previous level o f functioning which may cause anxiety, feelings of 
inadequacy in terms o f meeting normal responsibilities, and feelings o f  depression due to 
failure and inadequate performance (Reitan & Wolfson, 1997). However, they do not 
readily accept the prevalent belief that emotional distress has a significant effect on 
neuropsychological functioning, and they point to studies that disagree with that 
contention. For example, Alvarez (1962) compared Trail Making Test (TMT; Reitan, 
1979) performance in depressed versus brain-injured patients. He utilized 32 persons with
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unequivocal brain damage (variety o f conditions) and 32 patients with severe depression
(33% had attempted suicide). He believed that depressed participants might be limited in
their performances because o f psychomotor slowness and a diminution o f  the effort
needed to perform well. The TMT was selected because it requires “focused attention,
selective responses to appropriate stimuli, and a deliberate effort to complete the task as
quickly as possible” (Alvarez, 1962). Comparisons o f the two groups on the MMPI
(Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) indicated that the depressed
patients had statistically significant elevations over the brain-injured group on Depression,
Hysteria, Psychasthenia, Paranoia, Schizophrenia, and the F scale. Results on the TMT
showed performance by the brain-injured group to be significantly poorer than the
depressed group (p<.001) on Parts A and B. Moreover, performance o f the depressed
group was found to be “similar to that reported by Reitan for his non-brain-injured control
groups” (Alvarez, 1962). The implication here by Reitan and Wolfson was that since
depressed individuals performed better than brain injured individuals (i.e., similar to
controls) they were not impaired by depression as measured by the TMT.
In another study cited by Reitan and Wolfson, Vingerhoets, DeSoete, and Jannes
(1995) investigated the relationships between measures o f emotional status and cognitive 
test performances in patients who were awaiting open-heart surgery and in the same 
patients following surgery. The researchers described an impending open-heart surgery 
as “one of the most frightening medical procedures”, and they felt it provided a “natural 
stress paradigm” to evaluate the “impact o f  emotional state on neuropsychological test 
performance” (Vingerhoets, DeSoete, & Jannes, 1995). Measures o f stress included 
anxiety, using the A-State scale o f the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger,
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Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970), and depression, using the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 
1987). Measures o f neuropsychological performance included 11 tests "selected to cover 
an extensive range o f cognitive functions.” Both sets o f tests were administered to 130 
patients before surgery and 109 o f  the same patients 7-8 days after surgery. Not 
surprisingly, the results showed significant elevations for anxiety and depression before 
surgery. Following the surgery, anxiety and depression were lowered but only by a 
significant degree for anxiety. Correlational analyses were run between measures o f 
emotional status and neuropsychological performance and the results showed no 
significant relationship for either pre- or post-surgical testing. According to Reitan and 
Wolfson (1997), results such as these suggest that “neuropsychological abilities are quite 
robust, even under conditions o f rather striking personal stress and anxiety.” The 
implication being that even high levels o f stress and anxiety have limited-to-no impact on 
neuropsychological functioning.
What about clinical depression at levels requiring hospitalization? Kaufman, 
Grossman, and Kaufman (1994) used the Kaufman Short Neuropsychological Assessment 
Procedure (KSNAP) to compare cognitive performances o f  56 hospitalized inpatients with 
clinical depression to normal matched controls. They analyzed results according to tests 
grouped in terms o f the three functional units proposed by Luria; ( 1 ) attention-orientation 
representing a low level o f  cognitive complexity; (2) successive and simultaneous 
processes, representing an intermediate level of cognitive complexity; and (3) high-level 
planning ability, representing a high level of cognitive complexity. Results showed no 
significant differences at any task level, suggesting that clinical depression at levels
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requiring hospitalization had no adverse effect on those cognitive functions measured by
Kaufinan and his colleagues.
Perhaps one o f the more enduring assumptions in neuropsychology is the adverse 
effect o f depression on the cognitive functions o f  the elderly, the so-called 
"pseudodementia" syndrome. As Reitan and Wolfson (1997) observe, a review o f  the 
literature by Bieliauskas (1993), concluded that "depressive-like symptoms have little or 
no impact on cognitive functions." He further asserted that, "the case for emotional 
influence on cognitive abilities in the elderly (i.e., pseudodementia) is vastly overrated", 
and "if elderly patients do present with cognitive difficulties, (they) are more likely 
disease-based rather than the result of emotional factors such as depression." Bieliauskas 
and colleagues conducted studies o f their own in which nursing home patients and elderly 
medical outpatients were studied using various measures o f  cognition (Bieliauskas, 
Costello, & Terpenning, 1991; Bieliauskas & Lamberty, 1991; Bieliauskas, Lamberty, & 
Boczar, 1991). In all three studies, they found no significant effects o f depression on 
cognitive abilities for their elderly samples. Although no significant effects o f depression 
were observed in their samples, Bieliauskas allowed that there may have been an adverse 
influence on cognitive symptoms in patients with a psychiatric history o f primary 
depression coupled with sufficient loss o f self-esteem.
Reitan and Wolfson (1997) reviewed findings from studies o f MMPI profiles in 
brain-injured individuals as well as individuals with emotional disorders. The MMPI is 
considered the instrument "used most frequently to assess the emotional status o f  patients 
referred for neuropsychological examinations" (Mittenberg, Tremont, & Rayls, 1996). As 
Reitan and Wolfson note, it possesses several advantages in the evaluation o f personality
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and emotional characteristics; it is self-administered and relatively easy to score; has
empirically validated scales that have established meanings; is an objectively interpreted
instrument; provides clear, valid descriptions o f  psychological problems, symptoms, and
characteristics in a broadly acceptable clinical language; has clinical interpretation
strategies that are easily learned; and possesses scales that have high reliability. Reitan and
Wolfson reviewed studies o f  MMPE profiles in an effort to find support for the position
that “significant emotional disturbances impact adversely on both neuropsychologcal test
performances and on functional outcome” (Kay, 1993). In one study they reviewed, Gass
(1991) analyzed a group o f 105 patients referred for neuropsychological evaluation whose
neurological examination did not identify any evidence o f  brain damage. The referrals
were from a VA hospital consisting of psychiatric, neurologic, and rehabilitation services.
Findings revealed “relatively weak relationships between MMPI indices and Halstead-
Reitan Battery (HRB) scores.” As a result, Gass concluded that, “as a general rule, these
widely-used neuropsychological measures are largely resilient to the effects o f emotional
and personality factors in patients referred for neuropsychological testing.” He further
cautioned that a “conservative stance is recommended in attributing poor performance on
these tests to psychological factors, particularly as inferred from elevated MMPI scores.”
Gass argued that HRB tests seem to be generally robust in the presence o f
psychopathology, and he asserted that “traditional interpretive lore that surrounds the use
of various MMPI scores and patterns to make inferences with regard to cognitive
functioning may be inaccurate.”
In another study, Gass and Daniel (1990) evaluated the effect o f emotional factors
on Trail-Making Test -  Part B performances. They concluded that performance on the
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Trail Making Test was resistant to a variety o f emotional influences and, though
psychiatric symptoms and severe anxiety impairs performances, it is rarely to the extent
caused by brain damage.
In a study investigating the relationships between MMPI scores o f  59 psychiatric 
patients and measures o f attention, concentration, and memory derived from the Wechsler 
Memory Scale (WMS), Gass, Burda, Starkey, and Dominguez (1992) found uniformly 
low correlations between MMPI variables and memory performance. They concluded 
patients’ subjective complaints are unreliable indicators o f  actual ability. Taken 
together, it appears that Reitan and Wolfson (1997) have provided compelling evidence 
that emotional distress does not cause neuropsychological impairment equal to that seen in 
brain injured individuals. Nonetheless, their evidence also indicates that emotional distress 
can affect neuropsychological performance, at least at levels somewhere on a continuum 
between the performance o f normal controls and that o f brain-injured participants.
Supportive Evidence for an Adverse Effect o f Depression on Cognition
Veiel ( 1997) performed a meta-analysis o f “all studies published since 1975 and 
meeting stringent methodological and sample selection criteria” to assemble a profile o f 
neuropsychological deficits o f clinically depressed (major depression) but otherwise 
unimpaired individuals. Veiel’s findings supported a profile “consistent with a global- 
diffuse impairment o f  brain functions with particular involvement of the frontal lobes.” In 
fact, the severity o f cognitive deficiencies he profiled were observed to be similar to those 
seen “in moderately severe traumatic brain injury” (Veiel, 1997).
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Veiel’s (1997) meta-analysis narrowed a large pool of research down to 13 studies
using 6 stringent screening criteria, which he noted sacrificed research breadth for 
methodological stringency. The results o f  the analysis were grouped in the following nine 
categories: Attention/Concentration; Verbal Fluency; Scanning and Visuo-Motor 
Tracking; Verbal Leaming-Acquisition; Verbal Leaming-Retention/Retrieval; Nonverbal 
Leaming-Acquisition; Nonverbal Leaming-Retention/Retrieval; Visuo-Spatial Functions; 
and Mental Flexibility-Control.
Results for Attention/Concentration from the resulting 13 studies generally 
included only Digit Span Forward (only a few included Digit Span Backward o f  the 
Wechsler scales; Wechsler, 1981, 1987). Results showed only a 0.18 standard deviation 
between depressed and non-depressed controls. In the category o f Verbal Fluencv. tests 
included only the Controlled Oral Word Association Test (FAS test; Benton & Hamsher, 
1989) and results showed a 0.55 standard deviation. Scanning and Visuo-Motor Tracking 
included Trail Making Test Part A and the WAIS-R Digit Symbol subtest (Wechsler,
1981) and results revealed almost a full standard deviation between groups at 0.93. 
Visuo-Spatial Functions included the following tests: Rey Complex Figure Test (Rey, 
1964) and the Block Design and Object Assembly subtests o f the WAIS-R (Wechlser, 
1981). Results indicated a 0.81 standard deviation between groups in this category.
Verbal Leaming-Acquisition included immediate recall from many o f the standard memory 
tests and results indicated a 0.90 standard deviation. Verbal Leaming-Retention/Retrieval 
included delayed recall of at least several minutes, and findings showed a 0.91 standard 
deviation. Nonverbal Leaming-Acquisition and Nonverbal Leaming-Retention/Retrieval 
had standard deviations o f 0.93 and 0.83, respectively, and included visually presented
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material from recurring figures (Williams, lacono, Remick, & Greenwood, 1990) and
Rey’s Complex Figure (Rey, 1964). The final category revealed the most striking
distinction. Mental Flexibility and Control included measures commonly regarded as very
sensitive to most kinds o f  brain dysfunction, and especially to frontal lobe dysfunction
(Veiel, 1997); Trail Making Test Part B (time) and the Color-Word score of the Stroop
Test. Results for this category was 2 full standard deviations between groups. To
summarize, the cognitive functions observed to be most affected by depression (i.e., above
0.50 standard deviation) were, in order: Mental Flexibility and Control, Scanning and
Visuo-Motor Tracking, Nonverbal Leaming-Acquisition, Verbal Leaming-
Retention/Retrieval, Verbal Leaming-Acquisition, Nonverbal Leaming-
Retention/Retrieval, Visuo-Spatial Functions, and Verbal Fluency. As Veiel (1997)
observed, the obtained profile o f cognitive deficiencies appeared “at first glance” to match
that which would raise the question o f impaired frontal lobe functions.
Sweet, Newman and Bell (1992) observed a similar profile in their review. They 
noted a pattern o f “decreased cognitive efficiency or mild attentional or mild memory 
problems”, typically evidenced by the following patterns: slowed information processing 
(e.g., slowness on all Stroop Color-Word pages), impaired word recall with normal 
recognition, impaired incidental learning with normal intentional leaming, and impaired 
recall of easy word pairs (often with normal recall of difficult word pairs).
A number o f studies have demonstrated a negative effect o f depression on motor 
tasks. In a study by Raskin, Friedman, and DiMascio (1982; in Grant & Adams, 1986), 
277 depressed patients were matched on age, sex, and education with 112 normal controls 
in a multicenter research project. Findings showed that depressed subjects performed
Depression and Anxiety 12 
poorly on a number of motor performance tasks, including tapping, aiming, and circle
tracing. Impairments were also found on nonsense syllable learning, Stroop scores, and
the Clock Reversal Test. In another study, Cohen et al. (1982) examined motor
performance (i.e., grip strength) and cognitive function (i.e., various mental tasks such as
working with "trigrams ') in depressed patients by severity level (severely depressed,
moderately depressed, euthymie and normal mood). Results demonstrated deficits in
motor and cognitive performance o f depressed patients that appeared to be proportionate
to depression severity.
Taken together, findings tend to consistently show that “cortically mediated 
intellectual functions are spared” (Grant & Adams, 1986), such as repetition, reading, 
naming, mathematics, and motor praxis. However, deficits that are more prominent tend 
to be those dependent on arousal, attention, and concentration. Grant and Adams (1986) 
observed that depressed patients suffer deficits in attention on tasks requiring "effort.” 
Although some investigators conclude that depressed patients have “motivational 
disorders”. Grant and Adams argued there is more to it than "motivation.” For example, 
they ask how can one conclude that poor vigilance or grip strength can be simply due to 
lack o f "motivation”? Ultimately, they concluded that depressed patients are simply “less 
with it” than unimpaired controls, suggesting a deficit in information processing. In 
profiling memory deficits of depressed individuals, they argued that the depressive state o f 
the individual impedes the reception o f new information as well as its initial processing. 
This ineffective initial acquisition appears to be central to later failures in recall. However, 
once information is encoded it appears that depressed patients tend to retain it. Retrieval 
deficits are common as well, especially for spontaneous recall, due in part to the poor
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initial processing, however performance tends to improve on less stringent recall testing
(e.g., recognition memory; Grant & Adams, 1986).
In summary, depressive states tend to exert adverse ef&cts on cognition in the 
form of global and diffuse impairment o f brain functions with particular involvement o f  the 
frontal lobes, noted in at least one study to reach levels seen in moderately severe 
traumatic brain injury. Adverse effects that have been noted include impairment in 
mental flexibility; scanning and visuomotor tracking; and both verbal and nonverbal 
acquisition, retention, and retrieval. Deficits have also been noted on measures o f 
cognitive efficiency, attentional performance, information processing, and incidental 
leaming. Cognitive functions that are typically spared tend to be those cortically-mediated 
intellectual functions such as repetition, reading, naming, and mathematics.
Supportive Evidence for an Adverse Effect of Anxiety on Cognition
There is evidence to suggest that anxiety, as a form of emotional distress, 
exerts an adverse effect on cognition. Anxiety, as with many psychological states, exists 
on a continuum o f severity from simple worry and rumination to chronic and severe levels 
such as that observed in Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD; APA, 1994). The 
research presented below highlights studies that have focused on varying levels o f  anxiety 
and stress.
Pruzinsky and Borkovec (1990) recruited 56 college students comprising two 
groups, worriers and nonworriers. Subjects engaged in either brief relaxing imagery or 
stressful imagery. Before and after the imagery tasks, measures of focused attention and 
anagram measures were obtained. The results revealed that worriers reported more
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negative daydreaming, greater difficulty with attentional control and greater obsessional
symptoms. They also evidenced significantly more negatively affect-laden cognitive
intrusions during relaxed wakefulness and focused attention.
In another study utilizing college students, Gillis (1993) investigated the hypothesis 
that stress impairs judgment (among other hypotheses which were not supported). He had 
98 undergraduates complete a complex multiple-cue judgment task. Subjects were then 
assessed for (1) their exposure to two potential sources o f stress, life events and irrational 
thinking and (2) the amount o f personal dysphoria they were experiencing. Measures 
included the Life Experiences Survey, Dysfunctional Attitude Scale, State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory, and Beck Depression Inventory. Results indicated that subjective distress, 
depression and state anxiety were significantly related to poor judgmental performance. In 
addition, results suggested that potential external sources o f stress do not negatively affect 
judgment unless they generate subjective distress at the time those judgments are made.
High and low state anxiety was studied in a sample of community-dwelling elderly 
volunteers by Rankin, Gilner, Gfeller, and Katz (1994). Participants were administered 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children, Mini-Mental Status Examination, and 
subtests o f the Wechsler Memory Scale— Revised. Results indicated that anxiety (low and 
high) adversely affected sustained attention, but the findings were not significant for verbal 
and figurai memory tasks.
If cognitive processes are affected by anxiety states at the lower end o f the 
continuum, what about more intense pathological conditions o f anxiety? One would 
reasonably infer that there is an inverse relationship where anxiety severity increases as 
cognitive performance decreases. However, “cognitive performance” covers a  lot o f
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neuropsychological ground. It is possible that an inverse relationship exists but only for
certain cognitive domains as was observed in a number o f the studies on depressive effects
on cognition. For example, in attentional processes, information processing, and
encoding. Vasterling, Brailey, Constans, and Sutker (1998) investigated attention and
memory performances in Persian Gulf War veterans with and without PTSD diagnoses.
Veterans who were diagnosed with PTSD exhibited relative deficiencies in performance
on tasks o f sustained attention, mental manipulation (mental arithmetic), initial information
acquisition, and retroactive memory interference. They also committed more errors o f
commission and intrusion. Veterans’ tendencies toward response disinhibition and
intrusion on cognitive tasks was positively correlated with re-experiencing symptoms and
negatively correlated with avoidance-numbing symptoms. Vasterling and colleagues
observed that the veterans’ pattern o f cognitive deficits were consistent with models o f
PTSD that emphasize the role o f hyperarousal and involvement o f frontal-subcortical
systems. Moreover, their data suggested that intrusion o f traumatic memories in PTSD
might not be limited to  trauma-related cognitions but instead reflect a more generalized
pattern o f disinhibition.
Individuals suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD; APA, 1994) are 
also at risk for adverse cognitive effects due to anxiety. In one recent study by Clayton, 
Richards, and Edwards (1999) individuals diagnosed with OCD were studied along with a 
panic disordered and control group. Results showed significantly poorer performance on 
a series o f psychometric tasks o f selective attention. The researchers concluded that the 
data supported the hypothesis that OCD individuals have a diminished ability to selectively
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ignore competing external (sensory) and internal (cognitive) stimuli, especially intrusive
thoughts.
Further support was found by Schmidtke, Schorb, Winkeimann and Hohagen 
(1998). They investigated “frontal lobe performance” in 29 unmedicated OCD patients 
who were matched on age, gender, and intelligence with a double-size control group o f  
normals. Participants were administered 12 neuropsychological tests, most o f which are 
thought to be sensitive to different aspects o f frontal lobe functioning. Results indicated 
that OCD patients were imimpaired on tests o f abstraction, problem-solving, set-shifting, 
response inhibition, and reaction speed, however they evidenced deficits o f approximately 
one standard deviation on timed tests o f verbal and nonverbal fluency and attentional 
processing. Schmidtke and colleagues theorized that the obtained neuropsychological 
profile is related to “dysfUnctioning within the anterior cingulate, but not the dorsolateral 
prefrontal circuit.” Similar results were obtained by Veale, Sahakian, Owen, and Marks
(1996) who found impairment on an attentional shifting task in 40 matched OCD patients.
Finally in another study of anxiety and cognition, Channon, Flynn, and Robertson
(1992) compared 18 adults with Tourette syndrome with 22 controls. Participants were 
assessed on a number of clinical and experimental measures o f  attention and self-report 
measures o f mood, anxiety, and obsessionality. Results revealed that the Tourette group 
was more depressed, anxious, and obsessional, and they performed worse on complex 
measures o f attention, including serial addition, block sequence span (forward), trail- 
making, and a letter cancellation task.
In summary, anxiety states tend to exert adverse effects on cognition in the form o f 
impairment in attentional control, sustained and selective attention performance, poor
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judgment, attentional shifting, and initial information acquisition. Deficits have also been
noted in mental arithmetic and verbal and nonverbal fluency. Evidence o f overall
disinhibition is characteristic as well, in the form o f cognitive intrusions, retroactive
interference and errors o f commission and intrusions. Cognitive functions that were noted
to be spared (in OCD patients) were abstraction, problem-solving, set-shifting, response
inhibition, and reaction speed.
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Cognitive Processes in Depression 
To attempt to better understand obtained neuropsychological profiles, cognitive 
theorists have developed models o f cognitive processing. One o f  the more compelling 
approaches is that articulated by Ingram (1984), the information processing model (or 
information processing " approach"). In the information processing model, network theory 
is utilized to conceptualize a  process called "spreading activation." According to this 
theory, memory is composed o f  cognitive networks o f  associated concepts and descriptive 
propositions. Previous information and events that have been encoded into memory are 
represented by these propositions, and each memory unit is composed o f  a cluster o f 
components (concepts and propositions) making up the memory. These clusters are 
referred to as memory "nodes.” Network theory proposes that, in order for a memory or 
cognition to reach an individual's conscious awareness, its corresponding node must be 
activated above some minimum threshold. Once activation reaches a sufficient level, the 
person consciously experiences the memory.
Theoretically, there are at least two ways that a memory may be activated 
sufficiently to reach consciousness. One is through the presentation o f an environmental 
stimulus array that corresponds to an active memory node. Ingram presents the example 
o f an individual who has been wanting to buy a Porsche. Although the individual might 
not be consciously experiencing thoughts about the Porsche, if one o f  them happens to 
pass by on the street the person will be "reminded" o f the desire to own one. Network 
theory would argue that this happens because the energy from the Porsche stimulus 
pattern activates the corresponding "Porsche memory node" to a sufficient level to reach
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conscious awareness so the individual is reminded of, and begins to think about, the
Porsche.
A second way in which memory nodes may be activated is through the spread o f 
activation. Network theory assumes that memories are connected with each other through 
associative linkages. Theoretically, memories that are similar conceptually, or have 
somehow become associated for the individual, are linked through associative pathways. 
The strength o f these pathways is seen as a function o f  how strongly the memories are 
associated. Strongly associated memories will have strong and more closely associated 
linkages, whereas weakly associated memories will have weaker or perhaps no associative 
pathways. Presumably, when a memory is activated, activation is presumed to spread 
along its associative pathways causing other memory nodes to become more likely to be 
activated. Memory nodes which stand the highest chance o f being activated in this manner 
are those that are connected through the strongest associative pathways. It is theorized 
that this spreading activation of memories may be analogous to the person's stream of 
consciousness. To return to the Porsche example, not only is the person reminded of the 
desire to buy one, but a flood o f associated cognitions may become conscious as well, 
such as the inability to buy one on his present salary, the need for a raise or promotion, or 
a project under way that could lead to a promotion, and so on (Ingram, 1984).
With regard to affect, Ingram proposes that affect can be conceptualized in terms 
of affective structures called "primitive emotion nodes." Each specific emotion such as 
depression, anger, joy, or fear is theoretically represented by a particular node or unit in 
memory. Connected to each emotion node is a set of features associated with the 
emotion, such as its subjective experience, its unique autonomic response pattern, verbal
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labels used to describe the emotion, and cognitions containing descriptions of events that
evoke that emotion. When a particular node is activated, the emotion is experienced and
activation is channeled through its interconnections to evoke the emotion's other
manifestations. Additionally, each emotion node is thought to be associated with a
particular cognitive network consisting o f emotion-related memories and cognitions.
Although some connections to the emotion node are believed to be innate, such as the
connection to nodes that trigger autonomic responses, cognitive linkages are largely
learned and are generally established through "contiguity" during life events (Ingram,
1984). Ingram presented the example of attending the funeral o f a friend. A link is
established when the sadness felt at the funeral (depression emotion node activation)
becomes associated with a cognitive node representing descriptions of funerals. Thus,
through acculturation, learning, and innate programming, emotion nodes are viewed as
being linked with particular cognitive networks containing emotion-congruent content.
Components o f the information-processing framework that are particularly 
relevant to the present study of attention and general cognition are the "depth o f 
processing model" and "cognitive capacity." As network theory seeks to describe the 
structure of memory, depth o f processing seeks to describe the process by which 
information is encoded into memory. At its basic level, the depth o f processing model 
proposes that information is more likely to be fully perceived and encoded when it is 
processed "deeper," where depth refers to the degree and extent of cognitive analysis the 
information receives. In other words, the more cognitive analysis a piece of information 
receives, the more likely it is to be comprehended and understood. Ingram (1984) refers 
to this cognitive analysis as “cognitive elaboration.” That is, information that receives
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analysis is elaborated upon cognitively. When received, information is processed at
different cognitive depths. These different depths may be viewed as corresponding
roughly to different cognitive networks, with larger and more intricate networks being
seen as representing deeper and deeper cognitive depths.
The concept o f  cognitive capacity has sometimes been referred to as the same as 
attention or consciousness (Lachman, Lachman & Butterfield, 1979). According to the 
model, individuals have processing limits. They can only process a finite amount of 
information at any given time, or, stated another way, the amount o f  attention they can 
pay is limited. An individual's processing capacity is limited, and when this capacity is 
exceeded, no more information can be attended to or processed. Not all information 
utilizes the same proportion of capacity, however. For example, the information required 
to drive a car may engage very little cognitive capacity if the person has driven a car for a 
long time (i.e., an overleamed skill), on the other hand it may engage large portions of 
cognitive capacity if the skill is just being learned. To tie this concept back in with the 
depth o f processing model discussed above, in order for an individual to process 
information at a deeper level (i.e., increased cognitive elaboration) a relatively larger 
proportion of cognitive capacity must be utilized. That is, it will take nearly all o f their 
attention.
So, how is depression presumed to affect these cognitive processes? The 
information-processing model o f depression acknowledges that any psychological state is 
a complex process involving the interaction of a variety o f factors, however it views those 
factors as converging upon a basic mechanism called the "depression emotion node" 
(Bower, 1981 as cited in Ingram, 1984). It proposes that the phenomenological
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experience o f depression, along with the onset o f depressive symptoms, results from the
activation o f an individual's depression node (although other emotion nodes may be
activated concurrently). This activation o f the depression node is determined by the
appraisal o f life events, referring to the manner in which life events are linked to the
contents o f existing cognitive structures (e g., attitudes, beliefs). Appraisal is viewed as
the process that gives subjective meaning to external events and is generally thought to be
determined by an individual's ( I )  beliefs about the parameters o f a particular life event, and
(2) beliefs as to the effects o f the event. For example, suppose a woman has been left by
her husband for another woman. If she believes that she will never see him again (a
parameter o f the event) and that she will not be able to function without him (a perceived
effect o f the event), then it is likely that the event will be cognitively appraised in such a
way as to activate her depression node.
A variety o f factors are assumed to either shorten or lengthen the duration o f  
depressive episodes, however in the absence o f those factors it is believed that the 
underlying mechanism that determines depression duration is level o f activation. Once 
activated, a depression node is thought to experience a period o f decay until the activation 
level falls below a threshold, at which time the individual no longer experiences depressive 
affect. The higher the initial activation level, the longer it will take to decay to 
subthreshold levels. The initial activation level is, in turn, determined by the value that the 
individual places on the negative event (i.e., how it is appraised).
The activation o f  a depression node is presumed to be necessary and 
sufficient to cause depressive affect (Ingram, 1984), however the information processing 
model postulates a somewhat different set o f  cognitive processes and mechanisms which
Depression and Anxiety 23 
act to maintain the depressive affect. The depression node is viewed as a  central part of
certain cognitive networks with associated linkages to various other units in the network.
Due to the associative nature o f the networks, it is thought that other units will be the
representations o f  past events associated with depression. In addition, cognitions that
were related to past depressive feelings would also be linked to the network. These
particular memory units will in turn be linked to other units with which they have become
associated through past experiences, however the strongest associative links will be with
the memory units representing the present depressing situation.
The concept o f spreading activation maintains that, when the depression node is 
activated above the threshold, activation spreads through the depression-associated 
network, causing its various contents to become more likely to be brought to conscious 
awareness. This presumably may set up a “cognitive loop” process where thoughts, 
memories, and associations consistent with an individual’s mood become more accessible 
to the individual (Clark & Isen, 1982). Importantly, due to the depression node being 
relatively central to this particular network, it is thought that as activation cycles through 
the network, it is eventually fed back (though at a slightly lower level due to signal decay), 
causing the depression node to remain activated. For the person experiencing this, it is as 
if negative memories and cognitions keep coming back again and again to consciousness, 
thus maintaining the depressive feelings.
Important to the present study is the notion o f “available cognitive capacity.” As 
activation spreads it is viewed as occupying a proportional amount o f the person’s 
available cognitive capacity. With greater magnitudes o f activation, there are greater 
levels o f spreading activation and more associations in the network are activated above
Depression and Anxiety 24
consciousness. As those associations are activated above threshold and the person b ^ n s  
to actively think about them, a larger proportion o f  the limited capacity is engaged. 
Consequently, persons undergoing a depressive episode will have a high degree o f  
attention focused upon themselves and their cognitions as available capacity becomes 
increasingly occupied by spreading activation (Ingram, 1984).
Ingram illustrates this process with the following example. Suppose an individual 
has just lost an important job. It is assumed that this loss will activate the personas 
depression node, which in turn sends activation spreading throughout its associated 
network. In other words, in addition to the initial depression that the individual feels, he 
will think about losing the job and will be more likely to think about past depressive 
experiences (as depression-associated memory nodes are activated). As more and more 
associations become activated, related past cognitions that are related to depression may 
be experienced (e.g., guilt, self-degradation, low self-esteem). Thus, as the individual has 
depressive cognitions, the depression is maintained as activation is recycled back to the 
depression node.
When presented with a task or new information, not only is adequate available 
cognitive capacity necessary to attend to it but the incoming information is addressed 
according to its similaritv to the person’s current cognitive contents. The implication o f  
this is that, unless the new task or information is unusually strong (to exceed activation 
threshold), information that is not particularly relevant to current cognitive content will 
not be processed (or not fully processed) because it is not associated with the presently 
active network (i.e., it is not related to the depression-associated network and is more 
related to networks that are presently inactive).
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Evidence for this limited cognitive capacity or “limited resource” hypothesis has
found support from studies o f  memory and aging and mixed groups o f  bipolar and
unipolar depressives (see King, Caine, & Cox, 1993) and other studies o f  self-focused
attention (Ellis, 1991; Ingram, Lumry, Cruet, & Seiber, 1987; Lemelin, Baruch, Vincent,
Laplante, Everett, & Vincent, 1996).
Other related and empirically-supported hypotheses posited to explain depressives’
poor attentional (and memory) performance are: automatic versus effortful processing and
the reduced initiative hvpothesis. First articulated by Hasher and Zacks in 1979 (see King,
Caine, & Cox, 1993), effortful and automatic processing are distinguished by processes
that are either intentional and conceptually driven (effortful) or automatic and “data
driven” (automatic). These processes are usually apparent in explicit versus implicit
memory tasks, where explicit memory tasks are effortful and implicit memory tasks are
automatic. Explicit memory tasks are those in which recall and recognition are assessed
directly with the person being conscious o f the task and requiring conceptual processing
(e.g., recalling a word within the context of a list). In contrast, implicit memory tasks do
not necessarily involve the person’s awareness and are thought to be an unconscious
activation of an item (e.g., a word) in the person’s lexicon that subsequently makes the
item more accessible to consciousness.
Studies o f implicit versus explicit memory indicate that depressed individuals are
generally more impaired versus controls on explicit (i.e., effortful) memory tasks. For
example, in an extensive review o f such studies Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, and Dykman
(1993) concluded the following: (1) Depression interferes with effortful processing, and
the degree o f interference is determined by the degree o f effort fulness o f the task, the
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seventy o f depression, and the valence o f the stimulus material to be processed; and (2)
depression interferes only minimally with automatic processes.
The reduced initiative hvpothesis stipulates that depressives’ poor attentional 
performance is due to a  tendency to be self-focused and to fail to direct sufficient 
attentional resources to an external task. For example, Channon, Baker, and Robertson 
(1993) found that deficits in short-term memory o f  depressed patients was the result o f  
difficulties in attentional regulation, rather than a ‘‘simple defect in storage capacity.” In a 
dramatic demonstration o f  this process Hertel and Rude (1991) showed that, by 
experimentally eliciting increased “focused attention”, they were able to improve memory 
scores of depressed patients such that it matched the performance of formerly depressed 
(i.e., recovered) patients and non-psychiatric controls. Thus, these studies would suggest 
that attentional resources o f depressed patients, given the right conditions, might be 
shifted “outward” to focus on external tasks.
Another hypothesis investigating the effects o f depression on cognition is that o f  
selective attentional, or negative bias. It is hypothesized that depressives have enhanced 
memory (and possibly attention) for negatively toned material (King, Caine, & Cox,
1993). For example, on memory tasks depressed patients remembered anxiety-provoking 
information more vividly and “agreeable” information more poorly than did controls 
(Mialet, Pope, & Yurgelun-Todd, 1996). A study by Pace and Dixon (1993) supports this 
hypothesis. In a study examining the effects o f  6-8 sessions of Beck’s cognitive therapy 
on mildly and moderately depressed college students’ depressive symptoms and depressive 
self-schemata, results demonstrated not only that depressives show a clear preference in
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recall for negative self-referent judgments, but that brief cognitive therapy can significantly 
decrease that negative bias.
In 1989, Schwartz and Garamoni described an information-processing model o f 
positive and negative cognition, the States o f  Mind (SOM) model. Based on the “golden 
section proportion”, an extensively studied phenomena in personal construct psychology 
whereby individuals differentiate dichotomous judgments in a ratio of approximately 
61.8% to 38.2% (e g., in a balance o f positive (P) and negative (N) adjectives, 
P/(P+N)=-618), the States of Mind model proposes five distinct states o f mind that are 
conceptualized in terms o f cognitive balance and quantitatively defined by homeostatic set 
point ratios o f  positive cognitions to total positive plus negative cognitions.
The five states of mind consist of three SOMs (positive dialogue, internal dialogue 
o f conflict, and negative dialogue! that retain a dialectical interaction between positive and 
negative thoughts and two SOMs (positive monologue and negative monologue! that are 
imbalanced positively or negatively to the degree that they virtually abandon a dialectical 
process. Each SOM is defined its ratio o f positive to negative cognitions. The most 
optimal state o f  mind, positive dialogue, is characterized by a ratio of .618 positive 
cognitions to .382 negative cognitions. It allows a general positivity in cognition and 
mood while preserving maximal attentiveness to negative, threatening events. The 
individual with this SOM will readily recognize negative cognitions and likely engage in 
sufficient facilitory self-talk and positive coping strategies to alleviate distress.
Negative dialogue is a SOM characterized by a ratio o f .382 positive cognitions to 
.618 negative cognitions. Individuals with this SOM maintain a background o f continual, 
moderate negativity such that, when negative events occur, they are less shocking and
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more easily assimilated into existing structures. Such persons are usually observed to  be
moderately anxious or depressed. The system strives to maintain a “preferred” (or
homeostatic) level o f  dysphoria or fear.
The internal dialogue of conflict SOM is characterized by symmetrically balanced 
structures such that the ratio o f positive to negative cognitions is .50. This results in equal 
salience o f  positive and negative information as well as maximal uncertainty, a  state that is 
not optimal as it is associated with indecision and doubt. Clinically, it may manifest as 
mild levels o f anxiety, depression, and obsessionality.
Positive monologue is one o f the SOMs characterized by a ratio that is 
asymmetrical to the degree that a dialectical process is virtually abandoned. It consists o f  
positive cognitions with a ratio o f .69 or more. In this state, positive thoughts and feelings 
exceed the optimal balance. Ratios in these ranges (i.e., that are monologic versus 
dialogic) are inherently unstable, and there is a tendency to strive toward a more balanced 
and less extreme dialogic SOM. Clinically, this excess o f positive cognitions may manifest 
as mania or hypomania. With rising positivity, there is reduction in uncertainty at the 
expense o f a loss o f salience of negative events. Consequently, important threatening 
events may go unnoticed to the detriment of the individual.
At the other end o f the spectrum is the negative dialogue SOM characterized by 
positive cognitions at a ratio o f .31 or less (and negative cognitions at .69 or more). 
According to Schwartz and Garamoni ( 1989), this SOM is not as enduring as the other 
states o f mind (especially the dialogic SOMs) and is more transitory, which may explain 
the tendency for some severe unipolar depressives to experience spontaneous remission. 
The negative monologue is usually associated with extremely severe psychopathological
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states and is characterized clinically by profound depression or acute panic. It is
qualitatively distinct and exhibits “distinct structural and information processing
properties. In addition to its hypothesized instability, there are “internal and external
pressures” exerted on the individual to move towards more positive thinking - to
reestablish a more balanced, dialogic SOM (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989).
Garamoni et al. (1991) found support for the States o f Mind model in a study of 
39 outpatients with major depression. Correlational analysis confirmed that the balance o f 
positive and negative affective symptoms (P/(P+N)) in this sample closely approximated 
the golden section (i.e., 0.37). More recently, Nasby and Russell (1997) investigated 
whether the States o f Mind model could successfully differentiate between Vietnam 
combat veterans who suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and Vietnam 
combat veterans who did not. After matching the groups by combat exposure and 
controlling for general psychopathology, their results demonstrated more maladaptive 
SOM in PTSD veterans than combat veterans without PTSD.
Finally, a theoretical model well known to the field o f psychology is the cognitive 
model of depression posited by Aaron Beck (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979). In its 
simplest form, it consists o f three specific concepts which seek to explain the 
psychological underpinnings o f depression: (1) the cognitive triad, (2) schemas, and (3) 
cognitive errors or faulty information processing.
The cognitive triad is composed o f three major patterns o f cognition: a negative 
view of self, world, and future. With regard to the self the individual develops a view o f 
himself as defective, inadequate, or worthless. His view o f the world is distorted, and he 
may envisage an environment that places exorbitant demands on him, presents unfair
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obstacles, and sets him up for failure. The future may be equally bleak. As the depressed
individual makes long-range projections, he expects his situation to continue as it has or
become worse. Frustration and hardship are expected.
Schemas are theoretical cognitive structures that organize environmental stimuli 
along unique patterns (unique to the individual). Although different persons may 
conceptualize the same situation in different ways, a particular individual tends to be 
consistent in his responses to similar types o f events. Relatively stable cognitive patterns 
form the basis for the regularity o f interpretations o f a particular set of situations (Beck et 
al., 1979). Depressed individuals will tend to activate idiosyncratic negative schemas that 
may not logically relate to the situation at hand. As these idiosyncratic schemas become 
more active, they are evoked by a wider range o f stimuli which are less logically related to 
them, and they lose increasingly more voluntary control over their thinking processes.
With increasing levels o f  severity, they are unable to  invoke other more appropriate 
schemas. As the depression deepens, cognitive organization may become so independent 
o f  external stimulation that the individual is unresponsive to changes in his immediate 
environment (Beck et al., 1979).
Faulty information processing, or cognitive errors, refer to systematic errors in the 
thinking of the depressed person. These systematic errors serve to maintain the 
individual’s belief in the validity o f his negative concepts despite the presence o f 
contradictory evidence. According to Beck and colleagues (1979), depressed individuals’ 
thinking tends to be “primitive” in nature so that global judgments are made regarding 
events that impinge on their lives. The meanings that they attribute to external events are
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likely to be extreme, negative, absolute, and judgmental. In turn, the emotional response
tends to be negative and extreme.
Consistent with previously mentioned models o f depressive cognition, the
cognitive model of depression proposed by Beck and colleagues (1979) conceptualizes
depressive cognition as significantly self-, or internally, focused. In addition, external
stimuli tend to be distorted or significantly self-, or internally, focused. In addition,
external stimuli tend to be distorted or unattended to, which may lead to attentional
deficits, decreased concentration, and inefficient memory encoding/retrieval.
Psychophysiological Measures
In addition to neuropsychological measures o f cognitive performance to ascertain 
deviations in depressives, psychophysiological mechanisms can also be assessed and 
compared to controls. As a component o f their study on focused attention, Hertel and 
Rude (1991) incorporated a reaction time component to assess participants' mental 
demands. Reaction time to an auditory signal was assessed and found to be significantly 
slower in the depressed group. Moreover, reaction time was not affected by increases in 
attentional focus, though it was in the control group (i.e., increased attentional focus 
improved reaction time in controls).
Psychophysiological studies which are particularly relevant to attention are those 
o f evoked potentials and contingent negative variation fCNVl. Evoked potentials are 
waves of cerebral electrical activity arising in response to a sensory stimulus (auditory, 
visual, or somesthetic). These potentials can only be observed by repeating the stimulus, 
averaging several repetitions, and subtracting the background noise o f the
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electroencephalogram (EEG). The early components o f  the evoked potential (i.e., before
100 milliseconds) are usually linked to characteristics o f  the stimulus, however
components which arrive later are related to the attention which the stimulus has aroused.
For example, the evoked potential commonly used is the "P300" (positive deflection, 300
ms) component. At the level of the P300, studies o f  depressed patients unanimously show
a reduction in amplitude (Mialet, Pope & Yurgelun-Todd, 1996). Yee and Miller (1994)
compared dysthymies to anhedonic and normal controls on P300 evoked potentials and
found that dysthymic individuals are hyporesponsive at various stages o f information
processing. Yet it was unclear whether they were deficient in the amount o f available
attentional resources for information processing or deficient in the allocation o f  those
resources.
In addition to P300 potentials, recent studies have attempted to utilize changes in 
the attenuation o f  the "N2 Vertex wave" in participants during a selective attention task 
(Mialet et al., 1996). Changes observed are suggestive o f a deficit o f the "attentional 
trace" at the initial stage of information processing (El Massioui, 1988). Mialet et al. 
(1996) interpret these changes as evidence o f limited availability of attentional resources in 
depressed patients, thus constraining them to "mobilize controlled attention for operations 
that would normally be easily handled by automatic processing.”
Contingent negative variation (CNV) consists o f a slow negative potential which 
develops in the frontal regions o f the brain during the interval between an alerting stimulus 
and a response and represents the physiological correlate o f anticipation in a motor or 
mental performance (Mialet et al., 1996). In summarizing the findings o f CNV in 
depressives, Mialet and colleagues report a clear decrease in the amplitude o f  the CNV
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and an association o f  CNV with relative insensibility o f depressives to contextual
(environmental) cues.
Additional studies investigating speech (larynghographic recordings), eye 
movements, and visual tracking in depressives have also revealed impairment, lending 
additional support for the hypothesis o f an overall reduction in depressed patients' 
attentional performance (Mialet et al., 1996). In fact, Mialet and colleagues compare 
attention in depressives to that o f  schizophrenic patients, stating that depressi ves display 
an "impoverished intensity" of attention rather than an impaired ability to orient their 
attention.
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Cognitive Processes in Anxiety 
As reported earlier, there is ample support for an adverse effect of anxiety states 
on cognitive performance, however there are studies which have actually reported equal or 
better performance o f  anxious individuals over controls on cognitive performance 
(Dibartolo, Brown, & Barlow, 1997; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). To attempt to account for 
the discrepancy in findings, Eysenck and Calvo (1992) developed the processing efficiency 
theory o f anxiety. Processing efficiency theory conceptualizes state anxiety as the crucial 
factor determining individual differences in internal processing and performance. Eysenck 
and Calvo (1992) assert that state anxiety is determined through an interaction o f trait 
anxiety and situational threat or stress, however they also note that it is often difficult to 
distinguish between trait and state anxiety empirically because they both correlate very 
highly (often 0.70 or higher). Thus, many studies do not attempt to disentangle the two 
forms.
Two components o f anxiety, worry and emotionality, are identified in processing 
efficiency theory. Emotionality refers to an individual’s awareness o f the physical aspects 
o f anxiety (e.g., increased heart rate, or sweating), whereas the worry component consists 
o f self-preoccupation, concern over evaluation, and concern over level of performance 
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). The worry component is viewed as occupying the cognitive 
component o f state anxiety, and it is hypothesized to play an integral role in the 
articulatory loop o f the working-memory system devised by Baddeley (1986; see Eysenck 
& Calvo, 1992). Baddeley’s working-memory system consists o f three components, all 
having limited capacity; a modality-free central executive resembling attention, which is 
involved in active processing; an articulatory loop specializing in rote verbal rehearsal used
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for temporary storage o f verbal information (often involving sub vocalizations); and a
visual-spatial sketch pad specializing in visual and/or spatial information. The central
executive is considered the most important component of the working-memory system,
and it is used on tasks that require planning or decision making and as a problem-solver
when lower processing systems seem inadequate.
According to Eysenck and Calvo (1992), the worry component o f  anxiety is not 
only thought to consume some o f an individual’s valuable processing and storage 
resources, but is also thought to serve a motivational function via a “control system”. 
Importantly, the functioning of this control system leads to an allocation o f  additional 
processing resources (i.e., effort) and to the initiation of processing activities (e.g., 
strategies) designed to improve performance, especially when the person perceives their 
performance as poor (or is given feedback to that effect). If successful, such attempts at 
allocating additional resources increase available working memory capacity and may, in 
fact, improve performance provided there are not undue demands placed on their overall 
resources (elaborated fiirther below).
A fundamental theoretical distinction set forth in processing efficiency theory, one 
which seeks to explain the inconsistent findings in other studies o f anxiety and 
performance, is that between performance effectiveness and processing efftciencv. 
Performance effectiveness simply refers to the quality of task performance (as in test 
scores), whereas processing efficiency refers to the relationship between the effectiveness 
o f  performance and the effort, or amount o f processing resources, invested. This 
relationship is defined as performance effectiveness divided by effort, though “not in a 
strict mathematical sense” (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992).
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Processing efficiency theory differs from other theories o f anxiety and performance
in a number o f ways. First, worry has motivational as well as attentional interference 
effects. Second, the motivational effect is generally positive in that it leads to increased 
effort or compensatory strategies. Third, the notion that the effects o f  anxiety on 
performance differ from the effects on performance efficiency is unique to this theory. 
Fourth, anxiety affects both the storage and the processing capacity o f  the working- 
memory system which are available for task performance, rather than simply the storage 
capacity o f short-term memory or attentional resources as hypothesized in other theories. 
Finally, at a conceptual level it is assumed within other theories (see Eysenck & Calvo, 
1992) that stressful situations or threats cause anxious individuals to respond relatively 
passively with self-preoccupation, which either interferes with attention to task-relevant 
processing or motivates them to avoid the task, thus reducing on-task effort. Performance 
efficiency theory, on the other hand, assumes that anxious individuals respond to stressful 
situations dynamically. They worry about possible aversive consequences but try to avoid 
them by allocating further resources to the task, however that strategy can only be useful 
to a point given the finite resources available at any given time.
To elaborate, when presented with a simple task, anxious and non-anxious 
individuals are roughly equal in the amount o f  attentional resources required for the task. 
However, when task demands increase, the amount of attentional resources required by 
each begins to diverge. The central executive (o f the anxious individual) begins to direct 
additional resources to the task, and if the individual is aware of poor task performance, 
he will begin to worry (in the articulatory loop) about adverse consequences o f  his poor 
performance and will be motivated to improve that performance. This motivational
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function entails the allocation o f  further resources (i.e., effort) and processing activities
(i.e., strategies) in an attempt to improve performance. This compensatory response may
lead to improved performance but not always. Objectively, task performance, as
measured by test scores, may not reveal any significant differences between anxious and
non-anxious controls unless secondary (concurrent) tasks are employed to further tax the
capacity o f  the available resources. It is then that differences are often detected,
highlighting the anxious individual’s re-distribution o f resources in an effort to  compensate
for poor task performance. Numerous confirmatory studies have been conducted on
performance efficiency, utilizing ever-inventive research strategies to uncover this
underlying process (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Elliman, Green, Rogers & Finch, 1997;
Dibartolo et. al, 1997).
Eysenck and Calvo ( 1992) outline the following predictions o f the processing 
efficiency theory, all of which are supported by empirical studies cited in their monograph: 
(I)  Anxiety typically impairs processing efficiency more than performance effectiveness, 
and (2) adverse effects o f  anxiety on task performance generally become stronger as task 
demands on working memory capacity increase. The implications o f the first prediction, 
also supported empirically, are as follows:
(a) highly anxious participants should report higher levels of subjective effort than 
low-anxious participants on comparable tasks
(b) anxiety will typically have an adverse effect on a secondary task performed 
concurrently with a primary task
(c) anxiety will reduce spare processing capacity (assessed by responding to 
probes) during the performance o f  a central task
(d) motivational factors enhancing effort typically benefit the performance o f low- 
anxious individuals more than high-anxious individuals
(e) the performance o f a central task will be adversely affected by an additional 
load to a greater extent in anxious than in non-anxious groups
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(f) impaired processing efficiency produced by anxiety can be detected by 
lengthened processing time (e.g., response or reaction time)
(g) the greater impairment effect of anxiety on efficiency than on effectiveness can 
be detected by psychophysiological measures
The second prediction by Eysenck and Calvo, that adverse effects o f anxiety on 
task performance generally become stronger as task demands on working memory 
capacity increase, includes the following empirically supported implications;
(a) the effects o f  anxiety on task performance depend on the amount of 
resources required by the task (measurable by the susceptibility o f that task 
to interference by a concurrent load)
(b) anxiety reduces temporary storage capacity
(c) anxiety has powerful adverse effects on tasks with high storage and
processing demands
(d) anxiety does not generally impair performance on tasks not involving the
central executive arid/or articulatory loop components o f  the working- 
memory system (e.g., undemanding or automatic tasks)
Processing efficiency theory has held up well under empirical scrutiny. As recently 
as 1997, Elliman and colleagues examined the effect o f anxiety on three groups of anxious 
individuals consisting o f low, medium, and high anxiety. Participants performed a high- 
processing load measure of sustained attention, including accuracy and response scores, 
and basic measures of psychomotor performance. Results revealed that high levels of 
anxiety were associated with longer response times and a decline in performance accuracy. 
Since all participants performed equally well on basic psychomotor speed, the researchers 
were able to demonstrate that the increase in response times was unique to the high- 
anxious group. In other words, high-anxious individuals used more processing capacity 
(and thus more response time) than their lower anxious counterparts. Thus, they were 
performing less efficiently as they attempted to maintain similar levels o f performance.
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Finally, in a  study by Dibartolo and colleagues (1997), participants with
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) were compared to normal controls on two
information processing signal detection tasks. The first task consisted o f neutral
distractors, and the second consisted o f  administering negative feedback cues. GAD
participants evidenced impaired performance on the first task, however they unexpectedly
improved on the second task to match normal controls despite reporting significantly
higher levels o f worry and negative affectivity. Dibartolo and colleagues interpreted this
finding as demonstrating Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) concept o f motivational functioning
within the articulatory loop and central executive. In other words, they believed GAD
participants experienced increased worry about their performance and consequently
reallocated additional resources to the second task condition. Thus, improving their
scores.
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Presumed Anatomical Basis for Attentional Processes
Drawing on earlier work conducted with schizophrenia and other disorders 
affecting attention, Mirsky (1987) postulated that attention could be subdivided into a 
number o f different elements, including the capacity to focus on or select some aspect o f 
the environment, the ability to sustain or maintain focus for a period o f time, the ability to 
encode or manipulate information held in memory, and the ability to shift adaptively from 
one aspect o f  the environment to another. These four elements o f attention (focus- 
execute, sustain, encode, and shift) can be measured by a variety o f  neuropsychological 
tests o f attention. In a study conducted through the Laboratory o f  Psychology and 
Psychopathology of the National Institute o f Mental health (see Culbertson & Krull, 1996) 
a factor analysis was used to analyze a battery o f neuropsychological tests thought to be 
sensitive to various aspects o f attention. The analysis yielded four factors which 
supported the aspects of attention proposed by Mirksy (1987). As reported by Culbertson 
and Krull (1996), the factor associated with the "focus-execute" component was related to 
perceptual motor speed and loaded on such tests as Trail Making (Reitan, 1979), a  letter 
cancellation procedure, a measure similar to Coding from the Wechsler scales (Wechsler, 
1990), and the Stroop test (C.J. Golden, 1978). The factor associated with the "sustain" 
element o f attention was vigilance and loaded on scores from a Continuous Performance 
Test (omissions, commission errors, and reaction time; Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, 
Bransome, & Beck, 1956). The "encode" element was best captured by a factor loading 
on numerical or mnemonic tasks, as on Digit Span and Arithmetic from the Wechsler 
scales. Finally, the "shift" element o f attention was measured best by a factor loading on
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flexibility, as measured by scores from the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton,
1981).
Mirsky (1987) integrated the neuropsychological testing data and findings from 
previous neuroanatomic studies to arrive at descriptions o f the neuroanatomic localization 
of the elements o f attention. The following functional specialization was suggested: The 
"focus-execute" function is likely shared by superior temporal and inferior parietal 
cortices, as well as by structures that make up the corpus striatum (including the caudate, 
putamen, and globus pallidus). The motor component of the execute function is felt to be 
mediated by the inferior parietal and corpus striatal regions of the brain. The "sustain" 
function o f attention is thought to be mediated by rostral structures, including the tectum, 
mesopontine reticular formation, and reticular and midline thalamic nuclei. The 
"encoding" function is believed to be accomplished by the hippocampus, which provides 
an essential mnemonic function required for some aspects o f attention. Finally, the ability 
to “shift” attention from one aspect o f the environment to the other is supported by the 
prefrontal cortex. As Mirsky observed, this attentionai system within the brain is very 
widespread and, therefore, quite vulnerable so that damage or dysfunction in any one o f 
these brain regions can lead to specific deficits in attentionai function.
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Purpose o f Study
Depression and anxiety are encountered on a frequent basis in psychological and 
neuropsychological patient populations (Sweet, Newman, & Bell, 1992), therefore it is 
paramount to have an adequate understanding of the impact o f these conditions on 
cognitive processes. As mentioned previously, decreased attention can have significant 
implications for psychotherapy by limiting the patient’s ability to attend to, incorporate, 
and apply therapeutic principles and insight. For the neuropsychologist, it is crucial to 
appreciate the role o f emotional distress in impaired attention to help clarify its 
contribution versus CNS injury.
Empirical studies exploring the relationship o f emotional distress and 
neuropsychological test performance are a relatively recent trend and results have been 
mixed due to various methodological problems (e.g., not using standardized measures, 
inadequate diagnostic specificity, small sample sizes; Sweet et al., 1992). Furthermore, 
the very notion of emotional distress exerting a significant impact on attentionai processes 
has been called into question (Reitan & Wolfson, 1997).
The present study seeks to determine the impact o f  differing levels of anxiety and 
depression on attentionai performance in both patients with neurologic insult and those 
without. It represents a unique contribution to this area o f  research due to its large sample 
size, use of standardized measures, and diverse patient population characterizing a rich 
array of presenting etiologies within the context of a large academic medical center.
Based upon the existing literature reviewed, the following research questions and 
hypotheses were generated.
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Research Questions and Hypotheses
Patients were routinely administered the MMPI as part o f  a flexible 
neuropsychological battery, thus MMPI t-scores on scales 2 (Depression) and 7 
(Psychasthenia) were used to assess severity levels o f anxiety and depression. Analyses 
were then conducted on the group as a whole, followed by analyses on neurologic (i.e., 
some evidence o f neurologic insult) and non-neurologic (i.e., no evidence of neurologic 
insult) patients. The following research questions and hypotheses were posed:
/. Which neuropsychological insiruments seemed to best measure attention in this 
sample?
What is the factor structure o f  the purported neuropsychological measures o f attention 
in this sample? Which measures appear to best assess the construct known as attention? 
What is the relationship, if any, to Mirsky's (1987) attentionai model? Which instruments 
appear to be the most useful to include in subsequent analyses with this sample? It was 
expected that the factor structure o f  test scores in this sample would closely match that of 
Mirsky’s factor structure (i.e., the four factors: focus-execute, sustain, encode, and shift). 
It was also expected that the tests found to load most highly on attention components 
would be those identified by Mirsky or tests roughly equivalent within the test battery 
used with this sample.
2. Do legal cases differ significantly on attention performance from  the sample as a  
whole?
Does having a legal case pending cause a patient to perform significantly different on 
neuropsychological measures o f attention compared to the rest o f  the outpatient sample? 
If  indeed this is the case, patients with a legal case pending will be selected from the
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sample and analyzed separately. Sweet and colleagues (1992) identify motivational
variables and malingering as potential confounding factors in investigations of
neuropsychological performance. O f the studies reviewed for this study, it was unclear as
to how significant legal status affected attention performance on neuropsychological tests.
It is expected that, o f  those presenting for neuropsychological evaluation due to a legal
case pending, motivation levels and blatant attempts at malingering will be sufficiently
varied as to ngt represent a significant confound in this outpatient sample. Thus, it is
expected that no significant difference will be found from the overall sample, and it will be
possible to include their scores in subsequent analyses.
3. What is the relationship between depression and attention in the outpatient sample?
What is the relationship between scale 2 MMPI t-scores and the neuropsychological 
measures of attention administered to this outpatient sample? The information processing 
approach (Ingram, 1984) predicts that depression significantly impairs attentionai 
resources. Therefore, it is expected that scale 2 MMPI t-scores will be significantly 
correlated with attention measures, such that increasing depression results in poorer 
attention performance.
3b. What is the relationship between depression severity level (Low and High) and  
attetUion in this outpatient sample?
When scale 2 MMPI t-scores are divided into Low (D > 45 and D < 55) and High 
(D > 70) Depression, while controlling for anxiety (Pt < 60), what relationship exists with 
attention measures? It is expected that higher depression levels will result in fewer 
attentionai resources being available for attention-demanding tasks, therefore higher levels 
should result in significantly poorer attention performance than lower depression levels.
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4. What is the relationship between anxiety and attetUion in this outpatient sample?
What is the relationship between scale 7 MMPI t-scores and the neuropsychological 
measures of attention administered to this outpatient sample? Processing efficiency theory 
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) predicts that anxiety places increased demands on attentionai 
processes such that more effort is required for attention tasks than is normally required. 
However, it is sometimes difficult to detect this increased demand on attentionai resources 
empirically. Consequently, studies have been mixed in finding attentionai deficits due to 
anxiety. Nonetheless, with this large sample it is expected that scale 7 MMPI t-scores will 
be significantly correlated with attention measures, such that increasing anxiety results in 
poorer attention performance.
4b. What is the relationship between anxiety severity level and attetition in this
outpatient sample?
When scale 7 MMPI t-scores are divided into Low (Pt > 45 and D < 55) and High 
(Pt > 70) Anxiey, while controlling for depression (D < 60), what relationship exists with 
attention measures? Processing efficiency theory predicts that increasing levels of anxiety 
place more and more demands on attentionai processes. Therefore, it is expected that 
higher anxiety levels will result in significantly poorer attention performance than lower 
anxiety levels.
The Yerkes-Dodson Law (Revelle & Loffus, 1992) predicts optimal performance at 
Moderate levels o f anxiety, and poorer performance at low and high anxiety states. The 
Yerkes-Dodson Law has been supported in numerous empirical studies (Revelle & Loftus, 
1992) and is hypothesized to be a function of the central nervous system (CNS). At very 
low levels o f  anxiety, the CNS is not sufficiently attentive to environmental cues, thus less
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encoding takes place. At high levels o f anxiety, the CNS is overly preoccupied with the
stressor responsible for the anxiety and internal body functioning to be sufficiently
attentive to environmental cues, which also results in less encoding. To assess for the
effects o f  Yerkes-Dodson, Scale 7 will be divided into four groups: No Anxiety, Low
Anxiety, Moderate Anxiety, and High Anxiety and attention measures will be compared
along those dimensions.
5. What relationship exists with attention when depression and anxiety severity levels 
are both High, and hath Low?
When scale 2 and scale 7 MMPI t-scores are both High (D and Pt > 70), what 
relationship exists with attention measures? Similarly, when scale 2 and scale 7 MMPI t- 
scores are both Low (D and Pt > 45 and < 55), what relationship exists with attention 
measures? Vanderploeg, Kizilbash, Curtiss, and Schinka (1998) reported significant 
(detrimental) effects on memory by depression compounded with anxiety. Moreover, 
effects were stronger with high levels versus low. Therefore, it is expected that similar 
effects will be obtained with attention performance.
6. When the sample is divided into two groups according to neurologic status, is there a 
significant difference on neuropsychological measures o f attention?
It is expected that, by virtue of their neurological insult, neurologic patients will 
evidence significantly more impairment on neuropsychological measures o f attention.
6b. Are there significant differences in depression levels fo r  neurologies versus non­
neurologics?
Are there significant differences on scale 2 MMPI t-scores between neurologic and 
non-neurologic groups? As Reitan and Wolfson (1997) observe, intellectual and cognitive
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impairment represents a stressful situation that can cause emotional difficulties with
awareness o f one’s reduction in ability from previous levels o f functioning. It is expected
that this sample will be no different. Neurologic patients should report higher levels o f
depression than non-neurologic patients.
6c. Are there significant differences in anxiety levels fo r  neurologies versus non­
neurologics?
Are there significant differences on scale 7 MMPI t-scores between neurologic and 
non-neurologic groups? Anxiety and depression are frequently comorbid conditions 
(Vanderploeg et al., 1998), therefore it is expected that a number o f  depressed neurologies 
will likely evidence concomitant anxiety. Consequently, it is expected that neurologic 
patients will report higher anxiety levels than non-neurologic patients.
6d. Are depressed neurologies more affected on attention measures than nott-depressed 
neurologies?
When neurologies are separated by depression level (D > 70), is there a significant 
difference in performance on measures o f  attention? It is expected that neurologies will, 
as a group, evidence impaired attention due their neurologic insult. According to the 
information processing approach, depression will also impair attention performance. 
Therefore, it is expected that depression will impair attention over and above that existing 
due to the underlying neurologic condition.
6e. Are anxiotts neurologies more affected on attention measures than non-anxious 
neurologies?
When neurologies are separated by anxiety level (Pt > 70), is there a significant 
difference in performance on measures o f attention? In keeping with processing efficiency
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theory, it is expected that anxiety will impair attention over and above that existing due to 
the underlying neurologic condition. However, it is recognized that processing efficiency 
has stated that attention deficits will not always be revealed due to increased effort by 
anxious individuals to perform better.
6f. Are depressed non-neiiro/ogics more affected on attention measures than non­
depressed non-neurologics?
When non-neurologies are separated by depression level (D > 70), is there a 
significant difference in performance on measures o f attention? It is expected that 
depression will impair attention performance as predicted by the information processing 
approach.
6g. Are anxious non-neurologics more affected on attention measures than non-anxious 
non-neurologics?
When non-neurologics are separated by anxiety level (D > 70), is there a 
significant difference in performance on measures of attention? It is expected that anxiety 
will impair performance in non-neurologics, however it is also recognized that anxiety 
deficits are not always revealed according to processing efficiency theory.
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Method
Setting and Participants
The data for the study were gathered retrospectively from the records o f patients 
who had been referred to the Neuropsychological Assessment Laboratory at the 
Department o f  Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, University o f Oklahoma Health 
Sciences Center (OUHSC) between 1955 and 1997. The Neuropsychological Laboratory 
at OUHSC receives approximately 300 referrals per year for neuropsychological 
assessment from neurology, tumor clinic, epilepsy clinic, attorneys, and other allied 
professions. Assessments usually consisted of a flexible battery of tests (i.e., a core battery 
of tests given to all patients plus additional tests added by the neuropsychologist based on 
the patient's presenting problem or etiology). Tests were administered by a Master’s level 
psychometrist, pre-doctoral intern, post-doctoral fellow, or neuropsychologist. Testing 
time varied according to patient but was generally between 3-8 hours with appropriate 
breaks to prevent fatigue effects. Participants were individuals referred for 
neuropsychological evaluation that completed valid MMPI’s (Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) and 
were at least 18 years old. For the years 1963 through 1997, 1,654 completed MMPI’s 
were available, with the majority encompassing the years 1977 through 1997. Use o f  the 
MMPI was discontinued in 1992, in favor of the MMPI-2. In the total sample, there were 
701 (58%) MMPI’s and 508 (42%) MMPl-2's administered.
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O f the 2,942 cases in the database, 1,209 (41.1%) participants were
selected for analysis. Demographic information for this sample is presented in Table 1
below.
Table 1
Demographic Information for Participants
Variable Mean SD
Age 42.01 16.61
Education 13.20 2.81
Frequencies Percent
Gender
Male 673 55.7
Female 536 44.3
Ethnicity
Caucasian 1079 89.2
African American 76 6.3
Native American 21 1.7
Hispanic 6 0.5
Asian American 5 0.4
Other 3 0.2
Unknown 4 0.3
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Measures
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory - 2”* Edition (MMPI-2; Butcher, 
Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989), a widely used tool in the assessment o f 
emotional/personality functioning, was utilized for the present study. Basic scales 2 (D; 
Depression) and 7 (Pt; Psychasthenia) were used as a measure o f depression and anxiety, 
respectively. Participants were eliminated if they had MMPI T-score elevations above 70 
on L or K scales, or above 80 on F. Similar procedures were utilized by Vanderploeg et 
al. (1998).
Measures of Attention 
Digit Span
WAIS-R Digit Span (Wechsler. 1987) scaled score Forward and Backward raw scores. 
Digit Span consists o f two parts; Digits Forward requires the subject to repeat sequences 
o f three to nine digits; Digit Backward sequences are two to eight numbers long, and the 
subject must say them in reverse order (Spreen & Strauss, 1998). Moderate correlations 
have been achieved with the PAS AT, RBMT (Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test), 
WMS scores, CVLT, TPT (Tactual Performance Test) Memory, and numerous other tests 
utilizing attention and memory.
Visual Memory Span
WMS-R Visual Memory Span (Wechsler, 1987) forward and backward raw scores. The 
Visual Memory Span consists o f  two cards on each o f which eight squares are printed in a 
nonlinear pattern, red squares for the forward span and green for reversed span.
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Administration procedures are the same as for Digit Span, requiring two trials at each
level regardless o f  whether the first was passed (Lezak, 1995).
Mental Control
WMS-R Mental Control (Wechsler, 1987) consists o f  (1) counting backwards from 20 in 
30 seconds; (2) reciting the alphabet in 30 seconds; and (3) counting from 1 to 40 by 3’s 
in 45 seconds. Its attentionai component is “consistently attested to by factor analytic 
studies” (Lezak, 1995).
Digit Symbol
WAIS-R Digit Symbol (Wechsler, 1987) scaled score. Digit Symbol is a symbol 
substitution task consisting o f four rows containing, in all, 100 small blank squares, each 
paired with a randomly assigned number from one to nine. Following a practice trial on 
the first seven, the task is to fill in the blank spaces with the symbol that is paired to the 
number above the blank space as quickly as possible for 90 seconds (Lezak, 1995).
Among other functions such as psychomotor speed and visuomotor coordination, it is a 
measure o f focused attention, requiring the individual to reject irrelevant information while 
attending to relevant input (Spreen & Strauss, 1998).
Symbol Digit Modalities Test
Symbol Digit Modalities Test (Smith, 1991) oral administration raw score and written 
administration raw score. This test preserves the substitution format o f Digit Symbol but 
reverses the presentation o f material so that the symbols are printed and the numbers are 
written, enabling the individual to respond with the more familiar act o f number writing.
It also allows for a spoken response trial. As with Digit Symbol, 90 seconds are allowed 
for each trial, however there are 110 items instead o f 100 (Lezak, 1995). Although Lezak
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(1995) maintains that this test primarily measures complex scanning and visual tracking
Spreen and Strauss (1998) include it as a measure o f  focused attention.
Trail Making Test
Trail Making Test (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) Part A time in seconds and Part B time in 
seconds. The individual must first draw lines to connect consecutively numbered circles 
on one work sheet (Part A) and then connect the same number o f  consecutively numbered 
and lettered circles on another worksheet by alternating between the two sequences (Part 
B; Lezak, 1995). Trail Making is a test involving focused attention, motor speed, and 
complex visual scanning (Lezak, 1995; Spreen & Strauss, 1998).
Finger Tapping
Tapping (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) dominant hand mean number o f taps and nondominant 
hand mean number of taps. Finger Tapping consists o f a tapping key with a device for 
recording the number o f  taps. Each hand makes five 10-second trials with brief rest 
periods between trials. The score for each hand is the average for a set o f  five trials that 
do not vary more than 5 taps (Lezak, 1995). Though not a formal test o f  attention, it taps 
motor speed and manual dexterity and is sensitive to the presence and laterality o f brain 
lesion (Lezak, 1995; Spreen & Strauss, 1998).
Grooved Pegboard
Grooved Pegboard (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) dominant hand time in seconds and 
nondominant hand time in seconds. Grooved Pegboard consists o f a small board 
containing a 5 X 5 set o f  slotted holes angled in different directions. Each peg has a ridge 
along one side requiring it to be rotated into position for correct insertion. The score is 
time to completion, and its complexity makes it sensitive for measuring general slowing
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and progression o f disease processes, and by assisting in identifying iateralized impairment 
(Lezak, 1995). It is not recognized as a formal test o f  attention.
Conners’ Continuous Performance Test fCPT^
Conners’ Continuous Performance Test (CPT; Conners, 1995) number o f hits, omission 
errors, commission errors, and hit reaction time. The Standard CPT in Conners’ program 
requires the individual to press the appropriate key (e.g., space bar) for any letter except 
the letter X. There are six blocks, each with three 20-trial sub-blocks. For each block, the 
sub-blocks have different interstimulus intervals; 1, 2, or 4 seconds. Each letter is 
displayed for 250 milliseconds. The CPT assesses lapses in attention or vigilance and 
impulsivity (Spreen & Strauss, 1998).
Seashore Rhvthm Test
Seashore Rhythm Test (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) total errors. The Seashore Rhythm Test 
is the most widely used test for nonverbal auditory perception. It also consists of 
concentration and tracking components. It requires the individual to discriminate between 
like and unlike pairs o f musical beats.
Speech Perception Test
Speech Sounds Perception Test (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) total errors. This test consists 
of 60 sets o f nonsense syllables each beginning and ending with different consonants but 
based on the vowel sound “ee.” It is administered by tape recording, and individuals must 
note what they think they heard on a four-choice form laid out in six 10-item sections 
labeled A to F. Since it is a rapidly paced test, it is thought to be sensitive to attentionai 
deficits (Lezak, 1995).
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WMS-R Attention/Concentration Index
WMS-R (Wechsler, 1987) Attention/Concentration Index score. This score is derived 
from the WMS-R Digit Span, Visual Memory Span, and Mental Control subtest scores. 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test fWCSTI
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, et al., 1993) number correct, number o f 
errors, number o f  perseverative responses, number o f categories completed, and failure to 
maintain set. This test is designed to assess the ability to form abstract concepts, to shift 
and maintain set, and utilize feedback (Spreen & Strauss, 1998). It consists o f four 
stimulus cards (or representations of cards on a computer screen), red triangle, two green 
stars, three yellow crosses, and four blue circles. The individual is asked to match each o f 
64 cards, which have designs similar to those on the stimulus cards, varying in color, 
geometric form, and number, to one o f the four key cards and is given feedback each time 
whether he or she is right or wrong. There is no time limit.
Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test f PAS AT)
Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT; Gronwall, 1977) total errors on each o f 
trials 1-4. The PAS AT is a serial-addition task used to assess capacity and rate o f 
information processing and sustained and divided attention. The individual is required to 
comprehend the auditory input, respond verbally, inhibit encoding o f his or her own 
response while attending to the next stimulus in a series, and perform at an externally 
determined pace. A prerecorded tape delivers a random series o f 61 numbers from I to 9. 
The individual is instructed to add pairs of numbers such that each number is added to the 
one that immediately precedes it; the second is added to the first, the third to the second, 
the fourth to the third, and so on. The same 6 1 numbers, given in the same sequence, are
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presented in four different trials, each trial differing in its rate o f  digit presentation (2.4,
2.0, 1.6, 1.2 seconds).
Stroop Color and Word Test
Stroop (Golden, 1978) Word score. Color score, and Color-Word score. This test is a 
measure o f selective attention and cognitive flexibility was originally developed by Stroop 
(1935). A number o f versions have been developed, but the one utilized here is the 
version developed by Golden (1978). In Golden’s version, three cards are used consisting 
of 100 items on each. On the first card, the individual is asked to read the color words 
(red, green, or blue) printed in black ink as quickly as possible for 45 seconds. On the 
second, the individual reads the color of ink, each item consisting o f “XXX” as quickly as 
possible for 45 seconds. On the final card, the individual must name the color in which the 
color words are printed and disregard their verbal content (i.e., inhibit the natural urge to 
read the word).
Word Fluencv
Benton Word Fluency (Benton, Hamsher, & Sivan, 1994) total number of words 
generated. The purpose of this test is to evaluate the spontaneous production of words 
beginning with a given letter (C, F, and L; or F, A, and S). The individual is asked to 
produce orally as many words as possible, for each letter, given a 60 second time limit for 
each trial. The score is the combined total for the three trials added to an education 
correction factor.
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Category Fluencv
Animal naming (Goodglass & Kaplan, 1987) total number o f  words. This test serves the 
same purpose as Word Fluency, however on this task the individual is confined to a 
category and asked to produce as many animal names as possible within 60 seconds.
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Results
Analyses were conducted using SPSS 9.0 (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences - Version 9.0). Participants completing valid MMPI’s were selected from the 
overall sample. Valid MMPFs were defined as t-score elevations less than 70 on scales L 
and K and less than 80 on scale F (Vanderploeg, et al., 1998).
Preliminary Analyses
A selection o f only cases in which the MMPl-2 was administered, allowing for 
potentially less-confounding interpretations, resulted in an undesirable sample size 
(N=390). Consequently, fewer analyses would be possible and with less statistical power. 
With a goal of significantly increasing the total sample size, the decision was made to 
utilize the total MMPI dataset, which includes individuals administered the original MMPI 
(N=641 ). Understandably, there are normative issues with regard to combining the two 
datasets. Namely, scaling differences between the two instruments. On the original 
MMPI, each clinical scale is comprised o f t-scores that are linear combinations o f the 
underlying raw score distribution for that scale. As such, they retain the original raw score 
distribution (e.g., in skewness), and the linear t-score transformation does not change 
these distributions (aside from rounding errors). As a result, the same linear t-score value 
can have different meanings (i.e., different relative standings or percentiles) for different 
scales (Tellegen & Ben-Porath, 1992). The MMPl-2 was developed utilizing uniform t- 
scores to provide direct comparisons across scales. For example, a t-score of 80 (98.6* 
percentile) on Scale 8 corresponds to a t-score o f 80 (98.6* percentile) on Scale 9 (for
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that same individual or another individual). Procedures to derive uniform t-scores are
described in detail by Tellegen and Ben-Porath (1992).
Because raw scores tend to be higher for the MMPI-2 than for the MMPI 
normative sample, t-scores tend to be lower on the MMPI-2 than on the MMPI. These 
findings led to a recommendation in the MMPI-2 manual (Butcher et al., 1989) that less- 
restrictive criteria that recognize potential significance o f elevation in the 65-69 t-score 
range be used in interpreting MMPI-2 profiles.
To determine the degree to which the two MMPI datasets differed in this 
particular sample, a one-way ANOVA was performed. As expected, the two groups were 
significantly different (p<0.01 ; see Table 2 below) on all five scales (L, F, K, D, and Pt). 
T-scores for the MMPI-2 were lower than the MMPI T-scores for all scales except Scale 
L. This was expected. Harrell, Honaker, and Parnell (1992) found significantly lower t- 
scores on several o f  the clinical scales but found a higher Scale L for the MMPI-2. They 
administered the MMPI, MMPl-2, or both, in a counterbalanced repeated-measures 
design (N=131). Subject rank order T scores and dispersion o f  the basic clinical scales did 
NOT differ between the tests, and measures o f profile similarity indicated congruence 
between the two instruments. Among subjects who completed both instruments, code-type 
concordance was not significantly lower than stability rates o f the tests. The results 
supported the assignment o f 65T as the lower boundary o f clinical elevation on the 
MMPI-2 and the psychometric equivalence of the MMPI-2 and MMPI with respect to T 
scores, score rankings, and measures of score distribution. In a clinical review, Clavelle 
(1992) asked clinical psychologists (N=35) to review pairs o f MMPI and MMPI-2 profiles 
derived from the same test responses and estimated that 92-96% o f their diagnoses and
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89-93% of their narrative interpretations would be essentially the same from one version
o f the MMPI to the next.
Table 2
ANOVA of MMPI and MMPI-2 Scales L. F. K. D. and Pt
N Mean IS D/I F Si&
MMPIL 19.232 .0001
MMPI
MMPI-2
641
390
51.20(7.3) 
53.01 (8.24)
MMPI F 44.762 .0001
MMPI
MMPI-2
641
390
60.67 (9.02) 
56.63 (10.62)
MMPIK 44.351 .0001
MMPI
MMPI-2
641
390
51.90 (8.5) 
48.13 (10.24)
MMPID 11.465 .001
MMPI
MMPI-2
641
390
71.06(15.76) 
66.65 (14.45)
MMPI Pt 21.753 .0001
MMPI
MMPI-2
641
390
66.55 (13.82) 
61.57(13.52)
Note: MMPIL=Scale L; MMPIF=Scale F; MMPIK=Scale K; MMPID=Scale D; 
MMPIPt=Scale Pt
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To determine the effect size of the differences between the two groups (i.e., the
degree to which their distributions do not overlap), a  MANOVA was performed to derive
the Eta Squared for each comparison. The effect sizes are summarized in Table 3 below.
Cohen (1977) suggests the following effect size conventions: "0.2 = small, 0.5 = medium,
and 0.8 = large effect size.” The resulting Eta Squared values suggested effect sizes less
than 0.04, indicating very small differences between the two MMPI datasets. It is likely
that the significant differences found in the MANOVA were due to the large overall
sample size. With t-score differences less than T=4.98, the original MMPI dataset was
considered appropriate for inclusion in subsequent analyses, however separate analyses
were performed using “MMPI version administered” as a covariate. This was done as
another safeguard against this potentially confounding issue
Table 3
Effect Size Differences Between MMPI and MMPl-2 Groups
Variable Sum o f  Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Eta Squared
MMPIL 1107.534 I 1107.534 19.04 .000 .016
MMPI F 4481.732 I 4481.732 47.34 .000 .038
MMPIK 3870.380 1 3870.380 46.355 .000 .037
MMPID 2973.480 1 2973.480 12.139 .001 .010
MMPI Pt 4338.107 I 4338.107 22.530 .000 .018
Note: MMPIL=Scale L; MMPlF=Scale F; MMPlK=Scale K; MMPlD=Scale D; MMPI 
Pt=Scale Pt
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Descriptive statistics were performed to examine variables for errors, number o f
valid cases, and measures o f  central tendency, variability, and shape o f  distribution. Data
were recoded as necessary and incorrectly coded variables were removed. Descriptive and
Frequency statistics are presented in Appendix A. Variables for the Stroop Color Word
Naming Test, PASAT, Symbol Digit Modalities Test and CPT were removed from
subsequent analyses due to low sample size (N=19, N=30, N=34, and N=51, respectively).
Next, a correlation matrix was constructed to explore the relationships between
emotional distress (MMPI Scales 2 and 7) and attentionai measures. Significant
correlations are reported in Table 4 below (only those with >0.35 absolute value).
Significant correlations (* p < .05; ** p < .01 ) were obtained between Scales 2 and 7 and
attention measures, though they were very modest. MMPID (Scale 2) was significantly
correlated with LPID (-.070*), LPTND (-.079*), ROCOPY (.069*), SPTE (.073*),
TAPD (-.069*), and WDSY (-.099**). MMPI PT (Scale 7) was significantly correlated
with LPID (-.121**), LPTND (-.119**), and ROCOPY (.130**).
Depression and Anxiety 63
Table 4
Correlation Matrix o f Significant Correlations
ANIM&LPID .365 WCSTC & WCSTE -.438
ANIM & ROCOPY -.537 WCSTC & WCSTFM .381
DYND&DYNND .835 WCSTC & WCSTPR -.432
DYND & TAPD .448 WCSTCT & WCSTE -.830
DYND & TAPND .365 WCSTCT & WCSTPE -.538
LPID & LPTND .858 WCSTCT & WCSTPR -.707
LPID & ROCOPY -.667 WCSTE & WCSTPE .718
LPID & WRAC -.410 WCSTE & WCSTPR .809
LPTND & ROCOPY -.643 WCSTPE & WCSTPR .499
LPTND & WRAC -.351 MMPI D & MMPI F .474
ROCOPY & WRAC .528 MMPI D & MMPI Pt .740
TAPND & TAPD .739 MMPI F & MMPI K -.368
TRLA & TRLB .545 MMPI F & MMPI Pt .517
TRLA& WDSY -.422 WDSP & WDSY .382
TRLB & WDSY -.460 WDSP & WFSIQ .557
WDSY & WFSIQ .462 WFSIQ & EDUC .442
WDSY & AGE -.413
Note. All correlations significant at p<0.01. Only correlations greater than 0.35 absolute 
value listed. MMPIL=ScaIe L; MMPIF=Scale F; MMPlK=Scale K; MMPID=Scale D; 
MMPIPt=Scale Pt; ANlM=Category Fluency; DYND=Dominant Grip Strength;
(table continued)
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DYNNI>=Nondominant Grip Strength; LPID=Dominant Grooved Pegboard; 
LPTND=Nondominant Grooved Pegboard; TAPD=Dominant Finger Tapping; 
TAPND=Nondominant Finger Tapping; R0COPY=Rey-O Copy; TRLA=Trails A; 
TRLB=TraiIs B; WCSTC=Wisconsin Card Sorting Test Correct; WCSTCT=WCST 
Number o f Categories; WCSTE=WCST Errors; WCSTFM=WCST Failure to Maintain 
Set; WCSTPE=WCST Perseverative Errors; WCSTPR=WCST Perseverative Responses; 
WDSP=WAIS-R Digit Span; WDSY=WAIS-R Digit Symbol; WRAC=WMS-R 
Attention/Concentration Index; WFSIQ=WAIS-R Full Scale IQ; AGE=Age; 
EDUC=Education.
Next, a factor analysis was conducted to explore the underlying factor structure o f  
attention test scores in this sample and to compare to the factor structure obtained by 
Mirsky (1987). Results o f the factor analysis are presented in Table 5 below. Utilizing a  
Principal Component Analysis extracton method and Van max (with Kaiser Normalization) 
rotation method, six factors were identified. Loadings for Factor I consisted o f  Category 
Fluency, Grooved Pegboard (dominant and nondominant), Rey-O Copy, and WMS-R 
Attention/Concentration Index. Factor 2 included the following Wisconsin Card Sort 
Scores (WCST); Number Correct, Number o f Categories, Number o f Errors, Number o f  
Perseverative Errors, and Number of Perseverative Responses. Factor 3 was comprised 
of: Grip Strength (dominant and nondominant), and Finger Tapping (dominant and 
nondominant). Factor 4 consisted of both Finger Tapping scores. Verbal Fluency, Trails 
A and B, and WAIS-R Digit Symbol. Factor 5 included WCST scores for Number 
Correct and Failure to Maintain Set. Finally, Factor 6 consisted o f Seashore Rhythm, 
Speech Sounds Perception Test, and WAIS-R Digit Span.
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Table 5
Exploratory Factor Analysis o f  Attention Test Scores
Variable Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4  Factor 5 Factor 6
LPID
LPTND
WRAC
ROCOPY
ANIM
WCSTC
WCSTCT
WCSTE
WCSTPE
WCSTPR
WCSTFM
RHVE
SPTE
WDSP
ARITH
.873
.834
-.631
-.856
.700
-.484
-.906
-.960
.729
.842
.664
DYND .867
DYNND .881
TAPD .727 -.346
TAPND .736 -.332
BWFTW -.420
TRLA .790
TRLB .742
WDSY -.681
.901
.732
.584
-.643
-.584
Note. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax 
with Kaiser Normalization. ANIM=Category Fluency; ARITH= WAIS-R Arithmetic;
BWFTW=Verbal Fluency; DYND=Dominant Grip Strength; DYNND=Nondominant Grip 
Strength; LPID=Dominant Grooved Pegboard; LPTND=Nondominant Grooved 
Pegboard; RHYE=Seashore Rhythm; SPTE=Speech Sounds Perception Test;
TAPD=Domi nant Finger Tapping; TAPND=Nondominant Finger Tapping; 
R0C0PY=Rey-0 Copy; TRLA=Trails A; TRLB=Trails B; WCSTC=Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test Correct; WCSTCT=WCST Number o f  Categories; WCSTE=WCST Errors; 
WCSTFM=WCST Failure to Maintain Set; WCSTPE=WCST Perseverative Errors; 
WCSTPR=WCST Perseverative Responses; WDSP=WAIS-R Digit Span; 
WDSY=WAIS-R Digit Symbol; WRAC=WMS-R Attention/Concentration Index.
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An Analysis o f  Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine if participants
with a legal case pending (N=178 or 14.7%) differed significantly from the overall sample.
As discussed earlier, a confounding factor in other studies exploring attention has been
that o f symptom exaggeration, and individuals with legal cases pending are at increased
risk for exaggeration o f  symptoms due to potential financial gain (Sweet et al., 1992).
Results are presented in Table 6 below.
Table 6
ANOVA o f Groups bv Legal Status
Variable N Mean (S.D.) F
MMPID 17.78 .0001
Legal 
Not Legal
178
791
69.93 (15.65) 
67.61 (14.51)
MMPI Pt 18.74 .0001
Legal 
Not Legal
178
791
65.47(14.09) 
62.03 (12.97)
Note: MMPID=Scale D; MMPIPt=Scale Pt.
Results o f the ANOVA revealed significant differences (p <0.01) between groups 
on MMPI scales D and Pt by legal status, therefore individuals referred for testing due to a 
legal case pending were removed from subsequent analyses. Results were not significant 
for MMPI scales L, F, or K.
Next, a canonical correlation was performed between the set of 22 attention 
variables (test scores) and the set o f two emotional distress variables (Scales D and Pt).
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Canonical analysis is the most general of the multivariate techniques (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
1989). In fkct  ^other procedures such as multiple regression, discriminant function 
analysis, and MANOVA are special cases o f it. However, canonical correlation is also one 
of the least used. According to Tabachnick and Fidell, the most critical limitation is 
difficulty interpreting the solution due to computation o f  canonical pairs that are 
independent o f all others and sensitivity to variables added to each set on both sides o f  the 
equation. Sample size is also an issue. A ratio o f  at least 10 cases for every variable is 
desirable. For the present study, sample size was adequate, and interpretability was 
facilitated by maintaining the same set o f variables for each analysis (except for the one 
addition o f a covariate).
The first canonical correlation was .23 (5% o f variance). The second canonical 
correlation was not interpreted due to nonsignificance. With both canonical correlations 
included, Wilks Lambda = .92, p < .001, and with the first canonical correlation removed, 
Wilks Lambda = .97, p = .084. The first pair o f canonical variâtes therefore accounted for 
the significant relationships between the two sets o f variables. Data on the first pair o f  
canonical variâtes appear in Table 7 below, along with correlations between the variables 
and the canonical variâtes, standardized canonical variate coefficients, wdthin-set variance 
accounted for by the canonical variâtes (percent o f variance), redundancies, and the 
canonical correlation.
With a cutoff correlation of .30 as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (1989), the 
variables in the attention set that were correlated with the first canonical variate were Rey- 
O copy, WCST errors, WCST perseverative errors. Finger Tapping, Trails B time, WAIS- 
R Digit Symbol scaled score, and WAIS-R Digit Span scaled score. Among emotional
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distress variables, only MMPI Scale D (depression) was significantly correlated. The first 
pair of canonical variâtes indicate that higher depression scores (.45) are associated with 
lower scores on Rey-O copy (-.34), more WCST errors (.30) and perseverative errors 
(.35), fewer dominant (-.52) and nondominant (-.44) taps on Finger Tapping, longer total 
time on Trails B (.46), and lower scaled scores on WAIS-R Digit Symbol (-.75) and Digit 
Span (-.39).
Table 7
Canonical Correlation
Correlation Coefficient
Attention Test set
ANIM .16 .07
LPID .26 .47
LPTND .18 -4 9
ROCOPY -.34 -.38
WRAC -.07 .33
WCSTC -04 .23
WCSTCT -.12 .16
WCSTE .30 .31
WCSTPE .35 .17
WCSTPR .19 .06
WCSTFM -.01 -.21
DYND -.21 .20
DYNND -.22 -.22
TAPD -.52 -.38
TAPND -.44 .03
BWFTW -26 .03
TRLA .25 -.27
TRLB .46 .19
WDSY -.75 -.61
WDSP -.39 -.08
RHYE .19 .09
SPTE .17 .05
(table continued)
Depression and Anxiety 69
Table 7 (continued)
Canonical Correlation
Correlation
Percent o f  variance 9.90
Redundancy 0.50
Emotional Distress set
MMPID .45
MMPI Pt -.27
Percent o f  variance 0.70
Redundancy 13.60
Canonical correlation 0.23
Note. Second canonical variate was not significant (p = 0.084); ANIM=Category 
Fluency; DYND=Dominant Grip Strength; DYNND=Nondominant Grip Strength; 
LPID=Dominant Grooved Pegboard; LPTND=Nondominant Grooved Pegboard; 
TAPD=Dominant Finger Tapping; TAPND=Nondominant Finger Tapping; 
RHYE=Seashore Rhythm; R0C0PY =Rey-0 Copy; SPTE=Speech Sounds Perception 
Test; TRLA=Trails A; TRLB=Trails B; WCSTC=Wisconsin Card Sorting Test Correct; 
WCSTCT=WCST Number o f Categories; WCSTE=WCST Errors; WCSTFM=WCST 
Failure to Maintain Set; WCSTPE=WCST Perseverative Errors; WCSTPR=WCST 
Perseverative Responses; WDSP=WAJS-R Digit Span; WDSY=WAJS-R Digit Symbol; 
WRAC=WMS-R Attention/Concentration Index; MMPID=Scale D; MMPIPt=Scale Pt.
Next, an identical canonical correlation was performed with the addition o f 
MMPI VER (version o f  MMPI administered) as a covariate (Table 8 below). The first 
canonical correlation was .28 (8% o f variance). The second canonical correlation was .22 
(5% o f variance). With both canonical correlations included, Wilks Lambda = .88, g < 
.001, and with the first canonical correlation removed, Wilks Lambda = .95, g < .05. The 
first pair o f canonical variâtes therefore accounted for the significant relationships between 
the two sets o f variables. Data on the two pairs of canonical variâtes appear in Table 8, 
along with correlations between the variables and the canonical variâtes, standardized
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canonical variate coefficients, within-set variance accounted for by the canonical variâtes
(percent o f variance), redundancies, and canonical correlations.
Total percent o f variance and total redundancy indicate that the first pair o f  
canonical variâtes was marginally related with moderate redundan<ty (39%), however the 
second pair was circumspect due to very large redundancy (60%).
With a cutoff correlation o f .30, the variables in the attention set that were 
correlated with the first canonical variate were WCST errors, WCST perseverative errors, 
WCST perseverative responses, dominant and nondominant Finger Tapping, Trails B 
time, WAIS-R Digit Symbol scaled score, and Speech Perception Test errors. Among 
emotional distress variables, only MMPI Scale D (depression) was significantly correlated. 
The first pair of canonical variâtes indicate that higher depression scores (.85) are 
associated with more WCST errors (.39), perseverative errors (.33), perseverative 
responses ( 31 ), fewer dominant (-.47) and nondominant (-.41 ) taps on Finger Tapping, 
longer total time on Trails B (.40), lower scaled scores on WAIS-R Digit Symbol (-.71) 
and more errors on the Speech Perception Test (.34).
Table 8
Canonical Correlation with Covariate
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First canonical variate** Second canonical variate*
Correlation Coefficient Correlation Coefficient
Attention Test set 
ANIM -.04 .14 .29 -.07
LPID -.11 -.03 .46 .36
LPTND -.07 -.10 .42 -.30
ROCOPY .08 -.29 -.59 -.34
WRAC .11 .31 -.21 .22
WCSTC -.11 -.01 .24 .45
WCSTCT -.27 .40 .14 ,.13
WCSTE .39 43 -.04 -.11
WCSTPE .33 .20 .21 .11
WCSTPR .31 .04 -.04 .36
WCSTFM -.05 -.13 .19 -.08
DYND .04 .20 -.07 .02
DYNND .02 -.05 -.07 -.03
TAPD -.47 -.40 -.1 .12
TAPND -.41 -.05 -.13 -.15
BWFTW -.18 .04 -.33 -.13
TRLA .23 -.13 .25 .11
TRLB .40 .09 .09 -.06
WDSY -.71 -.64 -.35 -.28
WDSP -.25 .03 -.11 .09
RHYE .04 -.07 .08 .11
SPTE .34 .19 -.15 -.10
M M PIV ER -.28 -.41 .78 .66
Percent of variance 8.17 8.79 Total = 16.96
Redundancy 0.58 0.42 Total = 1.00
Emotional Distress set 
M M PID .85 1.45 -.53 .43
MMPI Pt .29 -.81 -.96 -1.28
Percent of variance 2.85 . 2.88 Total = 5.73
Redundancy 39.87 60.13 Total = 100.00
Canonical correlation 0.28 0.22
(table continued)
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Note. < 0.05 < 0.01; ANIM=Category Fluency; DYND=Dominant Grip
Strength; DYNND=Nondominant Grip Strength; LPID=Dominant Grooved Pegboard; 
LPTND=Nondominant Grooved Pegboard; TAPD=Dominant Finger Tapping; 
TAPND=Nondominant Finger Tapping; RHYE==Seashore Rhythm; R 0 C 0 P Y = R ^ -0  
Copy; SPTE=Speech Sounds Perception Test; TRLA=Trails A; TRLB=Trails B; 
WCSTC=Wisconsin Card Sorting Test Correct; WCSTCT=WCST Number o f  Categories; 
WCSTE=WCST Errors; WCSTFM=WCST Failure to Maintain Set; WCSTPE=WCST 
Perseverative Errors; WCSTPR=WCST Perseverative Responses; WDSP=WAIS-R D i^ t 
Span; WDSY=WAIS-R Digit Symbol; WRAC=WMS-R Attention/Concentration Index; 
MMPID=Scale D; MMPIPt=Scale Pt.
The variables in the attention set that were correlated with the second canonical 
variate were dominant and nondominant Grooved Pegboard, Rey-0 copy. Verbal Fluency, 
and WAIS-R Digit Symbol. In the emotional distress set, variables with significant 
correlations included both Scale D (depression) and Scale Pt (anxiety). The second pair of 
canonical variâtes indicated that lower depression scores (-.53) and anxiety scores (-.96) 
were associated with longer time to complete Grooved Pegboard for dominant (.46) and 
nondominant (.42) upper extremities, lower scores on Rey-O copy (- 59). fewer words on 
Verbal Fluency (-.33), and lower WAIS-R Digit Symbol scaled scores (-.35). ).
However, as mentioned above total redundancy for this canonical pair was 60% indicating 
a large portion o f the variance shared between the two sets o f variables. Therefore, 
interpretation o f  this canonical pair would be specious.
In conclusion, results o f the first canonical correlation revealed that depression was 
significantly correlated with the first canonical variate (Emotional Distress) but only 
contributed 0.7% o f the variance. Variables significantly correlated with the second 
canonical variate (Attention Tests) were Rey-O Copy, WCST Errors and Perseverative 
Errors, Finger Tapping (both hands). Trails B, and WAIS-R Digit Symbol and Digit Span, 
and they contributed approximately 10% o f the variance. Overall, the pair o f  canonical
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variâtes (Emotional Distress and Attention Tests) was modestly correlated (0.23) with
only 5% of the variance explained.
The second canonical correlation, which included the version o f MMPI 
administered to the participants, revealed minor differences. Only the first pair o f 
canonical variâtes was interpretable due to large redundancy in the second pair (60%) o f 
canonical variâtes. In the second canonical correlation, depression was significantly 
correlated with the first canonical variate (Emotional Distress) and contributed slightly 
more variance (2.85%). Variables significantly correlated with the second canonical 
variate (Attention Tests) differed somewhat. Rey-O Copy and WAIS-R Digit Span were 
dropped in favor of WCST Perseverative Responses and the Speech Sounds Perception 
Test. The percent o f variance contributed was 8.17%. Overall, the pair o f canonical 
variâtes (Emotional Distress and Attention Tests) was modestly correlated (0.28) with 
only 5% o f the variance explained. Furthermore, the covariate MMPI Version 
Administered (MMPI VER) was not significantly correlated with the second canonical 
variate (Attention Tests).
Next, a series o f Multiple Analyses o f Covariance (MANCOVA) were performed 
to determine the relationship between severity levels o f emotional distress and attention 
measures while controlling for either depression or anxiety scores. Severity levels for all 
analyses were determined using the same procedure utilized by Vanderploeg et al. (1998):
“High Depression” = T-score on D > 70, T-score on Pt < 60;
“Low Depression” = T-score on D > 45 and < 55, T-score on Pt < 60;
“High Anxiety” = T-score on Pt > 70, T-score on D < 60;
“Low Anxiety” = T-score on Pt > 45 and < 55, T-score on D < 60;
Depression and Anxiety 74 
“High Depression and Anxiety" = T-score on D and Pt > 70; and
“Low Depression and Anxiety” = T-score on D and Pt > 45 and < 55.
A MANCOVA was performed comparing attention scores between groups by 
level of anxiety (Le., No, Low, Moderate, and High Anxiety) while controlling for 
depression scores. Table 9 (below) presents significant interactions (p < 0.05) and 
significant post-hoc comparisons utilizing Games-Howell’s (1976) procedure for unequal 
nVvariances to determine significant pairwise comparisons. Mean differences (I minus J) 
are presented in parentheses. Significant interactions were found only for the three 
variables LPID (p = .012), ROCOPY (p = .003), and WRAC (p = .028).
Table 9
MANOVA bv Anxietv Severity Levels Controlling for Depression with Post-Hoc 
Comparisons
Variable 
I V. J levels (Means) N N
F Sig-
LPID 3.66 .012*
Moderate (72.05) 283 High (65.42) 245 .035*
ROCOPY 4.67 .003**
No (34.95) 56 High (36.77) 245 .021*
Low (35.40) 125 High (36.77) 245 .027*
Moderate (35.70) 283 High (36.77) 245 .027*
WRAC 3.05 .028*
Moderate (99.76) 83 High (103.05) 45 .013*
Note: Only significant interactions are shown (* p < 0.05 or ** p < 0.01); 
LPID=Dominant Grooved Pegboard; R0C0PY=Rey-0 Copy; WRAC=WMS-R 
Attention/Concentration Index.
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A similar MANCOVA was performed comparing attention scores between groups
by level o f depression (No, Low, Moderate, and High Depression) while controlling for
anxiety. Table 10 (below) presents significant interactions (g < 0.05) and significant post-
hoc comparisons utilizing Games-Howelfs procedure for unequal n’s/variances to
determine significant pairwise comparisons. Mean differences (I minus J) are presented in
parentheses.
Table 10
MANOVA by Depression Severity Levels Controlling for Anxiety with Post-Hoc 
Comparisons
Variable 
1 V . J levels (Means) N N
Sig.
LPID 
Moderate (74.40)
LPTND 
Moderate (83.08)
TAPD 
Low (46.64)
Low (46.64)
WCSTCT 
No (4.68)
WCSTE 
No (32.86)
No (32.86)
251 High (66.63)
251 High (66.63)
106 Moderate (44.10) 
106 High (43 .94)
34 High (3.95)
34 Moderate (4.01 ) 
34 High (41.95)
3.28 .021*
318 .013*
3.15 .024*
318 .028*
251
318
251
251
318
1.50
3.23
4.70
.015*
.002* *
.000* *
.022*
.035*
.003**
.015*
.012*
(table continued)
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Table 10
MANOVA bv Depression Severity Levels Controllina for Anxiety with Post-Hoc 
Comparisons
Variable 
I v. J levels (Means) N N
E Sig.
WCSTPR 2.97 .031*
No (21.15) 34 Moderate (28.26) 251 .007**
No (21.15) 34 High (28.77) 318 .002**
WDSP 3.68 .012*
No (9.97) 34 Moderate (8.48) 251 .026*
WDSY 3.28 .021*
No (8.33) 34 Moderate (7.11) 251 .048*
WRAC 4.65 .003**
Moderate (99.03) 251 High (102.90) 318 .002**
Note: Only significant interactions are shown (* p < 0.05 or ** p < 0.01); 
ANIM=Category Fluency; DYND=Dominant Grip Strength; DYNND=Nondominant Grip 
Strength; LPID=Dominant Grooved Pegboard; LPTND=Nondominant Grooved 
Pegboard; TAPD=Doniinant Finger Tapping; TAPND=Nondominant Finger Tapping; 
RHYE=Seashore Rhythm; R0C0PY=Rey-0 Copy; SPTE=Speech Sounds Perception 
Test; TRTA=Trails A; TRLB=Trails B; WCSTC=Wisconsin Card Sorting Test Correct; 
WCSTCT=WCST Number o f Categories; WCSTE=WCST Errors; WCSTFM=WCST 
Failure to Maintain Set; WCSTPE=WCST Perseverative Errors; WCSTPR=WCST 
Perseverative Responses; WDSP=WA1S-R Digit Span; WDS Y=WAIS-R Digit Symbol; 
WRAC=WMS-R Attention/Concentration Index; MMPID=Scale D; MMPI PT=Scale Pt.
Next, a series o f MANOVA procedures were performed to assess the effect o f 
both depression and anxiety. Attention performance o f participants with both High scores 
(T > 70) on Scales 2 and 7 was compared to those without High scores. Results were 
significant for several attention variables (see Table 11 below), however a comparison o f
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the means revealed surprising results. Except for SPTE, all other \ ariable means indicated 
improvement in performance o f participants. Attention performance o f  participants with 
both Low scores (T >45 and <55) on Scales 2 and 7 was compared to those without Low 
scores, however results were not significant.
The sample was subsequently divided into two groups by presence (neurologic, 
N=256) or absence (non-neurologic, N=287) of documented neurologic injury. The 
neurologic group consisted o f mixed etiologies (see Table 12 below). Neurologic injury 
due to trauma comprised 49.2% o f the sample, followed by degenerative processes 
(27.7%), vascular disorders (19.9%), and neoplasms ( 11.7%). The remaining etiologies 
(2.6%) comprised less than 1% each. A MANOVA was performed to compare the two 
groups on performance on attention measures. Results are presented in Table 13 below 
and show significant interactions for the following variables: BWFTW (p < .001), LPID (p 
< .007), LPTND (p = .012), ROCOPY (p = .005), TAPD (p = .019), TAPND (p = .015), 
TRLA (p < .001), TRLB(p < .001), WDSP (p < .001), WDSY (p < .001), and WRAC (p 
= .024). All mean differences were in the expected direction o f performance for each test.
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Table 11
MANOVA of Attention Measures for Both Hiizh Depression and Anxietv
Variable High D/A (N=204) Low D/A (N=505) F Sig.
BWFTW 33.97 (8.33) 32.60 (8.32) .3.91 048*
LPID 65.46 (25.69) 72.13 (30.89) 7.42 .007**
LPTND 76.30 (21.38) 80.77 (26.23) 4.66 .031*
ROCOPY 36.78 (4.31) 35.62 (4.51) 9.85 .002**
SPTE 8.30 (4.39) 7.63 (3.17) 5.14 .024*
WRAC 103.07(11.54) 100.79(13.43) 4.53 .034*
Note: * p <.05; ** g < .01; BWFTW=Verbal Fluency; LPID=Dominant Grooved 
Pegboard; LPTND=Nondominant Grooved Pegboard; ROCOPY=Rey-0 Copy; 
SPTE=Speech Perception Test; WRAC=WMS-R Attention/Concentration Index.
Table 12
Frequencies bv Neurologic Diagnosis
Diagnostic Category N
Trauma
Degenerative Process 
Vascular Disorders 
Neoplasm
126
71
51
30
(table continued)
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Table 12 (continued)
Frequencies bv Neurologic Diagnosis
Diagnostic Category N
Seizure Disorders 
Infectious Disease 
Metabolic or Toxic Disorder 
Congenital
24
19
15
4
Miscellaneous 4
(Cranial/Peripheral nerve disorder, spinal disorder, migraines, etc.)
Table 13
MANOVA bv Neurologic Status
Variable Neurologic (N=256) Non-neurologic (N=287) F Sig.
BWFTW 31.85 (9.6) 34.89 (6.88) 18.29 .000**
LPID 70.81 (29.52) 64.62 (23.38) 7.41 .007**
LPTND 79.94 (25.54) 75.06(19.21) 6.42 .012*
ROCOPY 35.95 (3.98) 36.89 (3.74) 8.01 .005**
TAPD 43.45 (8.74) 45.07 (7.28) 5.58 .019*
TAPND 38.89 (7.85) 40.35 (6.21) 5.90 .015*
(table continued)
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Table 13 (continued)
MANOVA by Neurolotric Status
Variable Neurologic (N=256) Non-neurologic (N=287) F Sig.
TRLA 53.13 (46.06) 39.18 (13.64) 23.96 .000**
TRLB 132.69 (90.43) 105.02(54.44) 19.11 .000**
WDSP 8.09 (2.67) 9.22 (2.72) 23.70 .000**
WDSY 6.15(3.02) 8.29 (2.75) 74.80 .000**
WRAC 101.44(14.19) 103.87(10.70) 5.14 .024*
Note: Only significant interactions are shown (* p < 0.05 or ** p < 0.01 ); 
LPID=Dominant Grooved Pegboard; LPTND=Nondominant Grooved Pegboard; 
TAPD=Dominant Finger Tapping; TAPND=Nondominant Finger Tapping; 
R0C0PY=Rey-0 Copy; TRLA=Trails A; TRLB=Traiis B; WDSP=WAIS-R Digit Span; 
WDSY=WAJS-R Digit Symbol; WRAC=WMS-R Attention/Concentration Index
Next, a series o f MANOVA’s were utilized for comparisons between neurologic 
and non-neurologic groups on levels o f anxiety and depression. Results are presented in 
Table 14 below. Depression and anxiety levels were significantly lower in the neurologic 
group as compared to the non-neurologic group.
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Table 14
MANOVA of Depression and Anxietv Level by Neurologic Status
Variable Neurologic (N=3 54) Non-neurologic (N=409) E Sig.
Neurologic Status
MMPID 68.31 (14.85) 70.81 (15.8) 5.024 .025*
MMPIPt 62.25(13.59) 67.33 (14.14) 25.458 .000**
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 ; MMPlD=Scale D; MMPlPt=Scale Pt.
The neurologic group was divided into two groups by depression level (i.e., 
depressed or non-depressed) and compared on attention measures using MANOVA (see 
Table 15 below). Significant differences were found on ROCOPY (p = .005), ANIM (p = 
.034), and LPID (p = .021). Interestingly, performance was better for the depressed 
group on ROCOPY and LPID. Performance was worse for the depressed group on 
ANIM.
Next, the neurologic group was divided into two groups by anxiety level (i.e., 
anxious or non-anxious) and compared on the attention measures, again utilizing the 
MANOVA procedure. Significant differences were found for the following variables: 
ROCOPY (p<  .001), WCSTFM (p = .011), BWFTW (p = .025), LPID (p = .001), and 
LPTND (p = 0 1 ). For all variables performance was significantly better in the anxious 
group.
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Next, the non-neurologic group was divided into two groups by depression level
(i.e., depressed or non-depressed) and compared on attention measures. Significant
differences were found on the following variables; TAPD (p = .016), TAPND (p = .022),
TRLA (p = .015), WCSTCT (p = .023), WCSTE (p = .013), WCSTPR (p = .001),
WDSY (p < .001), LPID (p = .024), and LPTND (p = .036). For all o f  these variables
except LPID and LPTND, performance was significantly worse in the depressed group.
Performance was improved for the depressed group on LPID and LPTND.
Finally, the non-neurologic group was divided into two groups by anxiety level
(i.e., anxious or non-anxious) and compared on attention measures. No significant
interactions were found.
Table 15
MANOVA of Attention Measures for Depression and Anxietv Level bv Neurologic Status
Variable High Low F Sig.
Neurologic by Depression (N=98) (N=158)
ROCOPY 36.83 (3.78) 35.40(4.01) 8.044 .005**
ANIM 11.4 (2.28) 12.04 (2.33) 4.56 .034*
LPID 65.43 (23.98) 74.14(32.11) 5.355 .021*
Neurologic by Anxiety (N=74) (N=184)
ROCOPY 37.31 (3.38) 35.39 (4.08) 12.828 .000**
WCSTFM 0.77 (0.48) 1.04(0.81) 6.642 .011*
BWFTW 33.95 (8.69) 30.99 (9.84) 5.100 .025*
LPID 61.27 (16.74) 74.68 (32.60) 11.301 .001**
LPTND 73.50(17.69) 82.57 (27.73) 6.787 .010*
(table continued)
Depression and Anxiety 83
Table 15
MANOVA of Attention Measures For Depression and Anxietv Level bv Neurologic Status
Variable High Low F Sig-
Non-neurologic by Dep (N=147) (N=140)
TAPD 44.06 (8.79) 46.13 (5.08) 5.854 .016*
TAPND 39.54 (7.23) 41.21 (4.79) 5.309 .022*
TRLA 41.10(15.59) 37.17(10.93) 6.047 .015*
WCSTCT 3.86(1.22) 4.21 (1.34) 5.251 .023*
WCSTE 42.07 (14.69) 37.78(14.43) 6.232 .013*
WCSTPR 29.65 (15.14) 24.32(10.84) 11.652 .001**
WDSY 7.70 (2.79) 8.91 (2.59) 14.332 .000**
LPID 61.58(19.16) 67.81 (26.81) 5.159 .024*
LPTND 72.75 (15.71) 77.49 (22.11) 4.427 .036*
Non-neurologic by Anxiety
(no significant interactions)
Note: * g < 0.05; ** g < 0 .01; ANIM=Category Fluency; DYND=Dominant Grip 
Strength; DYNND=Nondominant Grip Strength; LPID=Dontinant Grooved Pegboard; 
LPTND=Nondominant Grooved Pegboard; TAPD=Dominant Finger Tapping; 
TAPND=Nondominant Finger Tapping; RHYE=Seashore Rhythm; R0C0PY=Rey-0 
Copy; SPTE=Speech Sounds Perception Test; TRLA=Trails A; TRLB=Trails B; 
W(isTC=Wisconsin Card Sorting Test Correct; WCSTCT=WCST Number o f Categories; 
WCSTE=WCST Errors; WCSTFM=WCST Failure to Maintain Set; WCSTPE=WCST 
Perseverative Errors; WCSTPR=WCST Perseverative Responses; WDSP=WAIS-R Digit 
Span; WDSY=W.A1S-R Digit Symbol; WR.AC=WMS-R Attention/Concentration Index
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Discussion
The purpose o f this study was to explore the relationship between emotional 
distress and neuropsychological test performance given the frequency with which 
psychologists and neuropsychologists encounter depression and anxiety. Empirical studies 
exploring this relationship have been a relatively recent trend, and results have been mixed 
due to various methodological problems (Sweet et al., 1992). The present study aimed to 
address this problem by determining the impact of differing levels o f anxiety and 
depression on attention performance in both patients with neurologic insult and those 
without.
Relationships Among the Variables
Initial correlational analyses revealed relationships in the expected directions with 
respect to various scaling characteristics. For example, significant inverse correlations 
were found between tests that consist of total time to complete (e.g.. Grooved Pegboard) 
and number correct (e.g., Rey-O Copy), reflecting expected directions of performance. 
Tests scored in the same direction according to performance were positively correlated, 
and as expected, tests tended to correlate with each other by area (e.g., motor) and with 
themselves (e.g.. Dominant and Nondominant Finger Tapping). In addition, MMPI Scale 
2 (Depression) and Scale 7 (Anxiety) were highly correlated, as expected.
Unfortunately, it was necessary to remove a number o f  key measures of attention 
from all analyses due to low sample sizes: Conners’ Continuous Performance Test (CPT) 
scores (N=51), Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT) scores (N=30), Symbol 
Digit Modalities Test - Oral and Written scores (N=34) and Stroop Color and Word Test
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scores (N=19). As discussed previously, these tests are good measures o f attention ability 
and have been shown to be sensitive to the effects of depression and anxiety (Lezak, 1995; 
Spreen & Strauss, 1998; Sweet, Newman & Bell, 1992; and Veiel, 1997).
A factor analysis was performed in an attempt to derive similar factor loadings as 
that derived by Mirsky (1987) and to explore the factor structure underlying the data 
utilized for this study. Attempts to replicate Mirsky’s analysis were significantly limited by 
the removal of the Stroop and CPT variables, representing almost half (4) o f Mirsky’s 
original 10 variables. Removal o f variables associated with the Stroop Color and Word 
Test and Conners’ Continuous Performance Test (CPT) was necessitated by low sample 
sizes for those tests. Comparisons with Mirsky’s original factor analysis was further 
limited by the lack of a suitable analogue to the Talland Letter Cancellation Test, used by 
Mirsky in his original study. However, when the remaining variables were submitted to 
factor analysis, nearly analogous factor loadings were derived as originally found by 
Mirsky (see Table 5).
Mirsky’s original factor analysis identified four factors: “focus-execute”, “sustain”, 
“encode”, and “shift”, however in the current study six factors were derived. In the 
current analysis. Trail Making (Parts A and B), Digit Symbol, Finger Tapping and Verbal 
Fluency, loaded together on Factor 4, which may reflect Mirsky’s first factor, “focus- 
execute.” Mirsky’s second factor (“sustain”) consisted of CPT scores, which were 
removed from this analysis, thus no comparison was available. His third factor (“encode ”) 
consisted of Arithmetic and Digit Span scale scores, however factor loadings for 
Arithmetic and Digit Span loaded on Factor 6 in the current analysis with the Speech 
Perception Test and Seashore Rhythm. Loadings for this factor may have represented an
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“Auditory Attention” or “Auditoiy Processing” component. Mirsky’s fourth factor
(“shift”) consisted o f WCST errors, which appeared to correspond with Factor 2 in the
current study. This factor consisted of 5 out of the 6 WCST scores (i.e., all but Failure to
Maintain Set).
The remaining factors that were derived in the current analysis did not correspond 
to any o f Mirsky’s original factors. Factor 3 appeared to represent a straightforward 
motor component, consisting o f  Grip Strength (both hands) and Finger Tapping (both 
hands). Factor I was baffling and consisted of Category Fluency, Grooved Pegboard, 
Rey-O Copy, and the WMS-R Attention/Concentration Index. It is possible that tests 
with large variability [e.g.. Grooved Pegboard Dominant: 71 .51 (30.91); Grooved 
Pegboard Nondominant: 81.34 (28.32); and WMS-R Attention/Concentration Index: 
101.69 (13.69)] loaded on the first factor, which is a potential artifact o f  Principal 
Component Analysis. Equally puzzling was Factor 5, which consisted o f WCST Number 
Correct and WCST Failure to Maintain Set, both of which loaded separately from the 
other WCST scores.
It is difficult to derive rich interpretative findings from the factor analysis 
performed in the current study due to the loss o f key attention test scores (e.g., CPT and 
Stroop) and the lack of direct comparison to Mirsky’s original analysis. Nevertheless, a 
few conclusions may be drawn. First, it appeared that the underlying structure o f the 
dataset is represented by six factors or components of attention, as contrasted with 
Mirsky’s four components. The first factor is enigmatic, and a meaningful label or 
theoretical construct could not be derived. The second factor seemed to represent a 
cognitive “shifting” component, probably mediated by prefrontal cortex. A third factor
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was derived, and appeared to represent a straightforward "motor” component. This
activating or driving function likely incorporates lower midbrain structures such as the
caudate, putamen, and globus pallidus. The fourth factor appeared to represent a
“focusing” or “execute” function, probably mediated by superior temporal and inferior
parietal cortices. The fifth factor incorporated two of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
scores apart from those represented in a separate derived factor. It is possible that they
are tapping into another aspect o f cognitive flexibility, problem solving, or reasoning
however it is unusual for WCST scores to load separately. Thus, it is unclear what this
finding means. The final factor appeared to represent an auditory processing component
o f attention, which is represented primarily in the temporal cortices, although the spatial
aspects o f auditory processing probably takes place in the nondominant parietal cortex
(usually right hemisphere).
The Significance o f Medico-Legal Issues
It was hypothesized that, o f  those cases presenting for neuropsychological 
evaluation due to a legal case pending, motivation levels and attempts at malingering 
would be sufficiently varied as to not represent a significant confound in this large sample. 
However, this was not the case. Participants who presented for a neuropsychological 
evaluation that were involved in seeking financial compensation differed significantly from 
those without financial incentive. Results strongly supported findings that individuals with 
potential financial gain are at risk for exaggeration of symptoms and invalid response sets, 
thus presenting a potential confound in empirical studies (Sweet et al., 1992).
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Consequently, participants with a legal case pending were removed from subsequent
analyses.
Depression and Attention
Clinical lore and increasing numbers of empirical studies inform us that depression 
can significantly limit attentional resources (Beck et al., 1979; Ingram, 1984; and Sweet et 
al., 1992). One goal o f the current study was to explore the degree to which depression 
contributes to the variance in attention scores as measured by neuropsychological 
measures o f attention. A second goal was to explore the degree to which individual 
neuropsychological measures of attention are affected by depression scores.
Two canonical correlations were performed (Tables 7 and 8). The first canonical 
correlation included measures of emotional distress (MMPI Scales 2 and 7) and 
neuropsychological measures o f attention, while the second correlation included those 
same measures but also included the version of MMPI administered as a covariate, to 
ensure that this was not a potential confound. Moderate-to-high correlations were 
obtained in each canonical correlation between depression and attention measures 
(relationships with anxiety to be discussed in the next section), and though significant, the 
percent of variance contributed in each solution was surprisingly minute. The first 
canonical correlation accounted for 5% (r = 0.23) o f the variance, and the second 
canonical correlation (with the covariate of MMPI version) accounted for slightly more,
8% (r = 0.28).
In the first canonical correlation, moderate-to-high correlations (>0.30 absolute 
value) indicated that as depression (r = .45) increased performance was adversely affected
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on (in descending order) WAIS-R Digit Symbol, Dominant Finger Tapping, Trails B,
Nondominant Finger Tapping, WAIS-R Digit Span, WCST Perseverative Errors, Rey-O
Copy, and WCST Errors. When version of MMPI administered was added as a covariate,
Rey-O Copy and WAIS-R Digit Span dropped out and WCST Perseverative Responses
and Speech Perception Test were added (given a conservative >0.30 absolute value
criterion). In descending order, as depression (r = .85) increased performance was
adversely affected on WAIS-R Digit Symbol, Dominant Finger Tapping, Nondominant
Finger Tapping, Trails B, WCST Errors, WCST, Perseverative Errors, Speech Perception
Test, and WCST Perseverative Responses. Thus, it appeared that WAIS-R Digit Symbol,
Finger Tapping, and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test were most sensitive to the affects o f
depression on attention, followed closely by WAIS-R Digit Span, Rey-O Copy, and the
Speech Perception Test. Consideration of these patterns with respect to the factor
loadings discussed previously (in the context of Mirsky’s findings), seemed to suggest that
depression adversely affected the "Shift” and "Focus/Execute” components o f attention
and possibly some aspects o f the "Encode” component.
Next, attention measures were analyzed by depression severity levels, while 
controlling for the effect o f  anxiety. Post-hoc procedures were performed to explore 
pairwise comparisons (Table 10). Results showed that performance on attention measures 
was significantly affected by depression severity. Increasing levels of depression resulted 
in poorer performance on Dominant Finger Tapping; WCST Categories, Errors, and 
Perseverative Responses; WAIS-R Digit Span and Digit Symbol; and the WMS-R 
Attention/Concentration Index. A curious finding was improved performance on Grooved 
Pegboard (Dominant and Nondominant) as depression increases from Moderate to High
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Depression. In fact, for both variables mean scores were lower than the No Depression
group (though this was not significant). Data were re-checked and confirmed on this
result, and no reason could be determinded for such a finding.
Anxietv and Attention
Another goal of the current study was to explore the degree to which anxiety 
contributes to the variance in attention scores as measured by neuropsychological 
measures o f attention. A second goal was to explore the degree to which individual 
neuropsychological measures of attention are affected by anxiety scores. As reported 
earlier, ample support exists for an adverse effect o f anxiety states on cognitive 
performance, however some studies report equal or better performance o f anxious 
individuals over controls (Dibartolo, et al.. 1997; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Moreover, the 
Yerkes-Dodson Law (Revelle & Loftus, 1992) predicts optimal performance at moderate 
levels o f anxiety.
The two canonical correlations discussed previously (Tables 7 and 8) included 
anxiety (MMPI Scale 7) as part of the emotional distress variable set. The first canonical 
correlation included measures of emotional distress and neuropsychological measures o f 
attention, while the second correlation included those same measures but also included the 
version of MMPI administered as a covariate. Moderate-to-high correlations were 
obtained in each canonical correlation between anxiety and attention measures, and though 
significant, the percent o f variance contributed in each solution was surprisingly minute. 
Furthermore, anxiety was much less correlated with attention measures than depression in 
both canonical correlations (<.30 absolute value). In fact, anxiety was inversely correlated
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in the first canonical correlation (r = - 27) and positively correlated in the second canonical 
correlation (r = .29). Overall, the first canonical correlation accounted for 5% (r = 0.23) 
o f the variance, and the second canonical correlation (with the covariate o f MMPI 
version) accounted for slightly more, 8% (r = 0.28). However, given the small 
correlations for anxiety and reversed directional relationships, interpretations are 
extremely guarded. It is likely that depression contributed most o f what little variance in 
attention was contributed to the solutions by emotional distress.
Next, attention measures were analyzed by anxiety severity levels, while 
controlling for the effect o f depression. Post-hoc procedures were performed to explore 
pairwise comparisons (Table 9). Results showed that performance on attention measures 
was significantly affected by anxiety severity, but in a positive sense. Increasing levels o f 
anxiety resulted in improved performance on Dominant Grooved Pegboard, Rey-0 Copy, 
and the WMS-R Attention/Concentration Index. No significant adverse effects were 
observed on attention, even for participants in the High Anxiety group.
Improved performance with increasing anxiety supported the Yerkes-Dodson Law, 
however better performance at the High Anxiety level was not expected. In examining 
mean trends for all attention measures, performance was observed to be significantly 
improved for most variables at the High Anxiety level. This was possibly due to the 
assignment of all MMPI Scale 7 scores greater than T=70 to the High Anxiety group. If 
the floor were raised for admission to the High Anxiety group (e.g., T=80), it is possible 
that more high-anxious individuals would be reflected in the means and evidence worse 
performance. Put another way, perhaps individuals “captured” in the low end of the High 
Anxiety group are reflective of the “moderate anxiety” level described in the Yerkes-
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Dodson Law, thus they perform optimally - which is reflected in the means o f  the High
Anxiety group o f the current study.
Depression and Anxiety Combined
The combination o f both Low Depression and Low Anxiety (T > 45 and <55) did 
not exert adverse effects on attention performance. However, when the effects o f both 
High Depression and High Anxiety were ana!>'zed a surprising finding emerged. 
Performance improved on Verbal Fluency, Grooved Pegboard (dominant and 
nondominant), Rey-O Copy, and WMS-R Attention/Concentration Index. The only 
variable in which performance decreased was on the Speech Perception Test. It is not 
clear why such a finding would have emerged. One could speculate that the performance 
improvements noted previously in the separate analysis o f High Anxiety (i.e., in the 
context of Yerkes-Dodson) overwhelms the effects o f  High Depression when they are 
experienced together. Another related possibility might be that participants reporting both 
high anxiety and high depressive symptoms are experiencing a more 'agitated" depression 
versus one consisting o f "psychomotor retardation "
Neurologies versus Non-neurologics
Two groups were identified; those participants with documented neurologic injury 
and those clearly absent neurologic injury. The neurologic group was comprised o f almost 
half (49.2%) neurologic injury due to trauma. Nonetheless, it was a mixed neurologic 
group (i.e., multiple etiologies represented).
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When groups were compared by performance on attention measures, the non­
neurologic group outperformed the neurologic group as expected. The non-neurologic 
group performed better on Verbal Fluency, Grooved Pegboard, Finger Tapping, Trails A 
and B, Rey-0 Copy, WAIS-R. Digit Span and Digit Symbol, and the WMS-R 
Attention/Concentration Index.
When the two groups were compared by level of depression and anxiety, the 
neurologic group scored lower on depression and anxiety, which was unexpected. This 
finding was despite the fact that neurologic groups will often elevate on Scales 2 and 7 
simply due to the endorsement o f somatic complaints arising from their illness or injury 
(Gass & Wald, 1997). A likely explanation for decreased emotional distress in this group 
was impaired self-awareness (Prigatano & Schacter, 1991 ). Since nearly half o f the 
neurologic group was composed o f individuals with documented brain trauma, it is 
possible that those individuals had decreased awareness o f their cognitive and physical 
deficits. With reduced insight into their deficits such individuals are less likely to develop 
a reactive depression, because they simply fail to appreciate how different they are 
compared to pre-injury functioning.
Next, the neuroiogic group was itself divided into depressed and non-depressed 
groups to assess the effect o f depression on attention measures in this population. 
Significant differences were found on the Rey-O Copy, Category Fluency, and Grooved 
Pegboard. Performance was worse for the depressed group on Category Fluency, 
however the depressed group performed better than the non-depressed group on Grooved 
Pegboard (Dominant only) and Rey-0 Copy Anxiety level was not controlled in this
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analysis due to low cell sizes, thus anxiety may have contributed to better performance by 
the depressed group.
The neurologic group was also divided into anxious and non-anxious groups to 
assess the effect o f anxiety on measures of attention. Significant differences were found 
on Rey-0 Copy, Verbal Fluency, Grooved Pegboard, and WCST Failure to Maintain Set.
Performance on all variables was better in the anxious group.
Next, the non-neurologic group was divided according to depression level and 
compared on attention measures. Significant differences were found on Finger Tapping; 
Grooved Pegboard; Trails A; WAIS-R Digit Symbol; and WCST Categories, Errors, and 
Perseverative Responses. Performance was worse in the depressed group for all variables 
except Grooved Pegboard. Performance on Grooved Pegboard was better for the 
depressed group. Again, this may be due to the influence of anxiety level, which was not 
controlled for due to low cell sizes.
When the non-neurologic group was divided into two groups according to anxiety 
level and compared on attention measures, no significant results were obtained. However, 
results for Grooved Pegboard (Dominant) approached significance (p = .067) with cell 
means indicating improved performance by the anxious group. Non-significant results 
were likely due to low cell sizes.
While depression adversely affected attention performance in both neurologic and 
non-neurologic populations alike, it is likely that the depression experienced by both are 
indeed different. It is conceivable that depressive symptoms experienced by non­
neurologic individuals are more chronic in nature, whereas depressive symptoms 
experienced by neurologic individuals are more reactive or situational in nature If this is
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indeed the case, not only would depressive symptoms in neurologic individuals be
expected to be o f shorter duration, but they may actually be a good prognostic sign. A
sign that the neurologic individual is perhaps gaining better insight or awareness o f their
situation.
Relationship o f Current Findings to Past Research: Contributions and Limitations
Findings from the current study are consistent with past research (Cohen et al., 
1982, and Grant & Adams, 1986, Raskin et al., 1982, Sweet et al., 1992) and the stringent 
meta-analysis o f Veiel (1997), which demonstrate an adverse effect o f depression on 
cognition, especially attentional processes. The results o f the current study do not readily 
support the position o f  researchers such as Reitan and Wolfson (1997) that cognition is 
unaffected by depression when compared to controls. However, the current study also 
revealed that depression actually contributed little (5%) to the overall variance in attention 
scores.
Increases in the severity levels of depression were commensurate with worsening 
performance on certain attention measures. This finding was consistent with the 
theoretical models proposed regarding cognitive processes in depressed individuals (Beck 
et al., 1979; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Ingram, 1984; King et al., 1993; Pace & Dixon, 1993; 
and Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989). While specific findings with respect to poor 
performance on individual tests o f attention cannot support one particular theory of 
cognitive processing over another, the findings do support the general premise germane to 
each of the models reviewed; over-emphasis on, or pre-occupation with, internal events or 
psychological processes at the expense o f directing attentional resources out toward the
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environment. The outcome o f  which is poor attention to external demands or tasks and
poor encoding for later retrieval, which has implications for memory processes.
Empirical studies o f anxiety and attention have been mixed. Some studies find 
improved attention in anxious individuals. Eysenck and Calvo (1992) described the 
Processing Efficiency Theory o f anxiety, which predicts that under some circumstances 
performance will improve as anxiety increases. The present findings supported Eysenck 
and Calvo’s theory. Attention, as measured by certain assessment measures, improved as 
anxiety increased. This was true even in the presence o f high levels o f depression.
Specific to Processing Efficiency Theory is the notion that anxious individuals must 
expend more internal effort compared to controls to accomplish the same tasks. This 
process was not explored in the current study, therefore it is not known if anxious 
individuals in this sample found it necessary to expend more mental effort to achieve the 
improved attention scores. This is an empirical question open for future study.
In addition, findings from the current study demonstrated partial support for the 
Yerkes-Dodson Law (Revelle & Loftus, 1992). Attention scores improved for the High 
Anxiety group (as measured by Scale 7). Yerkes-Dodson posits optimal performance at 
Moderate levels of anxiety and decreasing performance at higher levels o f anxiety. 
However, as mentioned previously the High Anxiety group in the current study was 
defined as scores on Scale 7 greater than T=70. Therefore, it is possible that the High 
Anxiety group in the current study “captured” some o f the individuals at the low end o f 
this group (e.g., T > 70 but less than 80) who could have been more appropriately labeled 
as a “Moderate Anxiety” group in another study focusing on the Yerkes-Dodson 
relationship. Furthermore, it is possible that further support for Yerkes-Dodson could
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have been found if the High Anxiety group been further refined to represent individuals
scoring at the upper bounds of Scale 7 (e.g., T > SO or higher). It is possible that
attention performance may have dropped off dramatically at the upper ends o f the scale.
A limitation o f  the current study was the unfortunate exclusion o f three important, 
and sensitive, neuropsychological measures o f  attention: the Paced Auditory Serial 
Attention Test (PASAT), Conners’ Continuous Pefbrmance Test (CPT), and Stroop 
Color and Word Test. These sensitive measures may have significantly added to the 
current findings. It is hoped that future studies exploring the issue of emotional distress 
and attention ability will include these important tests in their analyses. Another limitation 
o f this study was the necessary combining of original MMPI and MMPl-2 data. Although 
it was statistically determined that the two groups had virtually non-overlapping 
distributions (i.e., very small effect size differences), it is possible that the fundamental 
scaling differences in the two instruments may have introduced one or more unknown 
confounds. Also, the use of a mixed neurologic group due to small cell sizes instead o f 
using one category o f  brain injury (e.g., trauma or degenerative diseases) may have 
introduced a confound. Patients presenting with differing mechanisms o f brain injury may 
perform differently on attention ability in the presence o f  depression and/or anxiety. Future 
studies could explore these issues with more homogenous neurologic populations.
The current study represents a unique contribution to the literature due to its large 
sample size, use o f  standardized measures, and diverse patient population representing a 
wide array of presenting etiologies within the context o f a large academic medical center. 
The findings from this study provide important information regarding the relationship of 
emotional distress, specifically depression and anxiety, and its affect on
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neuropsychological measures of attention. While one should be cautious in generalizing
the findings to other populations not referred for neuropsychological evaluation (e g ,
outpatient psychotherapy patients), the current findings represent an important addition to
psychological and neuropsychological research.
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Conclusions
It is widely held among psychologists that depressive and anxiety symptoms exert 
significant and deleterious etTects on attention resources. In particular, it is believed by 
many neuropsychologists that depression and anxiety can adversely influence performance 
on neuropsychological measures o f attention and memory. Although findings from the 
current study do not dispute those positions, the statistical results were not as robust as 
expected.
The findings suggest that depression exerts a more adverse effect on attention than 
anxiety. That being said, however, the contribution of depression in this study to the 
overall variance in attention scores was much less than expected (less than 1% o f the 
variance, in fact) and may not be particularly meaningful clinically. Nonetheless, the 
modest findings obtained in this sample may be atypical. Adverse effects may occur, and 
clinicians should always be mindful of the potential deleterious influence o f  depressive or 
anxiety symptoms.
The Processing Efficiency Theory of anxiety (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) predicts 
that anxious individuals may perform worse, the same, or better than non-anxious controls 
depending on the nature o f the task. Depending on the variables and type of analysis 
performed, the current findings found either little-or-no effect of anxiety on attention or 
modest, inverse correlations (i.e., slightly worse performance).
When individuals presenting with a medico-legal case were analyzed separately, 
findings supported empirical studies show those groups are significantly different and, may 
in fact, present a confounding influence on research findings.
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Finally, mixed neurologic cases were compared to cases without neurologic insult.
Results demonstrated less depression and anxiety among neurologic individuals, however
performance among non-neurologic individuals was superior to that o f  individuals with
documented neurologic injury.
Depression and Anxiety 101
References
Alvarez, R.R. ( 1962). Comparison of depressive and brain-injured subjects on the 
Trail Making Test. Perceptual and Motor Skills. 14. 91-96.
American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f 
Mental Disorders (4“* ed). Washington, D C : Author.
American Psychiatric Association (1987). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f 
Mental Disorders (3"' ed. rev ). Washington. D C.: Author.
Beck, A.T. (1987). Beck Depression Inventorv: Manual. Psvchological 
Corporation, San Antonio, TX.
Beck, A T., Rush, J.A., Shaw, B.F., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive Therapy o f 
Depression. New York: Guilford Press.
Benton, A.L. & Hamsher, K.D. (1989). Multilingual Aphasia Examination. Iowa 
City, lA: AJA Associates.
Bieliauskas, L A. (1993 ). Depressed or not depressed? That is the question.
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsvchologv. 15. 119-134.
Bieliauskas, L.A., Costello, S., and Terpenning, M. (1991). Depression and 
screening for cognitive deficit in elderly patients (Abstract). Journal of Clinical and 
Experimental Neuropsvchologv. 13. 101.
Bieliauskas, L.A., and Lamberty, G. (1991). Simple reaction time and depression 
in the elderly (Abstract). The Clinical Neuropsvchologist. 5. 252.
Bieliauskas, L A , Lamberty, G , and Boczar, J. ( 199 1 ). Lack of depression effects 
on cognitive functions in the elderly (Abstract). Journal o f Clinical and Experimental 
Neuropsvchologv. 13. 433.
Depression and Anxiety 102 
Brumback, R.A., & Staton, R.D. (1980). Neuropsychology study o f children
during and after remission o f  endogenous depressive episodes.-Perceptual and Motor
Skills. 50. 1163-1167.
Butcher, J.N., Dahlstrom, W.G., Graham, J.R., Tellegen, A., & Kaemmer, B.
(1989). Minnesota Multiphasic Personality lnventorv-2: Manual for administration and
scoring. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press.
Channon, S., Baker, J.E., & Robertson, M.M. (1993). Working memory in clinical
depression: an experimental study. Psvchological Medicine. 23. 87-91.
Channon, S., Flynn, P., & Robertson, M.M. (1992). Attentional deficits in Gilles
de la Tourette syndrome. Neuropsvchiatrw Neuropsvchologv. & Behavioral Neurology.
5(3), 170-177.
Clark, M.S., & Isen, A.M. (1982). Feeling states and social behavior. In A. 
Hastorf and A.M. Isen (Eds ), Cognitive social psychology. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Clavelle, P R  (1992). Clinician’s perceptions of the comparability o f the MMPI 
and MMPI-2. Psychological Assessment. 4M). 466-472.
Clayton, I.C., Richards, J.C., & Edwards, C.J. (1999). Selective attention in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 108( 1 ). 171-175.
Cohen, J. (1977). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. New 
York: Academic Press.
Cohen, R.M., Weingartner, H., Smallberg, S.A., Pickar, P., & Murphy, D.L.
(1982). Effort and cognition in depression. Archives of General Psychiatry. 39. 593-597.
Connors, C.K. (1992). Connors' Continuous Performance Test computer program 
user's guide. Toronto, Canada: Multi-Health Systems.
Depression and Anxiety 103
Culbertson, J.L. & Krull, K.R. ( 1996). Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. In
Neuropsvchologv for Clinical Practice: Etioiouv. Assessment, and Treatment. Adams, 
R.L., Parsons, O A , & Culbertson, J.L. (Eds.)
Curran, H. V., Shine, P., & Lader, M. (1986). Effects o f repeated doses o f  
fluvoxamine, mianserin, and placebo on memory and measures o f  sedation. 
Psvchopharmacologv. 89. 360-363.
Dibartolo, P.M., Brown, T.A., & Barlow, D.H. (1997). Effects o f anxiety on 
attentional allocation and task performance: An information processing analysis. Behavior 
Research and Therapv. 35( 12). l l Ol - l l l l .
Dodrill, C. ( 1988). Effects of antiepileptic drugs on abilities. Journal of Clinical 
Psychiatry. 49. 31 -34.
Elliman, N.A., Green, M W , Rogers, P J , & Finch, G.M. (1997). Processing- 
eflRciency theory and the working-memory system: Impairments associated with sub- 
clinical anxiety. Personality and Individual Differences. 23(I), 31-35.
Ellis, H. (1991). Focused attention and depressive deficits in memory. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General. 120(3), 310-312.
Eysenck, M W & Calvo, M.G. ( 1992). Anxiety and performance: The processing 
efficiency theory. Cognition and Emotion. 6(6). 409-434.
Fromm, D , and Schopflocher, D. (1984) Neuropsychological test performance in 
depressed patients before and after drug therapy. Biological Psychiatry. 19. 55-72.
Games, P A., and Howell, J.F. (1976). Pairwise multiple comparison procedures 
with unequal n’s and/or variances Journal o f Educational Statistics 1. 113-125.
Depression and Anxiety 104 
Garamoni, G.L., Reynolds, C F , Thase, E F , Berman, S R , & Fasiczka, A.L.
(1991). The balance of positive and negative affects in major depression; A further test of
the States of Mind model. Psvchiatrv Research. 39. 99-108.
Gass, C.S. (1991). Emotional variables and neuropsychological test performance.
Journal of Clinical Psychology. 47. 100-104.
Gass, C.S . Burda, P.C., Starkey, T W . and Dominguez, F. (1992). MMPI
interpretation of psychiatric inpatients; caution in making inferences about concentration
and memory. Journal o f Clinical Psychology. 48. 493-499.
Gass, C.S. and Daniel, S.K. (1990). Emotional impact on Trail Making Test
performance. Psvchological Reports. 67. 435-438.
Gass, C.S., and Russell, E. W (1991 ). MMPI profiles o f  closed head trauma
patients: Impact o f neurologic complaints. Journal of Clinical Psychology. 47. 253-260.
Gass, C S , and Wald, H.S. (1997). MMPl-2 interpretation and closed-head
trauma: Cross-validation o f a correction factor. Archives o f Clinical Neuropsychology.
12(3), 199-205.
Gillis, J.S. (1993). Effects oflife stress and dysphoria on complex judgements. 
Psvchological Reports. 72(3-21. 1355-1363.
Glenn, M B., & Joseph, A.B. (1987). The use of lithium for behavioral and 
affective disorders after traumatic brain injury. Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation. 2. 
68-76.
Grant, I. & Adams, K M (1986). The neuropsychology o f depression: The 
pseudodementia syndrome. Neuropsychological assessment o f neuropsychiatrie disorders. 
New York: Oxford.
Depression and Anxiety 105 
Harrell, T.H., Honaker, M , & Parnell, T. ( 1992). Equivalence o f the MMPI-2
with the MMPI in psychiatric patients. Psvcholouical Assessment. 4. 460-465.
Hartlage, S., Alloy, L.B., Vazquez, C., & Dykman, B. (1993). Automatic and
effortful processing in depression. Psvchological Bulletin. 113(2). 247-278.
Hartman, D. (1988). Neuropsvchological to.xicologv: Identification and assessment
of human neurotoxic syndromes. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon.
Ingram, R.E. (1984). Toward an information-processing analysis of depression.
Cognitive Therapy and Research. 8(5 ). 443-478.
Ingram, R.E., Lumry, A E , Cruet, D , & Seiber, W. (1987). Attentional processes
in depressive disorders. Cognitive Therapy and Research. 1 U3). 351-360.
Jamison, K., & Asiskal, H. (1983). Medication compliance in patients with bipolar
disorder. Psychiatric Clinics o f North America. 6. 175-192.
Kay, T. (1993). Neuropsychological treatment of mild traumatic brain injury.
Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation. 8. 74-85.
King, D A., Caine, E D., & Cox, C (1993). Influence of depression and age on
selected cognitive functions. Clinical Neuropsvchologist. 7(41. 443-453.
Lachman, R , Lachman, J.L., & Butterfield, E C (1979). Cognitive psychology
and information processing: An introduction. Hillsdale, New Jersey; Erlbaum.
Lemelin, S., Baruch, P., Vincent, A , Laplante, L., Everett, J., & Vincent, P.
(1996). Attention disturbance in clinical depression. The Journal o f Nervous and Mental
Disease. 184. 114-121.
Lezak, M. (1995). Neuropsvchological assessment Edition). New York:
Oxford University Press.
Depression and Anxiety 106 
Mialet, J-P, Pope, H G , & Yurgelun-Todd, D. (1996). Impaired attention in
depressive states: a non-specific deficit*’ Psychological Medicine. 26. 1009-1020.
Miller, W.R. (1975). Psychological deficit in depression. Psvchological Bulletin.
82, 238-260.
Mirsky, A. ( 1987). Behavioral and psychophysiological markers o f disordered 
attention. Environmental Health Perspectives. 74. 191-199.
Mittenberg, W., Tremont, G , & Rayls, K.R. (1996). Impact of cognitive function 
on MMPI-2 validity in neurologically impaired patients. Assessment. 3(21. 157-163.
Nasby, W. & Russell, M. (1997). Posttraumatic stress disorder and the States-of- 
Mind model: Evidence of specificity. Cognitive Therapy and Research. 21 (2). 117-133.
Pace, T.M. & Dixon, D.N. (1993). Changes in depressive self-schemata and 
depressive symptoms following cognitive therapy. Journal o f Counseling Psychology. 
40(3), 288-294.
Prigatano, G. P., & Schacter, D. L. (1991). Awareness o f deficit after brain infurv: 
Clinical and theoretical issues. New York; Oxford University Press.
Pruzinsky, T. & Borkovec, T. ( 1990). Cognitive and personality characteristics o f 
worriers. Behaviour Research & Therapy. 28(6). 507-512.
Rankin, E.J., Gilner, F.H., G feller, J.D., and Katz, B.M. (1994). Anxiety states 
and sustained attention in a cognitively intact elderly sample: Preliminary results. 
Psychological Reports. 75(3-1). 1176-1178.
Reitan, R M & Tarshes, E.L. (1959). Differential effects of lateralized brain 
lesions on the Trail Making Test. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. 129. 257-262.
Depression and Anxiety 107 
Reitan, R. M , & Wolfson, D ( 1997). Emotional disturbances and their interaction
with neuropsychological deficits. Neuropsvcholouv Review. 7f I ). 3-19.
Revelle, W , & Loftus, DA. (1992). The implications o f arousal effects for the
study of affect and memory. In S.A. Christianson (Ed). Handbook o f Emotion and
Memory. Chicago: Erlebaum.
Rey, A. (1964). L'examen clinique en psychologie. (The clinical examination in
psychology). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Richards, P.M. & Ruft% R.M. (1989). Motivational effects on neuropsychological
functioning: Comparison of depressed versus nondepressed individuals. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psvcholouv. 57. 396-402.
Rossi, A., Stratta, P., Nistico, R . Sabatini, M.D., DiMichele, V., & Casacchia, M.
(1990). Visuospatial impairment in depression; a controlled ECT study. Acta
Psvchiatrica Scandinavica. 81. 245-249.
Rosvold, H E , Mirksy, A.P., Sarason, 1., Bransome, E D , & Beck, L.H. (1956).
A continuous performance test o f brain damage. Journal o f  Consulting Psvcholoev. 20.
343-350.
Schmidtke, K., Schorb, A , Winkelmann, G , & Hohagen, F. (1998). Cognitive 
fi"ontal lobe dysfunction in obsessive compulsive disorder. Biological Psvchiatrv. 43(9). 
666-673.
Schwartz, R M & Garamoni, G.L. (1989). Cognitive balance and 
psychopathology: Evaluation o f an information processing model o f positive and negative 
states of mind. Clinical Psvcholouv Review. 9. 271 -294.
Depression and Anxiety 108
Shaw, E. D , Stokes, P. E., Mann, J. J , & Manevitz, A Z (1987). Effects o f
lithium carbonate on the motor and memory speed of bipolar outpatients. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology. 96. 64-69.
Solomon, S., Hotchkiss, E., Saravay, S., Bayer, C., Ramsey, P., & Blum, R ,
(1983). Impairment o f  memory function by antihypertensive medication. Archives o f 
General Psvchiatrv. 40. 1109-1112.
Spielberger, C D ,  Gorsuch, R.L., and Lushene, R E. (1970). State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory Manual. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Spreen, O. & Strauss, E. (1998). A compendium o f neuropsvchological tests (2"  ^
edition). New York: Oxford University Press.
Squire, L. T., Judd, L. L., Janowsky, D. S., & Huey, L. V. (1980). Effects o f 
lithium carbonate on memory and other cognitive functions. American Journal o f 
Psvchiatrv. 137. 1042-1046.
Stroop, J R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of 
Experimental Psvcholouv. 18. 643-661.
Sweet, J.J.. Newman, P.. & Bell, B. (1992). Significance of depression in clinical 
neuropsychological assessment. Clinical Psychology Review. 12. 21-45.
Tabachnick, B.G. & Fidell, L.S. (1989). Using Multivariate Statistics (Second 
Ed ). New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
Telford, R , & Worrall, E. (1978). Cognitive function in manic depressives: Effect 
o f lithium and physiostigmine. British Journal o f Psvchiatrv. 133. 424-428.
Tellegen, A. & Ben-Porath, Y. (1992). The new uniform T scores for the MMPI- 
2: Rationale, derivation, and appraisal. Psvchological Assessment. 4(2). 145-155.
Depression and Anxiety 109
Trimble, M. (1987). Anticonvulsant drugs and cognitive function; A review o f the
literature. Epilepsia. 28(Suppl. 3), s37-s45.
Vanderploeg, R.D., Kizilbash, .A.H., Curtiss, G., Schinka, J., & LaLone, L. (1998, 
August). Effects o f depression and anxietv on memorv performance. Poster session 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, San 
Francisco.
Vasterling, J.J., Brailey, K., Constans, J.l. & Sutker, P.O. (1998). Attention and 
memory dysfunction in posttraumatic stress disorder. Neuropsvchologv. 12f I). 125-133.
Veale, D.M., Sahakian, B.J., Owen, A.M., & Marks, 1 M (1996). Specific 
cognitive deficits in tests sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. Psvchological Medicine. 26(61. 1261-1269.
Veiel, H. (1997). A preliminary profile of neuropsychological deficits associated 
with major depression. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsvchologv. 19(4). 
587-603.
Vingerhoets, G., DeSoete, G , and Jannes, C. (1995). Relationship between 
emotional variables and cognitive test performance before and after open-heart surgery. 
The Clinical Neuropsvchologist. 9. 198-202.
Wechsler, D. (1981). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -  Revised. New York: 
The Psychological Corporation.
Wechsler, D. (1987). Wechsler Memorv Scale - Revised New York: The 
Psychological Corporation.
Wechsler, D. (1990). Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Third edition 
manual. New York: Psychological Corporation.
Depression and Anxiety 110 
Williams, K.M., lacono. W G., Remick, R.A., & Greenwood, P. (1990). Dichotic
perception and memory following electroconvuisive treatment for depression. British
Journal of Psvchiatrv, 157. 366-372.
Yee, C.M. & Miller, G A. (1994). A dual-task analysis o f resource allocation in
dysthymia and anhedonia. Journal o f Abnormal Psychology. 103(4). 625-636.
Descriptive Statistics
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Variable N Mean Standard Deviation
Age 1209 42.01 16.61
Gender
Male 673
Female 536
Education 1209 13.20 2.81
Race
Caucasian 1079
African American 76
Native American 21
Hispanic 6
Asian American 5
Other 3
Unknown 4
MMPI-2 L Scale 1209 52.10 7.68
MMPI-2 F Scale 1209 58.95 9.92
MMPI-2 K Scale 1209 50.42 9.31
MMPI-2 Scale D 1209 70.08 15.72
MMPI-2 Scale Pt 1209 65.13 14.00
WAIS-R FSIQ 1143 95.71 15.19
WAIS-R Digit Span 1140 8.78 2.69
WAIS-R Digit Symbol 1 140 7.22 3.06
Oral Symbol Digit Modalities 34 45.68 12.04
PASAT Trial 1 30 10.57 8.54
PASAT Trial 2 30 14.93 7.97
PASAT Trial 3 30 20.73 8.92
PASAT Trial 4 30 26.00 8.83
WMS-R VMS Forward 138 7.83 2.05
WMS-R VMS Backward 138 6.92 2.26
WMS-R Mental Control 138 5.10 1.23
WMS-R Att/Conc Index Score 281 94.49 16.48
Seashore Rhythm 507 5.82
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4.93
Speech Sounds Percep Test 509 7.99 5.34
Grip Strength - Dorn 511 35.88 13.04
Grip Strength - Non-Dom 504 32.75 12.33
Grooved Pegboard - Dom 584 89.64 41.37
Grooved Peg - Non-Dom 583 99.30 44.16
Finger Tapping - Dom 539 44.04 9.72
Finger Tapping - Non-Dom 523 39.55 8.46
Trails A 921 44.33 33.87
Trails B 912 115.83 84.73
Word Fluency 409 32.15 11.71
Category Fluency 335 15.41 5.52
Stroop Word Score 19 93.11 15.08
Stroop Color Score 19 66.95 13.26
Stroop Color-Word Score 19 37.95 8.82
CPT Hits 51 318.24 6.77
CPT Omissions 51 5.76 6.77
CPT Commissions 51 12.53 8.47
CPT Hit Reaction Time 51 442.35 76.19
WCST Correct 232 69.17 15.09
WCST Errors 232 40.05 23.98
WCST Perseverative Resp 228 26.87 23.96
WCST Perseverative Errors 231 19.86 15.59
WCST Number o f Categories 233 4.39 2.00
WCST Failure to Maintain Set 216 0.95 1.29
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The Contribution o f Depression and Anxiety to Poor Attention
Performance on Neuropsychological Assessment Measures
Depression and anxiety are ubiquitous in the patient populations with which 
neuropsychologists and clinical and counseling psychologists work (Sweet, Newman, & 
Bell, 1992). Recognition o f the impact of emotional distress on cognitive processes, such 
as attention, is important for the work in which psychologists engage, particularly for 
assessment and psychotherapy. Decreased attentional skills due to emotional distress can 
have implications for psychotherapy by limiting the patient’s ability to attend to, and 
follow, therapist questions and comments Patient inefficiency in encoding important 
information relevant to therapeutic change may also hinder compliance and recall o f 
assigned homework and treatment strategies. Within the field of neuropsychology, it is 
especially important to understand the impact of emotional distress on attentional 
processes. The ability to distinguish between disordered attention secondary to emotional 
distress and disordered attention due to organic etiology is o f crucial importance. 
Understanding the extent to which emotional distress contributes to disordered attention 
can be critical to proper interpretation of neuropsychological assessment results, 
specifically deficits in attention and recall.
Interest in the effects o f emotional distress and psychiatric disturbance on 
neuropsychological test performance is a relatively recent trend. Sweet et al. (1992) 
reported that, o f 94 studies published on the effects o f emotional distress on 
neuropsychological performance between I960 and 1975, only 5 examined affective 
disorders, and o f the 14 published between 1975 and 1978, only 2 were concerned with
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depressive disorders. However, between 1978 and 1992 over 40 were published, with the 
majority o f those having been published from 1986 to 1992. One reason for the lack o f  
earlier empirical study in this area was a variety o f methodological problems observed by 
Miller (1975). He noted a paucity o f standardized measures across the studies at that time 
that limited efforts to compare findings. He also pointed out the inadequate diagnostic 
specificity and the use o f  differing diagnostic criteria prevalent during that time period. 
Since then, there has been an increased use of standardized neuropsychological tests and 
batteries and more rigorous diagnostic criteria through the development o f the DSM-HI-R 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987) and subsequent DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994; Sweet et al., 1992).
While increased focus on the effects of psychiatric disturbance on 
neuropsychological test performance is noteworthy, the empirical investigations o f those 
effects have not been without potential confounds. According to Sweet et al. (1992), 
potential confounding, or moderating, variables in the investigations of neuropsychological 
performance primarily involve motivation, malingering, and medical factors (Sweet et al., 
1992).
Richards and Ruff ( 1989) tested the hypothesis that reduced motivation accounts 
for cognitive deficits in depressed patients by randomly assigning two groups o f subjects, 
depressed and nondepressed, to either a motivation or non-motivation condition. 
Motivation manipulation involved encouragement, a monetary incentive, and performance 
feedback. Results showed that motivation was indeed lower for depressed subjects, 
however it did not significantly affect neuropsychological performance. The authors
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concluded that, although depressed patients may be less motivated, reduced motivation
may not fully account for observed cognitive deficits in depressed patients.
Another potential confounding variable in empirically evaluating the impact o f 
emotional disturbance on neuropsychological performance is malingering, or the 
“deliberate and conscious feigning o f symptoms or the gross exaggeration o f  symptoms 
for the purpose of attaining monetary or other external rewards” (Sweet et al., 1992). 
Thought to be relatively rare, malingering can pose significant diagnostic and assessment 
difficulties by artificially generating increased mood symptom endorsement and inaccurate 
and false cognitive profiles. As such, they may artificially skew investigative findings.
Confounding medical factors mentioned by Sweet et al. (1992) include the 
pharmacological treatment o f depression, anxiety, and other psychological conditions. 
Medications used in the treatment o f these conditions have been shown in some studies to 
impair neuropsychological functioning, however results have generally been mixed. For 
example, some studies found improved cognitive performance following (primarily) 
pharmacological treatment o f depression (Brumback & Staton, 1980; Fromm & 
Schopflocher, 1984). Others either observed no changes (Curran, Shine, & Lader, 1986; 
Telford & Worrall, 1978) or observed only perceptual motor slowing (Squire, Judd, 
Janowsky, & Huey, 1980). Commonly prescribed medications that were found to exert an 
adverse neuropsychological effect, at least in certain individuals, included anxiolytics, 
antidepressants, antipsychotics, anticonvulsants, and even antihypertensives (Dodrill,
1988; Hartman, 1988; Solomon et al., 1983; Trimble, 1987). Particularly troublesome 
was lithium’s adverse affect on memory which, according to Jamison and Asiskal (1983), 
accounted for the most frequently reported side-effect leading to lithium noncompliance.
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Shaw, Stokes, Mann, & Manevitz (1987) reported that over 80% o f their subjects
receiving lithium complained o f neuropsychological side-effects. While some medications
may cloud neuropsychological interpretation, many psychiatric and brain-injured patients
usually perform better on neuropsychological measures due to a decrease in depression’s
negative influence on cognitive functioning (Glenn & Joseph, 1987).
Does Emotional Distress Have a Detrimental Effect on Cognition?
While the prevailing opinion in neuropsychology appears to be that emotional 
disturbances such as depression and anxiety do have an adverse affect on 
neuropsychological performance, there are those who contend otherwise (Sweet et al., 
1992). In a lengthy review o f the interaction of emotional disturbance with 
neuropsychological deficits, Reitan and Wolfson (1997) question this widely held 
assumption. They acknowledge, as most do, that intellectual and cognitive impairment 
represents a stressful situation that can cause emotional difficulties and problems o f 
adjustment. They also agree that brain-injured individuals, if not experiencing impaired 
self-awareness (Prigatano & Schacter, 1991 ), experience a significant reduction in ability 
from his or her previous level o f functioning which may cause anxiety, feelings o f  
inadequacy in terms o f meeting normal responsibilities, and feelings of depression due to 
failure and inadequate performance (Reitan & Wolfson, 1997). However, they do not 
readily accept the prevalent belief that emotional distress has a significant effect on 
neuropsychological functioning, and they point to studies that disagree with that 
contention. For example, Alvarez (1962) compared Trail Making Test (TMT; Reitan, 
1979) performance in depressed versus brain-injured patients. He utilized 32 persons with
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unequivocal brain damage (variety o f conditions) and 32 patients with severe depression
(33% had attempted suicide). He believed that depressed participants might be limited in
their performances because o f psychomotor slowness and a diminution o f  the effort
needed to perform well. The TMT was selected because it requires “focused attention,
selective responses to appropriate stimuli, and a deliberate effort to complete the task as
quickly as possible” (Alvarez, 1962). Comparisons o f the two groups on the MMPI
(Butcher. Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) indicated that the depressed
patients had statistically significant elevations over the brain-injured group on Depression,
Hysteria, Psychasthenia, Paranoia, Schizophrenia, and the F scale. Results on the TMT
showed performance by the brain-injured group to be significantly poorer than the
depressed group (p<.001) on Parts A and B Moreover, performance o f the depressed
group was found to be “similar to that reported by Reitan for his non-brain-injured control
groups” (Alvarez, 1962). The implication here by Reitan and Wolfson was that since
depressed individuals performed better than brain injured individuals (i.e., similar to
controls) they were not impaired by depression as measured by the TMT.
In another study cited by Reitan and Wolfson, Vingerhoets, DeSoete, and Jannes 
(1995) investigated the relationships between measures o f emotional status and cognitive 
test performances in patients who were awaiting open-heart surgery and in the same 
patients following surgery. The researchers described an impending open-heart surgery 
as “one o f the most frightening medical procedures”, and they felt it provided a “natural 
stress paradigm” to evaluate the “impact of emotional state on neuropsychological test 
performance” (Vingerhoets, DeSoete, & Jannes, 1995). Measures o f stress included 
anxiety, using the A-State scale o f the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger,
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Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970), and depression, using the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 
1987). Measures o f  neuropsychological performance included 11 tests “selected to cover 
an extensive range o f cognitive functions.’' Both sets o f  tests were administered to 130 
patients before surgery and 109 o f the same patients 7-8 days after surgery. Not 
surprisingly, the results showed significant elevations for anxiety and depression before 
surgery. Following the surgery, anxiety and depression were lowered but only by a 
significant degree for anxiety. Correlational analyses were run between measures of 
emotional status and neuropsychological performance and the results showed no 
significant relationship for either pre- or post-surgical testing. According to Reitan and 
Wolfson (1997), results such as these suggest that “neuropsychological abilities are quite 
robust, even under conditions o f rather striking personal stress and anxiety.” The 
implication being that even high levels of stress and anxiety have limited-to-no impact on 
neuropsychological functioning.
What about clinical depression at levels requiring hospitalization? Kaufman, 
Grossman, and Kaufman (1994) used the Kaufman Short Neuropsychological Assessment 
Procedure (KSNAP) to compare cognitive performances o f  56 hospitalized inpatients with 
clinical depression to normal matched controls. They analyzed results according to tests 
grouped in terms o f the three functional units proposed by Luria: (1) attention-orientation 
representing a low level o f  cognitive complexity; (2) successive and simultaneous 
processes, representing an intermediate level of cognitive complexity; and (3) high-level 
planning ability, representing a high level of cognitive complexity. Results showed no 
significant differences at any task level, suggesting that clinical depression at levels
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requiring hospitalization had no adverse effect on those cognitive functions measured by
Kaufman and his colleagues.
Perhaps one o f  the more enduring assumptions in neuropsychology is the adverse 
effect of depression on the cognitive functions o f the elderly, the so-called 
" pseudodementia" syndrome. As Reitan and Wolfson (1997) observe, a review of the 
literature by Bieliauskas (1993), concluded that "depressive-like symptoms have little or 
no impact on cognitive functions." He further asserted that, "the case for emotional 
influence on cognitive abilities in the elderly (i.e., pseudodementia) is vastly overrated", 
and "if elderly patients do present with cognitive difficulties, (they) are more likely 
disease-based rather than the result o f emotional factors such as depression." Bieliauskas 
and colleagues conducted studies of their own in which nursing home patients and elderly 
medical outpatients were studied using various measures of cognition (Bieliauskas, 
Costello, & Terpenning, 1991; Bieliauskas & Lamberty, 1991; Bieliauskas, Lamberty, & 
Boczar, 1991). In all three studies, they found no significant effects of depression on 
cognitive abilities for their elderly samples. Although no significant effects o f depression 
were observed in their samples, Bieliauskas allowed that there may have been an adverse 
influence on cognitive symptoms in patients with a psychiatric history of primary 
depression coupled with sufficient loss of self-esteem.
Reitan and Wolfson (1997) reviewed findings from studies of MMPI profiles in 
brain-injured individuals as well as individuals with emotional disorders. The MMPI is 
considered the instrument "used most frequently to assess the emotional status of patients 
referred for neuropsychological examinations" (Mittenberg, Tremont, & Rayls, 1996). As 
Reitan and Wolfson note, it possesses several advantages in the evaluation of personality
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and emotional characteristics: it is self-administered and relatively easy to score; has
empirically validated scales that have established meanings; is an objectively interpreted
instrument; provides clear, valid descriptions of psychological problems, symptoms, and
characteristics in a broadly acceptable clinical language; has clinical interpretation
strategies that are easily learned; and possesses scales that have high reliability. Reitan and
Wolfson reviewed studies o f MMPI profiles in an effort to find support for the position
that “significant emotional disturbances impact adversely on both neuropsychological test
performances and on functional outcome” (Kay, 1993). In one study they reviewed, Gass
(1991) analyzed a group of 105 patients referred for neuropsychological evaluation whose
neurological examination did not identify any evidence o f brain damage. The referrals
were from a VA hospital consisting o f psychiatric, neurologic, and rehabilitation services.
Findings revealed “relatively weak relationships between MMPI indices and Halstead-
Reitan Battery (HRB) scores.” As a result, Gass concluded that, “as a general rule, these
widely-used neuropsychological measures are largely resilient to the effects of emotional
and personality factors in patients referred for neuropsychological testing.” He further
cautioned that a “conservative stance is recommended in attributing poor performance on
these tests to psychological factors, particularly as inferred from elevated MMPI scores.”
Gass argued that HRB tests seem to be generally robust in the presence o f
psychopathology, and he asserted that “traditional interpretive lore that surrounds the use
of various MMPI scores and patterns to make inferences with regard to cognitive
functioning may be inaccurate.”
In another study, Gass and Daniel ( 1990) evaluated the effect o f emotional factors
on Trail-Making Test -  Part B performances. They concluded that performance on the
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Trail Making Test was resistant to a variety o f emotional influences and, though
psychiatric symptoms and severe anxiety impairs performances, it is rarely to the extent 
caused by brain damage.
In a study investigating the relationships between MMPI scores of 59 psychiatric 
patients and measures o f attention, concentration, and memory derived from the Wechsler 
Memory Scale (WMS), Gass, Burda, Starkey, and Dominguez (1992) found uniformly 
low correlations between MMPI variables and memory performance. They concluded 
patients’ subjective complaints are unreliable indicators o f  actual ability. Taken 
together, it appears that Reitan and Wolfson (1997) have provided compelling evidence 
that emotional distress does not cause neuropsychological impairment equal to that seen in 
brain injured individuals. Nonetheless, their evidence also indicates that emotional distress 
can affect neuropsychological performance, at least at levels somewhere on a continuum 
between the performance o f  normal controls and that o f brain-injured participants.
Supportive Evidence for an Adverse Effect o f Depression on Cognition
Veiel (1997) performed a meta-analysis o f “all studies published since 1975 and 
meeting stringent methodological and sample selection criteria” to assemble a profile o f 
neuropsychological deficits o f clinically depressed (major depression) but otherwise 
unimpaired individuals. Veiel’s findings supported a profile “consistent with a global- 
diffuse impairment o f brain functions with particular involvement of the frontal lobes.” In 
fact, the severity of cognitive deficiencies he profiled were observed to be similar to those 
seen “in moderately severe traumatic brain injury” (Veiel, 1997).
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Veiel’s (1997) meta-analysis narrowed a large pool o f  research down to 13 studies
using 6 stringent screening criteria, which he noted sacrificed research breadth for 
methodological stringency. The results o f the analysis were grouped in the following nine 
categories: Attention/Concentration; Verbal Fluency; Scanning and Visuo-Motor 
Tracking; Verbal Learning-Acquisition; Verbal Leaming-Retention/Retrieval; Nonverbal 
Leaming-Acquisition; Nonverbal Leaming-Retention/Retrieval; Visuo-Spatial Functions; 
and Mental Flexibility-Control.
Results for Attention/Concentration from the resulting 13 studies generally 
included only Digit Span Forward (only a few included Digit Span Backward of the 
Wechsler scales; Wechsler, 1981, 1987). Results showed only a 0.18 standard deviation 
between depressed and non-depressed controls. In the category o f Verbal Fluencv. tests 
included only the Controlled Oral Word Association Test (FAS test; Benton & Hamsher,
1989) and results showed a 0.55 standard difference. Scanning and Visuo-Motor 
Tracking included Trail Making Test Part A and the WAIS-R Digit Symbol subtest 
(Wechsler, 1981) and results revealed almost a full standard difference between groups at 
0.93. Visuo-Spatial Functions included the following tests: Rey Complex Figure Test 
(Rey, 1964) and the Block Design and Object Assembly subtests o f the WAIS-R 
(Wechlser, 1981). Results indicated a 0.81 standard difference between groups in this 
category. Verbal Leaming-Acquisition included immediate recall from many of the 
standard memory tests and results indicated a 0.90 standard difference. Verbal Leaming- 
Retention/Retrieval included delayed recall of at least several minutes, and findings 
showed a 0.91 standard difference. Nonverbal Leaming-Acquisition and Nonverbal 
Leaming-Retention/Retrieval had standard differences o f 0.93 and 0.83, respectively, and
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included visually presented material from recurring figures (Williams, lacono, Remick, &
Greenwood, 1990) and Rey’s Complex Figure (Rey, 1964). The final category revealed
the most striking distinction. Mental Flexibilitv and Control included measures commonly
regarded as very sensitive to most kinds of brain dysfunction, and especially to frontal lobe
dysfunction (Veiel, 1997): Trail Making Test Part B (time) and the Color-Word score o f
the Stroop Test. Results for this category was 2 full standard differences between groups.
To summarize, the cognitive functions observed to be most affected by depression (i.e.,
above 0.50 standard difference) were, in order. Mental Flexibility and Control, Scanning
and Visuo-Motor Tracking, Nonverbal Leaming-Acquisition, Verbal Leaming-
Retention/Retrieval, Verbal Leaming-Acquisition, Nonverbal Leaming-
Retention/Retrieval, Visuo-Spatial Functions, and Verbal Fluency. As Veiel (1997)
observed, the obtained profile of cognitive deficiencies appeared “at first glance” to match
that which would raise the question of impaired frontal lobe functions.
Sweet, Newman and Bell (1992) observed a similar profile in their review. They 
noted a pattern o f “decreased cognitive efficiency or mild attentional or mild memory 
problems”, typically evidenced by the following patterns: slowed information processing 
(e.g., slowness on all Stroop Color-Word pages), impaired word recall with normal 
recognition, impaired incidental leaming with normal intentional leaming, and impaired 
recall of easy word pairs (often with normal recall o f difficult word pairs).
A number o f studies have demonstrated a negative effect of depression on motor 
tasks. In a study by Raskin, Friedman, and DiMascio (1982; in Grant & Adams, 1986),
277 depressed patients were matched on age, sex, and education with 112 normal controls 
in a multicenter research project. Findings showed that depressed subjects performed
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poorly on a number o f motor performance tasks, including tapping, aiming, and circle
tracing. Impairments were also found on nonsense syllable leaming, Stroop scores, and
the Clock Reversal Test. In another study, Cohen et ai. (1982) examined motor
performance (i.e., grip strength) and cognitive function (i.e., various mental tasks such as
working with “trigrams”) in depressed patients by severity level (severely depressed,
moderately depressed, euthymie and nomial mood). Results demonstrated deficits in
motor and cognitive performance o f  depressed patients that appeared to be proportionate
to depression severity.
Taken together, findings tend to consistently show that “cortically mediated 
intellectual functions are spared” (Grant & Adams, 1986), such as repetition, reading, 
naming, mathematics, and motor praxis. However, deficits that are more prominent tend 
to be those dependent on arousal, attention, and concentration. Grant and Adams (1986) 
observed that depressed patients suffer deficits in attention on tasks requiring “effort.” 
Although some investigators conclude that depressed patients have “motivational 
disorders”. Grant and Adams argued there is more to it than "motivation.” For example, 
they ask how can one conclude that poor vigilance or grip strength can be simply due to 
lack of “motivation”? Ultimately, they concluded that depressed patients are simply “less 
with it” than unimpaired controls, suggesting a deficit in information processing. In 
profiling memory deficits o f depressed individuals, they argued that the depressive state o f 
the individual impedes the reception o f new information as well as its initial processing. 
This ineffective initial acquisition appears to be central to later failures in recall. However, 
once information is encoded it appears that depressed patients tend to retain it. Retrieval 
deficits are common as well, especially for spontaneous recall, due in part to the poor
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initial processing, however performance tends to improve on less stringent recall testing
(e.g., recognition memory; Grant & Adams, 1986).
In summary, depressive states tend to exert adverse effects on cognition in the 
form o f global and diffuse impairment o f brain functions with particular involvement o f the 
frontal lobes, noted in at least one study to reach levels seen in moderately severe 
traumatic brain injury. Adverse effects that have been noted include impairment in 
mental flexibility; scanning and visuomotor tracking; and both verbal and nonverbal 
acquisition, retention, and retrieval. Deficits have also been noted on measures o f 
cognitive efficiency, attentional performance, information processing, and incidental 
leaming. Cognitive functions that are typically spared tend to be those corticaily-mediated 
intellectual functions such as repetition, reading, naming, and mathematics.
Supportive Evidence for an Adverse Effect o f Anxiety on Cognition
There is evidence to suggest that anxiety, as a form o f emotional distress, 
exerts an adverse effect on cognition. Anxiety, as with many psychological states, exists 
on a continuum of severity from simple worry and rumination to chronic and severe levels 
such as that observed in Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD; APA, 1994). The 
research presented below highlights studies that have focused on varying levels o f anxiety 
and stress.
Pruzinsky and Borkovec ( 1990) recruited 56 college students comprising two 
groups, worriers and nonworriers. Subjects engaged in either brief relaxing imagery or 
stressful imagery. Before and after the imagery tasks, measures o f  focused attention and 
anagram measures were obtained. The results revealed that worriers reported more
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negative daydreaming, greater difficulty with attentional control and greater obsessional
symptoms. They also evidenced significantly more negatively affect-laden cognitive
intrusions during relaxed wakefulness and focused attention.
In another study utilizing college students, Gillis (1993) investigated the hypothesis 
that stress impairs Judgment (among other hypotheses which were not supported). He had 
98 undergraduates complete a complex multiple-cue judgment task. Subjects were then 
assessed for (1 ) their exposure to two potential sources of stress, life events and irrational 
thinking and (2) the amount o f  personal dysphoria they were experiencing. Measures 
included the Life Experiences Survey, Dysfunctional Attitude Scale, State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory, and Beck Depression Inventory. Results indicated that subjective distress, 
depression and state anxiety were significantly related to poor judgmental performance. In 
addition, results suggested that potential external sources o f  stress do not negatively affect 
judgment unless they generate subjective distress at the time those judgments are made.
High and low state anxiety was studied in a sample of community-dwelling elderly 
volunteers by Rankin, Gilner, G feller, and Katz (1994). Participants were administered 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children, Mini-Mental Status Examination, and 
subtests of the Wechsler Memory Scale—Revised. Results indicated that anxiety (low and 
high) adversely affected sustained attention, but the findings were not significant for verbal 
and figurai memory tasks.
If cognitive processes are affected by anxiety states at the lower end of the 
continuum, what about more intense pathological conditions o f anxiety? One would 
reasonably infer that there is an inverse relationship where anxiety severity increases as 
cognitive performance decreases. However, "cognitive performance” covers a lot of
Depression and Anxiety 131 
neuropsychological ground. It is possible that an inverse relationship exists but only for
certain cognitive domains as was observed in a number o f  the studies on depressive effects
on cognition. For example, in attentional processes, information processing, and
encoding. Vasterling, Brailey, Constans, and Sutker ( 1998) investigated attention and
memory performances in Persian Gulf War veterans with and without PTSD diagnoses.
Veterans who were diagnosed with PTSD exhibited relative deficiencies in performance
on tasks of sustained attention, mental manipulation (mental arithmetic), initial information
acquisition, and retroactive memory interference. They also committed more errors of
commission and intrusion. Veterans’ tendencies toward response disinhibition and
intrusion on cognitive tasks was positively correlated with re-experiencing symptoms and
negatively correlated with avoidance-numbing symptoms. Vasterling and colleagues
observed that the veterans’ pattern of cognitive deficits were consistent with models of
PTSD that emphasize the role o f hyperarousal and involvement o f  frontal-subcortical
systems. Moreover, their data suggested that intrusion o f traumatic memories in PTSD
might not be limited to trauma-related cognitions but instead reflect a more generalized
pattern o f disinhibition.
Individuals suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD; APA, 1994) are 
also at risk for adverse cognitive effects due to anxiety. In one recent study by Clayton, 
Richards, and Edwards (1999) individuals diagnosed with OCD were studied along with a 
panic disordered and control group. Results showed significantly poorer performance on 
a series of psychometric tasks o f selective attention. The researchers concluded that the 
data supported the hypothesis that OCD individuals have a diminished ability to selectively
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ignore competing external (sensory) and internal (cognitive) stimuli, especially intrusive
thoughts.
Further support was found by Schmidtke, Schorb, Winkelmann and Hohagen 
(1998). They investigated “frontal lobe performance” in 29 unmedicated OCD patients 
who were matched on age, gender, and intelligence with a double-size control group o f 
normals. Participants were administered 12 neuropsychological tests, most o f  which are 
thought to be sensitive to different aspects of frontal lobe functioning. Results indicated 
that OCD patients were unimpaired on tests o f abstraction, problem-solving, set-shifting, 
response inhibition, and reaction speed, however they evidenced deficits o f approximately 
one standard deviation on timed tests of verbal and nonverbal fluency and attentional 
processing. Schmidtke and colleagues theorized that the obtained neuropsychological 
profile is related to “dysfunctioning within the anterior cingulate, but not the dorsolateral 
prefrontal circuit.” Similar results were obtained by Veale, Sahakian, Owen, and Marks 
(1996) who found impairment on an attentional shifting task in 40 matched OCD patients.
Finally in another study o f anxiety and cognition, Channon, Flynn, and Robertson
(1992) compared 18 adults with Tourette syndrome with 22 controls. Participants were 
assessed on a number of clinical and experimental measures of attention and self-report 
measures o f  mood, anxiety, and obsessionality. Results revealed that the Tourette group 
was more depressed, anxious, and obsessional, and they performed worse on complex 
measures o f  attention, including serial addition, block sequence span (forward), trail- 
making, and a letter cancellation task.
In summary, anxiety states tend to exert adverse effects on cognition in the form of 
impairment in attentional control, sustained and selective attention performance, poor
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judgment, attentional shifting, and initial information acquisition. Deficits have also been 
noted in mental arithmetic and verbal and nonverbal fluency. Evidence o f overall 
disinhibition is characteristic as well, in the form o f cognitive intrusions, retroactive 
interference and errors o f  commission and intrusions. Cognitive functions that were noted 
to be spared (in OCD patients) were abstraction, problem-solving, set-shifting, response 
inhibition, and reaction speed.
Cognitive Processes in Depression 
To attempt to better understand obtained neuropsychological profiles, cognitive 
theorists have developed models of cognitive processing. One o f the more compelling 
approaches is that articulated by Ingram ( 1984), the information processing model (or 
information processing “approach”). In the information processing model, network theory 
is utilized to conceptualize a process called "spreading activation." According to this 
theory, memory is composed of cognitive networks of associated concepts and descriptive 
propositions. Previous information and events that have been encoded into memory are 
represented by these propositions, and each memory unit is composed of a cluster of 
components (concepts and propositions) making up the memory. These clusters are 
referred to as memory "nodes.” Network theory proposes that, in order for a memory or 
cognition to reach an individual's conscious awareness, its corresponding node must be 
activated above some minimum threshold. Once activation reaches a sufficient level, the 
person consciously experiences the memory.
Theoretically, there are at least two ways that a memory may be activated 
sufficiently to reach consciousness. One is through the presentation of an environmental
Depression and Anxiety 134 
stimulus array that corresponds to an active memory node. Ingram presents the example
o f an individual who has been wanting to buy a Porsche. Although the individual might
not be consciously experiencing thoughts about the Porsche, if one o f them happens to
pass by on the street the person will be "reminded" of the desire to own one Network
theory would argue that this happens because the energy from the Porsche stimulus
pattern activates the corresponding "Porsche memory node" to a sufficient level to reach
conscious awareness so the individual is reminded of, and begins to think about, the
Porsche.
A second way in which memory nodes may be activated is through the spread of 
activation. Network theory assumes that memories are connected with each other through 
associative linkages. Theoretically, memories that are similar conceptually, or have 
somehow become associated for the individual, are linked through associative pathways. 
The strength of these pathways is seen as a function of how strongly the memories are 
associated. Strongly associated memories will have strong and more closely associated 
linkages, whereas weakly associated memories will have weaker or perhaps no associative 
pathways. Presumably, when a memory is activated, activation is presumed to spread 
along its associative pathways causing other memory nodes to become more likely to be 
activated. Memory nodes which stand the highest chance o f being activated in this manner 
are those that are connected through the strongest associative pathways. It is theorized 
that this spreading activation o f memories may be analogous to the person's stream of 
consciousness. To return to the Porsche example, not only is the person reminded o f the 
desire to buy one, but a flood o f associated cognitions may become conscious as well.
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such as the inability to  buy one on his present salary, the need for a raise or promotion, or 
a project under way that could lead to a promotion, and so on (Ingram, 1984).
With regard to  afiTect, Ingram proposes that affect can be conceptualized in terms 
o f affective structures called "primitive emotion nodes. " Each specific emotion such as 
depression, anger, joy, or fear is theoretically represented by a particular node or unit in 
memory. Connected to each emotion node is a set o f features associated with the 
emotion, such as its subjective experience, its unique autonomic response pattern, verbal 
labels used to describe the emotion, and cognitions containing descriptions of events that 
evoke that emotion. When a particular node is activated, the emotion is experienced and 
activation is channeled through its interconnections to evoke the emotion's other 
manifestations. Additionally, each emotion node is thought to be associated with a 
particular cognitive network consisting o f emotion-related memories and cognitions. 
Although some connections to the emotion node are believed to be innate, such as the 
connection to nodes that trigger autonomic responses, cognitive linkages are largely 
learned and are generally established through "contiguity" during life events (Ingram, 
1984). Ingram presented the example of attending the funeral o f a friend. A link is 
established when the sadness felt at the funeral (depression emotion node activation) 
becomes associated with a cognitive node representing descriptions o f funerals. Thus, 
through acculturation, leaming, and innate programming, emotion nodes are viewed as 
being linked with particular cognitive networks containing emotion-congruent content.
Components o f  the information-processing framework that are particularly 
relevant to the present study o f attention and general cognition are the "depth of 
processing model" and "cognitive capacity." As network theory seeks to describe the
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structure o f  memory, depth of processing seeks to describe the process by which
information is encoded into memory. At its basic level, the depth o f processing model
proposes that information is more likely to be fully perceived and encoded when it is
processed "deeper," where depth refers to the degree and extent o f cognitive analysis the
information receives. In other words, the more cognitive analysis a piece o f information
receives, the more likely it is to be comprehended and understood. Ingram (1984) refers
to this cognitive analysis as "cognitive elaboration.” That is, information that receives
analysis is elaborated upon cognitively. When received, information is processed at
different cognitive depths. These different depths may be viewed as corresponding
roughly to different cognitive networks, with larger and more intricate networks being
seen as representing deeper and deeper cognitive depths.
The concept o f cognitive capacity has sometimes been referred to as the same as 
attention or consciousness (Lachman, Lachman & Butterfield, 1979). According to the 
model, individuals have processing limits. They can only process a finite amount of 
information at any given time, or, stated another way, the amount o f attention they can 
pay is limited. An individual's processing capacity is limited, and when this capacity is 
exceeded, no more information can be attended to or processed. Not all information 
utilizes the same proportion of capacity, however. For example, the information required 
to drive a car may engage very little cognitive capacity if the person has driven a car for a 
long time (i.e., an overleamed skill), on the other hand it may engage large portions o f 
cognitive capacity if the skill is just being learned. To tie this concept back in with the 
depth of processing model discussed above, in order for an individual to process 
information at a deeper level (i.e., increased cognitive elaboration) a relatively larger
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proportion o f cognitive capacity must be utilized. That is, it will take nearly all of their
attention.
So, how is depression presumed to affect these cognitive processes? The 
information-processing model o f  depression acknowledges that any psychological state is 
a complex process involving the interaction o f a variety o f factors, however it views those 
factors as converging upon a basic mechanism called the "depression emotion node" 
(Bower, 1981 as cited in Ingram, 1984). It proposes that the phenomenological 
experience o f depression, along with the onset o f depressive symptoms, results from the 
activation o f  an individual's depression node (although other emotion nodes may be 
activated concurrently). This activation of the depression node is determined by the 
appraisal o f  life events, referring to the manner in which life events are linked to the 
contents o f existing cognitive structures (e.g., attitudes, beliefs). Appraisal is viewed as 
the process that gives subjective meaning to external events and is generally thought to be 
determined by an individual's ( 1 ) beliefs about the parameters of a particular life event, and 
(2) beliefs as to the effects o f the event. For example, suppose a woman has been left by 
her husband for another woman. If she believes that she will never see him again (a 
parameter o f the event) and that she will not be able to function without him (a perceived 
effect o f the event), then it is likely that the event will be cognitively appraised in such a 
way as to activate her depression node.
A variety o f factors are assumed to either shorten or lengthen the duration of 
depressive episodes, however in the absence o f  those factors it is believed that the 
underlying mechanism that determines depression duration is level o f activation. Once 
activated, a depression node is thought to experience a period of decay until the activation
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level falls below a threshold, at which time the individual no longer experiences depressive 
affect. The higher the initial activation level, the longer it will take to decay to 
subthreshold levels. The initial activation level is, in turn, determined by the value that the 
individual places on the negative event (i.e., how it is appraised).
The activation o f a depression node is presumed to be necessary and 
sufficient to cause depressive affect (Ingram, 1984), however the information processing 
model postulates a somewhat different set of cognitive processes and mechanisms which 
act to maintain the depressive affect. The depression node is viewed as a central part o f 
certain cognitive networks with associated linkages to various other units in the network. 
Due to the associative nature o f the networks, it is thought that other units will be the 
representations o f past events associated with depression. In addition, cognitions that 
were related to past depressive feelings would also be linked to the network. These 
particular memory units will in turn be linked to other units with which they have become 
associated through past experiences, however the strongest associative links will be with 
the memory units representing the present depressing situation.
The concept o f  spreading activation maintains that, when the depression node is 
activated above the threshold, activation spreads through the depression-associated 
network, causing its various contents to become more likely to be brought to conscious 
awareness. This presumably may set up a "cognitive loop” process where thoughts, 
memories, and associations consistent with an individual’s mood become more accessible 
to the individual (Clark & Isen, 1982). Importantly, due to the depression node being 
relatively central to this particular network, it is thought that as activation cycles through 
the network, it is eventually fed back (though at a slightly lower level due to signal decay).
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causing the depression node to remain activated. For the person experiencing this, it is as 
if negative memories and cognitions keep coming back again and again to consciousness, 
thus maintaining the depressive feelings.
Important to the present study is the notion o f “available cognitive capacity.” As 
activation spreads it is \newed as occupying a proportional amount o f the person’s 
available cognitive capacity. With greater magnitudes of activation, there are greater 
levels of spreading activation and more associations in the network are activated above 
consciousness. As those associations are activated above threshold and the person begins 
to actively think about them, a larger proportion of the limited capacity is engaged. 
Consequently, persons undergoing a depressive episode will have a high degree o f 
attention focused upon themselves and their cognitions as available capacity becomes 
increasingly occupied by spreading activation (Ingram, 1984).
Ingram illustrates this process with the following example. Suppose an individual 
has just lost an important Job. It is assumed that this loss will activate the person’s 
depression node, which in turn sends activation spreading throughout its associated 
network. In other words, in addition to the initial depression that the individual feels, he 
will think about losing the job and will be more likely to think about past depressive 
experiences (as depression-associated memory nodes are activated). As more and more 
associations become activated, related past cognitions that are related to depression may 
be experienced (e.g., guilt, self-degradation, low self-esteem). Thus, as the individual has 
depressive cognitions, the depression is maintained as activation is recycled back to the 
depression node.
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When presented with a task or new information, not only is adequate available
cognitive capacity necessary to attend to it but the incoming information is addressed
according to its similaritv to the person's current cognitive contents. The implication of
this is that, unless the new task or information is unusually strong (to exceed activation
threshold), information that is not particularly relevant to current cognitive content will
not be processed (or not fully processed) because it is not associated with the presently
active network (i.e., it is not related to the depression-associated network and is more
related to networks that are presently inactive!.
Evidence for this limited cognitive capacity or “limited resource” hypothesis has
found support from studies o f memory and aging and mixed groups o f bipolar and
unipolar depressives (see King, Caine, & Cox, 1993) and other studies o f self-focused
attention (Ellis, 1991; Ingram, Lumry, Cruet, & Seiber, 1987; Lemelin, Baruch, Vincent,
Laplante, Everett, & Vincent, 1996).
Other related and empirically-supported hypotheses posited to explain depressives’
poor attentional (and memory) performance are: automatic versus effortful processing and
the reduced initiative hypothesis. First articulated by Hasher and Zacks in 1979 (see King,
Caine, & Cox, 1993), effortful and automatic processing are distinguished by processes
that are either intentional and conceptually driven (effortful) or automatic and “data
driven” (automatic). These processes are usually apparent in explicit versus implicit
memory tasks, where explicit memory tasks are effortful and implicit memory tasks are
automatic. Explicit memory tasks are those in which recall and recognition are assessed
directly with the person being conscious of the task and requiring conceptual processing
(e.g., recalling a word within the context of a list). In contrast, implicit memory tasks do
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not necessarily involve the person’s awareness and are thought to be an unconscious
activation o f an item (e.g., a word) in the person’s lexicon that subsequently makes the
item more accessible to consciousness.
Studies o f implicit versus explicit memory indicate that depressed individuals are 
generally more impaired versus controls on explicit (i.e., effortful) memory tasks. For 
example, in an extensive review of such studies Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, and Dykman 
(1993) concluded the following: (I) Depression interferes with effortful processing, and 
the degree o f interference is determined by the degree o f effort Ailness o f the task, the 
severity of depression, and the valence of the stimulus material to be processed; and (2) 
depression interferes only minimally with automatic processes.
The reduced initiative hypothesis stipulates that depressives’ poor attentional 
performance is due to a tendency to be self-focused and to fail to direct sufficient 
attentional resources to an external task. For example, Channon, Baker, and Robertson
(1993) found that deficits in short-term memory of depressed patients was the result of 
difficulties in attentional regulation, rather than a “simple defect in storage capacity.” In a 
dramatic demonstration o f this process Hertel and Rude (1991 ) showed that, by 
experimentally eliciting increased “focused attention”, they were able to improve memory 
scores of depressed patients such that it matched the performance of formerly depressed 
(i.e., recovered) patients and non-psychiatric controls. Thus, these studies would suggest 
that attentional resources o f depressed patients, given the right conditions, might be 
shifted “outward” to focus on external tasks.
Another hypothesis investigating the effects of depression on cognition is that o f 
selective attentional, or negative bias. It is hypothesized that depressives have enhanced
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memory (and possibly attention) for negatively toned material (King, Caine, & Cox,
1993). For example, on memory tasks depressed patients remembered anxiety-provoking
information more vividly and “agreeable” information more poorly than did controls
(Mialet, Pope, & Yurgelun-Todd, 1996). A study by Pace and Dixon (1993) supports this
hypothesis. In a study examining the effects of 6-8 sessions o f Beck’s cognitive therapy
on mildly and moderately depressed college students’ depressive symptoms and depressive
self-schemata, results demonstrated not only that depressives show a clear preference in
recall for negative self-referent judgments, but that brief cognitive therapy can significantly
decrease that negative bias.
In 1989, Schwartz and Garamoni described an information-processing model of 
positive and negative cognition, the States o f Mind (SOM) model. Based on the “golden 
section proportion”, an extensively studied phenomena in personal construct psychology 
whereby individuals differentiate dichotomous judgments in a ratio o f approximately 
61.8% to 38.2% (e.g., in a balance o f positive (P) and negative (N) adjectives, 
P/(P+N)=.618), the States o f Mind model proposes five distinct states o f mind that are 
conceptualized in terms o f cognitive balance and quantitatively defined by homeostatic set 
point ratios of positive cognitions to total positive plus negative cognitions.
The five states o f mind consist o f three SOMs (positive dialogue, internal dialogue 
o f conflict, and negative dialogue) that retain a dialectical interaction between positive and 
negative thoughts and two SOMs (positive monologue and negative monoloeuel that are 
imbalanced positively or negatively to the degree that they virtually abandon a dialectical 
process. Each SOM is defined its ratio o f positive to negative cognitions. The most 
optimal state of mind, positive dialogue, is characterized by a ratio o f  .618 positive
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cognitions to .382 negative cognitions. It allows a general positivity in cognition and
mood while preserving maximal attentiveness to negative, threatening events. The
individual with this SOM will readily recognize negative cognitions and likely engage in
sufficient facilitory self-talk and positive coping strategies to alleviate distress.
Negative dialogue is a SOM characterized by a ratio of .382 positive cognitions to 
.618 negative cognitions. Individuals with this SOM maintain a background o f  continual, 
moderate negativity such that, when negative events occur, they are less shocking and 
more easily assimilated into existing structures. Such persons are usually observed to be 
moderately anxious or depressed. The system strives to maintain a “preferred” (or 
homeostatic) level o f dysphoria or fear.
The internal dialogue o f  conflict SOM is characterized by symmetrically balanced 
structures such that the ratio o f positive to negative cognitions is .50. This results in equal 
salience o f positive and negative information as well as maximal uncertainty, a state that is 
not optimal as it is associated with indecision and doubt. Clinically, it may manifest as 
mild levels o f anxiety, depression, and obsessionality.
Positive monologue is one of the SOMs characterized by a ratio that is 
asymmetrical to the degree that a dialectical process is virtually abandoned. It consists of 
positive cognitions with a ratio of .69 or more. In this state, positive thoughts and feelings 
exceed the optimal balance. Ratios in these ranges (i.e., that are monologic versus 
dialogic) are inherently unstable, and there is a tendency to strive toward a more balanced 
and less extreme dialogic SOM. Clinically, this excess o f positive cognitions may manifest 
as mania or hypomania. With rising positivity, there is reduction in uncertainty at the
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expense of a loss o f salience o f  negative events. Consequently, important threatening
events may go unnoticed to the detriment of the individual.
At the other end o f  the spectrum is the negative dialogue SOM characterized by 
positive cognitions at a ratio o f .31 or less (and negative cognitions at .69 or more). 
According to Schwartz and Garamoni (1989), this SOM is not as enduring as the other 
states of mind (especially the dialogic SOMs) and is more transitory, which may explain 
the tendency for some severe unipolar depressives to experience spontaneous remission. 
The negative monologue is usually associated with extremely severe psychopathological 
states and is characterized clinically by profound depression or acute panic. It is 
qualitatively distinct and exhibits “distinct structural and information processing 
properties. In addition to its hypothesized instability, there are “internal and external 
pressures” exerted on the individual to move towards more positive thinking - to 
reestablish a more balanced, dialogic SOM (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989).
Garamoni et al. (1991) found support for the States o f Mind model in a study of 
39 outpatients with major depression. Correlational analysis confirmed that the balance of 
positive and negative affective symptoms (P/(P+N)) in this sample closely approximated 
the golden section (i.e., 0.37). More recently, Nasby and Russell (1997) investigated 
whether the States of Mind model could successfully differentiate between Vietnam 
combat veterans who suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and Vietnam 
combat veterans who did not. After matching the groups by combat exposure and 
controlling for general psychopathology, their results demonstrated more maladaptive 
SOM in PTSD veterans than combat veterans without PTSD.
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Psychophysiological Measures
In addition to  neuropsychological measures o f  cognitive performance to ascertain 
differences in depressives, psychophysiological mechanisms can also be assessed and 
compared to controls. As a component of their study on focused attention, Hertel and 
Rude (1991) incorporated a reaction time component to assess participants' mental 
demands. Reaction time to an auditory signal was assessed and found to be significantly 
slower in the depressed group. Moreover, reaction time was not affected by increases in 
attentional focus, though it was in the control group (i.e., increased attentional focus 
improved reaction time in controls).
Psychophysiological studies which are particularly relevant to attention are those 
of evoked potentials and contingent negative variation (CNV). Evoked potentials are 
waves of cerebral electrical activity arising in response to a sensory stimulus (auditory, 
visual, or somesthetic). These potentials can only be observed by repeating the stimulus, 
averaging several repetitions, and subtracting the background noise of the 
electroencephalogram (BEG). The early components o f the evoked potential (i.e., before 
100 milliseconds) are usually linked to characteristics o f  the stimulus, however 
components which arrive later are related to the attention which the stimulus has aroused. 
For example, the evoked potential commonly used is the "P300" (positive deflection, 300 
ms) component. At the level of the P300, studies o f depressed patients unanimously show 
a reduction in amplitude (Mialet, Pope & Yurgelun-Todd, 1996). Yee and Miller (1994) 
compared dysthymies to anhedonic and normal controls on P300 evoked potentials and 
found that dysthymic individuals are hyporesponsive at various stages o f information 
processing. Yet it was unclear whether they were deficient in the amount o f available
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attentional resources for information processing or deficient in the allocation o f those
resources.
In addition to P300 potentials, recent studies have attempted to utilize changes in 
the attenuation o f  the "N2 Vertex wave" in participants during a selective attention task 
(Mialet et al., 1996). Changes observed are suggestive o f a deficit o f the "attentional 
trace" at the initial stage o f information processing (El Massioui, 1988). Mialet et al. 
(1996) interpret these changes as evidence o f limited availability o f attentional resources in 
depressed patients, thus constraining them to "mobilize controlled attention for operations 
that would normally be easily handled by automatic processing.”
Contingent negative variation (CNV) consists o f  a slow negative potential which 
develops in the frontal regions o f the brain during the interval between an alerting stimulus 
and a response and represents the physiological correlate o f anticipation in a motor or 
mental performance (Mialet et al., 1996). In summarizing the findings o f  CNV in 
depressives, Mialet and colleagues report a clear decrease in the amplitude o f the CNV 
and an association o f CNV with relative insensibility o f depressives to contextual 
(environmental) cues.
Additional studies investigating speech (larynghographic recordings), eye 
movements, and visual tracking in depressives have also revealed impairment, lending 
additional support for the hypothesis of an overall reduction in depressed patients' 
attentional performance (Mialet et al., 1996). In fact, Mialet and colleagues compare 
attention in depressives to that o f schizophrenic patients, stating that depressives display 
an "impoverished intensity" o f attention rather than an impaired ability to orient their 
attention.
Depression and Anxiety 147
Cognitive Processes in Anxiety 
As reported earlier, there is ample support for an adverse effect of anxiety states 
on cognitive performance, however there are studies which have actually reported equal or 
better performance o f  anxious individuals over controls on cognitive performance 
(Dibartolo, Brown, & Barlow, 1997; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). To attempt to account for 
the discrepancy in findings, Eysenck and Calvo (1992) developed the processing efficiency 
theory of anxiety. Processing efficiency theory conceptualizes state anxiety as the crucial 
factor determining individual differences in internal processing and performance. Eysenck 
and Calvo (1992) assert that state anxiety is determined through an interaction o f trait 
anxiety and situational threat or stress, however they also note that it is often difficult to 
distinguish between trait and state anxiety empirically because they both correlate very 
highly (often 0.70 or higher). Thus, many studies do not attempt to disentangle the two 
forms.
Two components of anxiety, worry and emotionality, are identified in processing 
efficiency theory. Emotionality refers to an individual’s awareness o f the physical aspects 
o f anxiety (e.g., increased heart rate, or sweating), whereas the worry component consists 
o f self-preoccupation, concern over evaluation, and concern over level of performance 
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). The worry component is viewed as occupying the cognitive 
component of state anxiety, and it is hypothesized to play an integral role in the 
articulatory loop of the working-memory system devised by Baddeley (1986; see Eysenck 
& Calvo, 1992). Baddeley’s working-memory system consists o f three components, all 
having limited capacity: a modality-free central executive resembling attention, which is
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involved in active processing; an articulatory loop specializing in rote verbal rehearsal used 
for temporary storage of verbal information (often involving subvocalizations); and a 
visual-spatial sketch pad specializing in visual and/or spatial information. The central 
executive is considered the most important component o f the working-memory system, 
and it is used on tasks that require planning or decision making and as a problem-solver 
when lower processing systems seem inadequate.
According to Eysenck and Calvo (1992), the worry component of anxiety is not 
only thought to consume some o f an individual’s valuable processing and storage 
resources, but is also thought to serve a motivational fonction via a “control system”. 
Importantly, the fonctioning o f this control system leads to an allocation of additional 
processing resources (i.e., effort) and to the initiation o f processing activities (e.g., 
strategies) designed to improve performance, especially when the person perceives their 
performance as poor (or is given feedback to that effect). I f  successful, such attempts at 
allocating additional resources increase available working memory capacity and may, in 
fact, improve performance provided there are not undue demands placed on their overall 
resources (elaborated further below).
A fundamental theoretical distinction set forth in processing efficiency theory, one 
which seeks to explain the inconsistent findings in other studies o f anxiety and 
performance, is that between performance effectiveness and processing efficiency. 
Performance effectiveness simply refers to the quality of task performance (as in test 
scores), whereas processing efficiency refers to the relationship between the effectiveness 
of performance and the effort, or amount of processing resources, invested. This
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relationship is defined as performance effectiveness divided by effort, though “not in a
strict mathematical sense” (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992).
Processing efficiency theory differs from other theories of anxiety and performance 
in a number of ways. First, worry has motivational as well as attentional interference 
effects. Second, the motivational effect is generally positive in that it leads to increased 
effort or compensatory strategies. Third, the notion that the effects of anxiety on 
performance differ from the effects on performance efpciency is unique to this theory. 
Fourth, anxiety affects both the storage and the processing capacity of the working- 
memory system which are available for task performance, rather than simply the storage 
capacity of short-term memory or attentional resources as hypothesized in other theories. 
Finally, at a conceptual level it is assumed within other theories (see Eysenck & Calvo,
1992) that stressful situations or threats cause anxious individuals to respond relatively 
passively with self-preoccupation, which either interferes with attention to task-relevant 
processing or motivates them to avoid the task, thus reducing on-task effort. Performance 
efficiency theory, on the other hand, assumes that anxious individuals respond to stressful 
situations dynamically. They worry about possible aversive consequences but try to avoid 
them by allocating further resources to the task, however that strategy can only be useful 
to a point given the finite resources available at any given time
To elaborate, when presented with a simple task, anxious and non-anxious 
individuals are roughly equal in the amount of attentional resources required for the task. 
However, when task demands increase, the amount o f  attentional resources required by 
each begins to diverge. The central executive (of the anxious individual) begins to direct 
additional resources to the task, and if the individual is aware o f poor task performance.
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he will begin to worry (in the articulatory loop) about adverse consequences o f his poor
performance and will be motivated to improve that performance. This motivational
function entails the allocation of further resources (i.e., effort) and processing activities
(i.e., strategies) in an attempt to improve performance. This compensatory response may
lead to improved performance but not always. Objectively, task performance, as
measured by test scores, may not reveal any significant differences between anxious and
non-anxious controls unless secondary (concurrent) tasks are employed to further tax the
capacity of the available resources. It is then that differences are often detected,
highlighting the anxious individual's re-distribution o f resources in an effort to compensate
for poor task performance. Numerous confirmatory studies have been conducted on
performance efficiency, utilizing ever-inventive research strategies to uncover this
underlying process (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Elliman, Green, Rogers & Finch, 1997;
Dibartolo et. al, 1997).
Eysenck and Calvo (1992) outline the following predictions o f the processing 
efficiency theory, all o f  which are supported by empirical studies cited in their monograph; 
(I) Anxiety typically impairs processing efficiency more than performance effectiveness, 
and (2) adverse effects o f anxiety on task performance generally become stronger as task 
demands on working memory capacity increase. The implications of the first prediction, 
also supported empirically, are as follows:
(a) highly anxious participants should report higher levels o f subjective effort than 
low-anxious participants on comparable tasks
(b) anxiety will typically have an adverse effect on a secondary task performed 
concurrently with a primary task
(c) anxiety will reduce spare processing capacity (assessed by responding to 
probes) during the performance o f a central task
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(d) motivational factors enhancing effort typically benefit the performance o f  low- 
anxious individuals more than high-anxious individuals
(e) the performance o f a central task will be adversely affected by an additional 
load to a greater extent in anxious than in non-anxious groups
(f) impaired processing efficiency produced by anxiety can be detected by 
lengthened processing time (e.g., response or reaction time)
(g) the greater impairment effect o f anxiety on efficiency than on effectiveness can 
be detected by psychophysiological measures
The second prediction by Eysenck and Calvo, that adverse effects o f anxiety on 
task performance generally become stronger as task demands on working memory 
capacity increase, includes the following empirically supported implications:
(a) the effects o f anxiety on task performance depend on the amount o f 
resources required by the task (measurable by the susceptibility o f that task 
to interference by a concurrent load)
(b) anxiety reduces temporary storage capacity
(c) anxiety has powerful adverse effects on tasks with high storage and 
processing demands
(d) anxiety does not generally impair performance on tasks not involving the 
central executive and/or articulatory loop components of the working- 
memory system (e.g., undemanding or automatic tasks)
Processing efficiency theory has held up well under empirical scrutiny. As recently 
as 1997, Elliman and colleagues examined the effect o f anxiety on three groups o f anxious 
individuals consisting o f low, medium, and high anxiety. Participants performed a high- 
processing load measure o f sustained attention, including accuracy and response scores, 
and basic measures o f psychomotor performance. Results revealed that high levels o f 
anxiety were associated with longer response times and a decline in performance accuracy. 
Since all participants performed equally well on basic psychomotor speed, the researchers 
were able to demonstrate that the increase in response times was unique to the high- 
anxious group. In other words, high-anxious individuals used more processing capacity
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(and thus more response time) than their lower anxious counterparts. Thus, they were
performing less efficiently as they attempted to maintain similar levels o f  performance.
Finally, in a study by Dibartolo and colleagues (1997), participants with 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) were compared to normal controls on two 
information processing signal detection tasks. The first task consisted o f  neutral 
distractors, and the second consisted of administering negative feedback cues. GAD 
participants evidenced impaired performance on the first task, however they unexpectedly 
improved on the second task to match normal controls despite reporting significantly 
higher levels of worry and negative affectivity. Dibartolo and colleagues interpreted this 
finding as demonstrating Eysenck and Cal vo’s ( 1992) concept o f motivational functioning 
within the articulatory loop and central executive. In other words, they believed GAD 
participants experienced increased worry about their performance and consequently 
reallocated additional resources to the second task condition. Thus, improving their 
scores.
Presumed Anatomical Basis for Attentional Processes 
Drawing on earlier work conducted with schizophrenia and other disorders 
affecting attention, Mirsky (1987) postulated that attention could be subdivided into a 
number o f different elements, including the capacity to focus on or select some aspect o f 
the environment, the ability to sustain or maintain focus for a period of time, the ability to 
encode or manipulate information held in memory, and the ability to shift adaptively from 
one aspect of the environment to another. These four elements o f attention (focus- 
execute, sustain, encode, and shift) can be measured by a variety o f neuropsychological
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tests of attention. In a study conducted through the Laboratory of Psychology and
Psychopathology o f  the National Institute of Mental health (see Culbertson & Krull, 1996)
a factor analysis was used to analyze a battery o f neuropsychological tests thought to be
sensitive to various aspects o f attention. The analysis yielded four factors which
supported the aspects o f attention proposed by Mirksy (1987). As reported by Culbertson
and Krull (1996), the factor associated with the "focus-execute" component was related to
perceptual motor speed and loaded on such tests as Trail Making (Reitan, 1979), a letter
cancellation procedure, a measure similar to Coding from the Wechsler scales (Wechsler,
1990), and the Stroop test (C.J. Golden, 1978). The factor associated with the "sustain"
element of attention was vigilance and loaded on scores from a Continuous Performance
Test (omissions, commission errors, and reaction time; Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason,
Bransome, & Beck, 1956). The "encode" element was best captured by a factor loading
on numerical or mnemonic tasks, as on Digit Span and Arithmetic from the Wechsler
scales. Finally, the "shift" element o f attention was measured best by a factor loading on
flexibility, as measured by scores from the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton,
1981).
Mirsky (1987) integrated the neuropsychological testing data and findings from 
previous neuroanatomic studies to arrive at descriptions o f the neuroanatomic localization 
o f the elements o f attention. The following functional specialization was suggested: The 
"focus-execute" function is likely shared by superior temporal and inferior parietal 
cortices, as well as by structures that make up the corpus striatum (including the caudate, 
putamen, and globus pallidus). The motor component o f the execute function is felt to be 
mediated by the inferior parietal and corpus striatal regions of the brain. The "sustain"
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function o f attention is thought to be mediated by rostral structures, including the tectum, 
mesopontine reticular formation, and reticular and midline thalamic nuclei. The 
"encoding" function is believed to be accomplished by the hippocampus, which provides 
an essential mnemonic function required for some aspects o f attention. Finally, the ability 
to “shift” attention from one aspect o f the environment to the other is supported by the 
prefrontal cortex. As Mirsky observed, this attentional system within the brain is very 
widespread and, therefore, quite vulnerable so that damage or dysfunction in any one of 
these brain regions can lead to specific deficits in attentional function.
Purpose o f Study
Depression and anxiety are encountered on a frequent basis in psychological and 
neuropsychological patient populations (Sweet, Newman, & Bell, 1992), therefore it is 
paramount to have an adequate understanding o f the impact o f these conditions on 
cognitive processes. As mentioned previously, decreased attention can have significant
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implications for psychotherapy by limiting the patient’s ability to attend to, incorporate,
and apply therapeutic principles and insight. For the neuropsychologist, it is crucial to
appreciate the role o f emotional distress in impaired attention to help clarify its
contribution versus CNS injury.
Empirical studies exploring the relationship of emotional distress and
neuropsychological test performance are a relatively recent trend and results have been
mixed due to various methodological problems (e.g., not using standardized measures,
inadequate diagnostic specificity, small sample sizes; Sweet et al., 1992). Furthermore,
the very notion of emotional distress exerting a significant impact on attentional processes
has been called into question (Reitan & Wolfson, 1997).
The present study seeks to determine the impact o f differing levels o f anxiety and
depression on attentional performance in both patients with neurologic insult and those
without. It represents a unique contribution to this area of research due to its large sample
size, use o f standardized measures, and diverse patient population characterizing a rich
array o f presenting etiologies within the context o f a large academic medical center.
Based upon the existing literature reviewed, the following research questions and
hypotheses were generated.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Since patients were routinely administered the MMPl as part o f a flexible 
neuropsychological battery, MMPl t-scores on scales 2 (Depression) and 7 
(Psychasthenia) will be used to assess severity levels o f anxiety and depression. Analyses 
will then be conducted on the group as a whole, followed by analyses on neurologic (i.e..
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some evidence of neurologic insult) and non-neurologic (i.e., no evidence o f neurologic
insult) patients. The following research questions and hypotheses are posed:
1. Which neuropsychological insirumenis seemed to best measure attention in th is 
sample?
What is the factor structure of the purported neuropsychological measures o f  attention 
in this sample? Which measures appear to best assess the construct known as attention? 
What is the relationship, if any, to Mirsky’s (1987) attentional model? Which instruments 
appear to be the most useful to include in subsequent analyses with this sample? It is 
expected that the factor structure o f test scores in this sample will closely match that o f 
Mirsky’s factor structure (i.e., the four factors: focus-execute, sustain, encode, and shift). 
It is also expected that the tests found to load most highly on attention components will be 
those identified by Mirsky or tests roughly equivalent within the test battery used with this 
sample.
2. Do legal cases differ significantly on attention performance from  the sample a s a 
whole?
Does having a legal case pending cause a patient to perform significantly different on 
neuropsychological measures of attention compared to the rest o f the outpatient sample?
If indeed this is the case, patients with a legal case pending will be selected from the 
sample and analyzed separately. Sweet and colleagues (1992) identify motivational 
variables and malingering as potential confounding factors in investigations o f 
neuropsychological performance. Of the studies reviewed for this study, it was unclear as 
to how significant legal status affected attention performance on neuropsychological tests. 
It is expected that, o f  those presenting for neuropsychological evaluation due to a legal
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case pending, motivation levels and blatant attempts at malingering will be sufficiently
varied as to not represent a significant confound in this outpatient sample. Thus, it is
expected that no significant difference will be found from the overall sample, and it will be
possible to include their scores in subsequent analyses.
3. What is the relationship between depression and attention in the outpatient sample? 
What is the relationship between scale 2 MMPl t-scores and the neuropsychological
measures of attention administered to this outpatient sample? The information processing 
approach (Ingram, 1984) predicts that depression significantly impairs attentional 
resources. Therefore, it is expected that scale 2 MMPl t-scores will be significantly 
correlated with attention measures, such that increasing depression results in poorer 
attention performance.
3b. What is the relationship between depression severity level (Low and High) and 
attention in this outpatient sample?
When scale 2 MMPl t-scores are divided into Low (D > 45 and D < 55) and High 
(D > 70) Depression, while controlling for anxiety (Pt < 60), what relationship exists with 
attention measures? It is expected that higher depression levels will result in fewer 
attentional resources being available for attention-demanding tasks, therefore higher levels 
should result in significantly poorer attention performance than lower depression levels.
4. What is the relationship between anxiety and attention in this outpatient sample? 
What is the relationship between scale 7 MMPl t-scores and the neuropsychological
measures of attention administered to this outpatient sample? Processing efficiency theory 
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) predicts that anxiety places increased demands on attentional 
processes such that more effort is required for attention tasks than is normally required.
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However, it is sometimes difficult to detect this increased demand on attentional resources 
empirically. Consequently, studies have been mixed in finding attentional deficits due to 
anxiety. Nonetheless, with this large sample it is expected that scale 7 MMPl t-scores will 
be significantly correlated with attention measures, such that increasing anxiety results in 
poorer attention performance.
4b. Whai is the relationship between anxiety severity level (Low and High) and  
attention in this outpatient sample?
When scale 7 MMPl t-scores are divided into Low (Pt > 45 and D < 55) and High 
(Pt > 70) Anxiey, while controlling for depression (D < 60), what relationship exists with 
attention measures? Processing efficiency theory predicts that increasing levels o f  anxiety 
place more and more demands on attentional processes. Therefore, it is expected that 
higher anxiety levels will result in significantly poorer attention performance than lower 
anxiety levels.
5. What relationship exists with attention when depression and anxiety severity levels 
are both High, and both Low?
When scale 2 and scale 7 MMPl t-scores are both High (D and Pt > 70), what 
relationship exists with attention measures? Similarly, when scale 2 and scale 7 MMPl t- 
scores are both Low (D and Pt > 45 and < 55), what relationship exists with attention 
measures? Vanderploeg, Kizilbash, Curtiss, and Schinka (1998) reported significant 
(detrimental) effects on memory by depression compounded with anxiety. Moreover, 
effects were stronger with high levels versus low. Therefore, it is expected that similar 
effects will be obtained with attention performance.
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6. When the sample is divided into two groups according to neurologic status, is  there a  
sigtuficant difference on neuropsychological measures o f  attention?
It is expected that, by virtue o f their neurological insult, neurologic patients will 
evidence significantly more impairment on neuropsychological measures o f attention.
6b. Are there significant differences in depression levels fo r  neurologies versus non­
neurologics?
Are there significant differences on scale 2 MMPl t-scores between neurologic and 
non-neurologic groups? As Reitan and Wolfson ( 1997) observe, intellectual and cognitive 
impairment represents a stressful situation that can cause emotional difficulties with 
awareness of one’s reduction in ability from previous levels o f  functioning. It is expected 
that this sample will be no different. Neurologic patients should report higher levels of 
depression than non-neurologic patients.
6c. Are there significant differences in anxiety levels fo r  neurologies versus non­
neurologics?
Are there significant differences on scale 7 MMPl t-scores between neurologic and 
non-neurologic groups? Anxiety and depression are frequently comorbid conditions 
(Vanderploeg et al., 1998), therefore it is expected that a number o f  depressed neurologies 
will likely evidence concomitant anxiety. Consequently, it is expected that neurologic 
patients will report higher anxiety levels than non-neurologic patients.
6d. Are depressed tieurologics more affected on attention measures than non-depressed 
tteurologics?
When neurologies are separated by depression level (D > 70), is there a significant 
difference in performance on measures of attention? It is expected that neurologies will.
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as a group, evidence impaired attention due their neurologic insult. According to the
information processing approach, depression will also impair attention performance.
Therefore, it is expected that depression will impair attention over and above that existing
due to the underlying neurologic condition.
6e. Are anxious neurologies more a ffeded  on aiteniion measures than non-anxious 
neurologies?
When neurologies are separated by anxiety level (Pt > 70), is there a significant 
difference in performance on measures o f attention? In keeping with processing efficiency 
theory, it is expected that anxiety will impair attention over and above that existing due to 
the underlying neurologic condition. However, it is recognized that processing efficiency 
has stated that attention deficits will not always be revealed due to increased effort by 
anxious individuals to perform better.
6f. Are depressed non-neurologies mare affected on attention measures than non­
depressed non-neurologies?
When non-neurologics are separated by depression level (D > 70), is there a 
significant difference in performance on measures of attention? It is expected that 
depression will impair attention performance as predicted by the information processing 
approach.
6g. Are anxious non-neurologics more affected on attention measures than noit-anxious 
nott-neurologics?
When non-neurologics are separated by anxiety level (D > 70), is there a 
significant difference in performance on measures of attention? It is expected that anxiety
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will impair performance in non-neurologics, however it is also recognized that anxiety
deficits are not always revealed according to processing efficiency theory.
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Method
Setting and Participants
The data for the study will be gathered retrospectively from the records o f patients 
who had been referred to the Neuropsychological Assessment Laboratory at the 
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, University o f Oklahoma Health 
Sciences Center (OUHSC) between 1955 and 1997. The Neuropsychological Laboratory 
at OUHSC receives approximately 300 referrals per year for neuropsychological 
assessment from neurology, tumor clinic, epilepsy clinic, attorneys, and other allied 
professions. Assessments usually consisted o f a flexible battery o f tests (i.e., a core battery 
of tests given to all patients plus additional tests added by the neuropsychologist based on 
the patient’s presenting problem or etiology). Tests were administered by a Master’s level 
psychometrist, pre-doctoral intern, post-doctoral fellow, or neuropsychologist. Testing 
time varied according to patient but was generally between 3-8 hours with appropriate 
breaks to prevent fatigue effects. Participants will be individuals referred for 
neuropsychological evaluation that completed valid MMPI’s (Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) and 
were at least 18 years old. For the years 1963 through 1997, 1,654 completed MMPI’s 
were available, with the majority encompassing the years 1977 through 1997. Use of the 
MMPl was discontinued in 1992, in favor of the MMPI-2. In the total sample, there were 
701 (58%) MMPI’s and 508 (42%) MMPI-2’s administered.
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O f the 2,942 cases in the database, 1,209 (4 1.1%) participants were
selected for analysis. Demographic information for this sample is presented in Table I
below.
Table 1
Demographic Information for Participants
Variable Mean SD
Age 42.01 16,61
Education 13.20 2.81
Frequencies Percent
Gender
Male 673 55.7
Female 536 44.3
Ethnicity
Caucasian 1079 89.2
African American 76 6.3
Native American 21 1.7
Hispanic 6 0.5
Asian American 5 0.4
Other 3 0.2
Unknown 4 0.3
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Measures
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory - 2"** Edition (MMPI-2; Butcher, 
Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989), a widely used tool in the assessment of 
emotional/personality functioning, will be utilized for the present study. Basic scales 2 (D; 
Depression) and 7 (Pt; Psychasthenia) will be used as a measure o f  depression and anxiety, 
respectively. Participants will be eliminated if they had MMPl T-score elevations above 70 
on L or K scales, or above 80 on F. Similar procedures were utilized by Vanderploeg et 
al. (1998).
Measures of Attention 
Digit Span
WAJS-R Digit Span (Wechsler, 1987) scaled score Forward and Backward raw scores. 
Digit Span consists of two parts: Digits Forward requires the subject to repeat sequences 
o f three to nine digits; Digit Backward sequences are two to eight numbers long, and the 
subject must say them in reverse order (Spreen & Strauss, 1998). Moderate correlations 
have been achieved with the PASAT, RBMT (Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test), 
WMS scores, CVLT, TPT (Tactual Performance Test) Memory, and numerous other tests 
utilizing attention and memory.
Visual Memorv Span
WMS-R Visual Memory Span (Wechsler, 1987) forward and backward raw scores. The 
Visual Memory Span provides consists o f two cards on each o f  which eight squares are 
printed in a nonlinear pattern, red squares for the forward span and green for reversed
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span. Administration procedures are the same as for Digit Span, requiring two trials at
each level regardless o f whether the first was passed (Lezak, 1995).
Mental Control
WMS-R Mental Control (Wechsler, 1987) consists o f (I)  counting backwards from 20 in 
30 seconds; (2) reciting the alphabet in 30 seconds; and (3) counting from 1 to 40 by 3’s 
in 45 seconds. Its attentional component is ^consistently attested to by factor analytic 
studies” (Lezak, 1995).
Digit Symbol
WAIS-R Digit Symbol (Wechsler, 1987) scaled score. Digit Symbol is a symbol 
substitution task consisting o f four rows containing, in all, 100 small blank squares, each 
paired with a randomly assigned number from one to nine. Following a practice trial on 
the first seven, the task is to fill in the blank spaces with the symbol that is paired to the 
number above the blank space as quickly as possible for 90 seconds (Lezak, 1995).
Among other functions such as psychomotor speed and visuomotor coordination, it is a 
measure of focused attention, requiring the individual to reject irrelevant information while 
attending to relevant input (Spreen & Strauss, 1998).
Symbol Digit Modalities Test
Symbol Digit Modalities Test (Smith, 1991) oral administration raw score and written 
administration raw score. This test preserves the substitution format of Digit Symbol but 
reverses the presentation o f  material so that the symbols are printed and the numbers are 
written, enabling the individual to respond with the more familiar act of number writing.
It also allows for a spoken response trial. As with Digit Symbol, 90 seconds are allowed 
for each trial, however there are 110 items instead o f  100 (Lezak, 1995). Although Lezak
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(1995) maintains that this test primarily measures complex scanning and visual tracking,
Spreen and Strauss (1998) include it as a measure of focused attention.
Trail Making Test
Trail Making Test (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) Part A time in seconds and Part B time in 
seconds. The individual must first draw lines to connect consecutively numbered circles 
on one work sheet (Part A) and then connect the same number o f consecutively numbered 
and lettered circles on another worksheet by alternating between the two sequences (Part 
B; Lezak, 1995). Trail Making is a test involving focused attention, motor speed, and 
complex visual scanning (Lezak, 1995; Spreen & Strauss, 1998).
Finger Tapping
Tapping (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) dominant hand mean number o f  taps and nondominant 
hand mean number o f taps. Finger Tapping consists of a tapping key with a device for 
recording the number o f taps. Each hand makes five 10-second trials with brief rest 
periods between trials. The score for each hand is the average for a set o f five trials that 
do not vary more than 5 taps (Lezak, 1995) The test taps motor speed and manual 
dexterity and is sensitive to the presence and laterality of brain lesion (Lezak, 1995;
Spreen & Strauss, 1998).
Grooved Pegboard
Grooved Pegboard (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) dominant hand time in seconds and 
nondominant hand time in seconds. Grooved Pegboard consists o f a  small board 
containing a 5 X 5 set o f slotted holes angled in different directions. Each peg has a ridge 
along one side requiring it to be rotated into position for correct insertion. The score is 
time to completion, and its complexity makes it sensitive for measuring general slowing
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and progression o f disease processes, and by assisting in identifying lateralized impairment 
(Lezak, 1995).
Conners’ Continuous Performance Test (CPTl
Conners’ Continuous Performance Test (CRT; Conners, 1995) number o f hits, omission 
errors, commission errors, and hit reaction time. The Standard CPT in Conners’ program 
requires the individual to press the appropriate key (e.g., space bar) for any letter except 
the letter X. There are six blocks, each with three 20-trial sub-blocks. For each block, the 
sub-blocks have different interstimulus intervals; 1,2, or 4 seconds. Each letter is 
displayed for 250 milliseconds. The CPT assesses lapses in attention or vigilance and 
impulsivity (Spreen & Strauss, 1998).
Seashore Rhvthm Test
Seashore Rhythm Test (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) total errors. The Seashore Rhythm Test 
is the most widely used test for nonverbal auditory perception. It also consists o f 
concentration and tracking components. It requires the individual to discriminate between 
like and unlike pairs o f musical beats.
Speech Perception Test
Speech Sounds Perception Test (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) total errors. This test consists 
o f 60 sets of nonsense syllables each beginning and ending with different consonants but 
based on the vowel sound “ee.” It is administered by tape recording, and individuals must 
note what they think they heard on a four-choice form laid out in six 10-item sections 
labeled A to F. Since it is a rapidly paced test, it is thought to be sensitive to attentional 
deficits (Lezak, 1995).
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WMS-R Attention/Concentration Index
WMS-R (Wechsler, 1987) Attention/Concentration Index score. This score is derived 
from the WMS-R Digit Span, Visual Memory Span, and Mental Control subtest scores. 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test fWCST)
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, et al., 1993) number correct, number of 
errors, number o f perseverative responses, number o f categories completed, and failure to 
maintain set. This test is designed to assess the ability to form abstract concepts, to shift 
and maintain set, and utilize feedback (Spreen & Strauss, 1998). It consists o f four 
stimulus cards (or representations o f cards on a computer screen), red triangle, two green 
stars, three yellow crosses, and four blue circles. The individual is asked to match each of 
64 cards, which have designs similar to those on the stimulus cards, varying in color, 
geometric form, and number, to one o f the four key cards and is given feedback each time 
whether he or she is right or wrong. There is no time limit.
Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT)
Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT; Gronwall, 1977) total errors on each of 
trials 1-4. The PASAT is a serial-addition task used to assess capacity and rate o f 
information processing and sustained and divided attention. The individual is required to 
comprehend the auditory input, respond verbally, inhibit encoding o f his or her own 
response while attending to the next stimulus in a series, and perform at an externally 
determined pace. A prerecorded tape delivers a random series o f 61 numbers from 1 to 9. 
The individual is instructed to add pairs o f numbers such that each number is added to the 
one that immediately precedes it: the second is added to the first, the third to the second, 
the fourth to the third, and so on. The same 61 numbers, given in the same sequence, are
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presented in four different trials, each trial differing in its rate o f digit presentation (2.4,
2.0, 1.6, 1.2 seconds).
Stroop Color and Word Test
Stroop (Golden, 1978) Word score. Color score, and Color-Word score. This test is a 
measure of selective attention and cognitive flexibility was originally developed by Stroop 
(1935). A number o f versions have been developed, but the one utilized here is the 
version developed by Golden (1978). In Golden’s version, three cards are used consisting 
of 100 items on each. On the first card, the individual is asked to read the color words 
(red, green, or blue) printed in black ink as quickly as possible for 45 seconds. On the 
second, the individual reads the color o f ink, each item consisting o f “XXX” as quickly as 
possible for 45 seconds On the final card, the individual must name the color in which the 
color words are printed and disregard their verbal content (i.e., inhibit the natural urge to 
read the word).
Word Fluencv
Benton Word Fluency (Benton, Hamsher, & Sivan, 1994) total number o f  words 
generated. The purpose o f this test is to evaluate the spontaneous production of words 
beginning with a given letter (C, F, and L; or F, A, and S). The individual is asked to 
produce orally as many words as possible, for each letter, given a 60 second time limit for 
each trial. The score is the combined total for the three trials added to an education 
correction factor.
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Category^ Fluencv
Animal naming (Goodglass & Kaplan, 1987) total number of words. This test serves the 
same purpose as Word Fluency, however on this task the individual is confined to a 
category and asked to produce as many animal names as possible within 60 seconds.
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Results
Analyses will be conducted using SPSS 9.0 (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences - Version 9.0). Participants will be selected from the overall sample if they 
completed valid MMPI’s, defined as t-score elevations below 70 on scales L or K, or 
below 80 on scale F (Vanderploeg, et al., 1998).
Descriptive statistics will be performed to examine variables for errors, number o f 
cases, measures o f central tendency, variability, and shape of distribution. Results will be 
described in Table form. Data will be recoded as necessary.
Next, a correlation matrix will be constructed to explore the relationships between 
emotional distress (MMPI Scales 2 and 7) and attentional measures. This will be followed 
by a factor analysis to identify the neuropsychological tests that best assess attention in 
this sample and which attentional construct or factor they appear to measure.
A Multiple Analysis o f Variance (MANOVA) will be conducted to determine if the 
participants with a legal case pending (N=I78 or 14.7%) differ significantly from the 
overall sample. If it is determined that they may skew the data, they will be removed from 
subsequent analyses.
A series o f canonical correlation analyses will be conducted to determine the 
extent to which attention measures contribute to prediction o f depression scores and to 
prediction of attention scores in the overall sample.
Next, canonical correlation analyses will be conducted to determine which 
attention measures contribute to prediction o f severity level of depression and severity 
level o f anxiety for the overall sample. Severity levels will be determined using the same 
procedure used by Vanderploeg et al. (1998; see below).
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The sample will be subsequently divided into two groups according to neurologic
status (presence or absence o f documented neurologic injury). In each o f these
MANOVA analyses, the attention scores will be the dependent variables and MMPI t-
scores on D and Ft will be the grouping variables. Next, a series of two MANOVAs will
be conducted by dividing the entire sample (both neurologic and non-neurologic) into
groups that scored high versus low on the MMPI D and Pt scales in the following manner:
“High Depression” = T-score on D > 70, T-score on Pt < 60, (N = ?),
“Low Depression” = T-score on D > 45 and < 55, T-score on Pt < 60, (N = ?);
“High Anxiety” = T-score on Pt > 70, T-score on D < 60, (N = ?), “Low Anxiety”
= T-score on Pt > 45 and < 55, T-score on D < 60, (N = ?); and
“High Depression and Anxiety” = T-score on D and Pt > 70, (N = ?), “Low
Depression and Anxiety” = T-score on D and Pt > 45 and < 55, (N = ?).
Next, a series o f MANOVA’s will be utilized for additional group comparisons to
answer the remaining research questions. This will be followed by separate analyses
utilizing “version o f MMPI administered” as a covariate to explore potential confounds o f
using both versions in the same dataset.
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